A "SOLDIER'S-EYE-VIEW" OF OUR ARMIES



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BY

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Celui qui vent bien connaître son métier ne peut guère connaître que son métier la vie est superio et l'art compliqué.



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PREFACE

NEVER before has the whole world wondered more anxiously what the immediate future is about to bring forth. Is the Lion of War really going to shed his teeth and his claws and be henceforth classified as a domestic animal that can be caged and controlled? If not it may not be altogether futile for a soldier to enunciate some form on which to found his imaginings of a future military state.

We are at this moment a Nation in arms. Is it possible for us to lay the foundations of what many of us have long desired but which we have never had the courage to create, a real National Army. We are not as a nation lacking in either physical or moral courage. Let us now take ours in both hands and seize an opportunity which may never recur.

It is not easy to define in a few words what is meant by National Army. It may help us if we begin by saying what we do not intend to signify by the expression. We do not, for instance, mean a force built on the lines of what is known as militarism; neither do we mean a force which is either second to, or the shadow of, what has been up till now known as our Regular Army.

A nationalised army must be one founded on equality of opportunity and the policy of the open door. It represents a treasury maintained by a tax in kind on the time of every able-bodied male citizen. The voice of the people deciding the amount and incidence of the taxation. No bar should exclude those who desire to become officers so long as they are able to satisfy the tests laid down by our rulers; nor should conditions be forced on them which would debar them either from entering the officers' ranks of the National Army, or living there in comfort without private means.


Once satisfy the nation that it is their Army and that it is an institution in which the balance of power is held level for all classes and you will remove much of the opposition, which undoubtedly exists on the part of Labour, to any form of military compulsion.

And what about our Regular Army? So long as we maintained professional soldiers in our Colonies so long did their local forces remain inert and inefficient. The Regular Army is paid to serve beyond the seas, and it is not therefore economical to employ it on home service. Our splendid Expeditionary Force was one of the finest and best trained armies the world has ever seen. At the same time had we on the formation of our Territorial Force boldly informed the country that we were going to rely entirely on our Citizen Army for

its protection, which might involve service beyond our shores, there can be no doubt that it would have been a very much more efficient force than it was in 1914.

Having put our National Army well in the foreground of our military picture with the Regular Army in the middle distance, let us now complete the landscape of Imperial Defence by a strong background representing our Dominion and Indian Forces, while above the distant horizon are seen some of the clouds of custom and tradition which have too long obscured from our view the sunshine and blue sky of a brighter future. Our Imperial Forces have been united by a common cause during several years of arduous and adventurous work. Are we going to allow the massive wall we have created to crumble for the want of the necessary cement?

The above is in the main what I have endeavoured to place before my readers in the following pages. It has been said that every nation has the government it deserves to have. We shall without doubt have the Army we deserve.



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"SOLDIER'S-EYE-VIEW" OF OUR ARMIES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

EVERY profession does well if it from time to time ponders over its own particular pathological condition, and although it must be admitted that attempts at healing maladies seldom entirely succeed, nevertheless in every case where such attempts are made, public opinion is to some extent rectified, and insidious ills are not permitted to gain the mastery they otherwise might.

The Army of to-day is for the moment a national one, and our hope is that it may always remain so. The Church of the nation, if it is not to shrink into the dimensions of an austere and exclusive sect, must also be nationalised. Both these professions have therefore need for a closer touch with the nation than they have ever felt before.

Some consider that the Church has so far failed in its desire to become national because it did not in the past rightly interpret the signs of the times, and was not therefore prepared for the change in mentality which would inevitably result from the awakened intellect of an educated nation. A too rigid insistence upon a uniform clerical type, which was considered the only one from which the hierarchs of the Church could be chosen, tended to produce a priesthood many of whom were out of touch with the masses. The independence which springs from increased mental activity prompted these to seek for spiritual leaders and advisers who were more closely united with their home life and part of them-Men who had been born in their midst and were in real fellowship with them and their friends. The lesson is one that has a grave significance for those who may have to undertake the formation of our National Army. There is still plenty of room in the Church for priests who have been educated at Oxford and Cambridge. There will also still be plenty of room in our National Army for officers educated at Woolwich and Sandhurst. The two latter should not, however, be the only gates of entrance for those seeking a military career. Moreover, the favours formerly extended to those who possessed property or social advantages should in future be equally shared with those who have but slender means but are blessed with superior practical education and better intellectual capacity. During the war men of all classes have gained commissions in our Army. The majority will return to civil life. Some, without private means, may, however, desire to persevere in the profession of a soldier. Under pre-war conditions this was in the majority of cases quite impossible. Is it to continue to be impossible

or are we going to discover a way out of the difficulty? To find the correct answer to this question is as difficult as it is important.

Over four years of the most sanguinary and devastating war of all time has awakened the dormant martial instincts of our race, and have drawn us together from all parts of our Empire. The gulf which separated the different classes has also been bridged and the many cases of promotion of working men over the heads of their wealthier neighbours has taught us an impressive object lesson in the best spirit of democracy. What effect this experience will have on our future aspect of any form of militarism can only be dimly surmised. A review of the past may, however, enable us to avoid some of our previous mistakes preliminary to undertaking the construction of what must be a National Army. We are about to enter upon a new epoch in the life of our nation. Our old Army with its glorious past records and its splendid traditions will have to give way to one of more recent birth, but more representative of the whole nation. The days of a ruling and privileged class which was alone considered fit to occupy the position of leaders are gone. Education is fast creating an open career for talent. past campaign has taught us that those gifts which make leaders of men are by no means the private property of any particular section or class.

When something quite new and original has to be designed you do not employ an architect or designer who has for years been turning out a standard pattern which he believes to be the best, perhaps the only

type, that can be of any real value. In making our new Army we should avoid old grooves and old prejudices and cease to worship fetishes which the war has overthrown. Our Army is about to become a really national institution. It must no longer be a thing apart from the life of the people. The old Conservative, who has for so long represented many of the best, and some of the worst, traditions of our Army is doubtless waiting to lead it back into captivity. Time will show whether he succeeds or whether the more liberal spirit introduced by the war will be too strong for him.

It is possible, perhaps even probable, that we may in the near future see a Labour Ministry in office which will not be content with a mere finger in the Army pie, but will interest themselves in its size, shape, and contents. Property and Vested Interests have each had a long innings and have good scores to their credit. A change in the bowling may cause both for a time to retire and so allow Unaided Talent some chance of scoring. There will be some hard hitting and some of our old ideas and past traditions will be dispatched to the boundary, a few may perhaps be included in the list of extras.

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We might perhaps with advantage take a lesson from Agriculture and try a rotation of crops. Our present crop has been a good one, but not necessarily the best produceable. In clearing the land for the next crop we shall dig many weeds which are too deeply embedded in the soil to be extracted by the ordinary means of mere surface cleansing.

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Some relics of feudal times still lingered in our Army. No one was supposed to be fit to occupy the position of an officer unless he lived in a certain style and spoke with an approved accent. Much of the happiness of the first few years of a young officer's life depended on the amount of his private means. The kind of life forced upon him reminded him at every turn of the advantages of property and taught him the apparent hopelessness of success in the Army without a good income.

The overgrowth of perpetuated privilege with its resultant power has made itself clear in the case of our cavalry, whose insistence on young, and at the same time propertied, officers has culminated in their holding nearly all the most important and best paid positions in our Army. The pre-eminence gained by an oligarchy of officers of this arm, seems almost to discredit Euclid's up till now undisputed axiom that the whole is greater than the part. This state of affairs, if tolerated, would have been unfair enough in peace, the largely enhanced salaries of wartime has magnified the seriousness of the injustice. If our Army is going to be planed down to the corresponding democratic level of the majority of our other national institutions there must be no sectarian and plutocratic domination. The handicap conferred by comparative wealth is a sufficient one without increasing it by placing in the hands of its fortunate possessors the power of indefinite multiplication. Let us be perfectly honest, or at any rate try to be. We no longer live in the days when the military historian recorded only the deeds of those who made

it worth his while. We are justly proud of the part played by all classes of our race, male and female. Who can single out a particular class for special praise or censure?

If then our National Army in whatever form it may appear is to be really national it must be representative of and popular with all sections of society. It should be the Sun of our whole Imperial Military System, as on it we must rely for our national existence. It must be loved, cherished, and understood by the whole nation as a dear member of its family. Among nations who have possessed National Armies for varying periods this is the attitude we see, and although there may be from time to time a few discordant notes, the general refrain is one of harmony especially so in countries where it is the people who retain their guidance and control of National affairs in their own hands. In no period of our history have we had a better chance of laying the foundations of our National Army on firm rock. We have the experience of a long war to guide us in building the edifice, and have not to collect second-hand information from our neighbours. The Army has ceased to be a small professional clan composed of elements which were in no way representative of the bulk of the nation, controlled by a body of experts bound by past traditions, whose horizon was a very limited one. What we desire in the future is national control counselled by expert advice, with the object of bringing the Army and military institutions of the country close to the nation. Allow the country to clearly understand the points at issue so that it may decide how they are to be settled.

Military economy, military education, dress, and promotion in their different branches have become matters of national concern which should be clearly understood by the public. In the Army of a people it is essential that each class of that people should feel that it has a place in the Army. Then, and only then, will the Army win the confidence of the whole nation. The ideal that the posts of highest command are to be filled by the men with the greatest minds can only be realised if we hold the balance level between rich and poor, and insure that real merit irrespective of rank or station is both recognised and rewarded.

Why was there such a prejudice against our Regular Army among what may be termed the comfortable classes of our nation? Many reasons may be given. In the first place it was not their Army. They had little or no place in it.

The Regular Army consisted of two main groups, patricians and proletaires. The officers were patricians, or patricianists; the men almost entirely proletaires. Between these two extreme poles of the social system there was no shading off. A gulf separated the two classes.

Until this gulf ceases to exist we shall not have an Army which the nation trusts with its whole heart and supports with its whole strength.

Another reason may have been that although our Regular Army was, what for a better term we may describe as fashionable, among the rich, it was far from being so among the poor.

In countries where compulsion is in force the unworthy and the second-rate are rejected, and this system of selection at once raises the reputation of an Army.

In England it was not a case of selection but of doing the best with what was received. A German professor once remarked that from an economic point of view our method of recruitment had at least one advantage over the system existing in his country. Whereas the Germans only took the best and strongest and increased their strength, the English took the starving and the unemployable and converted them into useful citizens. An overstatement with enough truth in it to justify the attitude towards the Army of the classes we were most anxious to attract.

Again the Regular Army offered very little career to an intelligent and ambitious man without private means. If he gained a commission the conditions of life imposed upon him made it next to impossible for him to live in the Army on his pay. He could become an officer in two ways, either by the usual channels through Sandhurst, Woolwich, or one of the Universities, etc., a course open only to a man of means; or by going through the ranks, a slow, tedious process which robbed him of the best years of his life, and often proved a serious handicap to his future career.

If he performed long and faithful service to the State as an N.C.O. or as a private soldier, giving to it the best years of his life, in practically forced celibacy, facing all climates, and enduring years of

expatriation, what did he receive from his grateful country in return? He had practically no vote, was a member of no organised political society, and could obtain no redress. Why wonder therefore that service in the ranks of our Regular Army was not popular, and that in spite of the great effort, made with a considerable degree of success, to raise the standard of living, and to improve the selfrespect of men in the ranks, a deep-seated mistrust prevented the mothers of our nation from having that pride in their soldier sons which is so vital to the life of a truly National Army. Turning over the page of past history and regarding existing facts as they stand revealed, at the commencement of this war we had undoubtedly in one direction at least cause for considerable satisfaction. So far as the upper ranks of our Army were concerned we could point to as clean an administration as that of any Department of the State. There was not in our Army a single really eminent soldier who had started his career backed by great social influence, or by great wealth. No officer held a high position at that time who had not proved himself to be worthy of his trust, and who was not prepared to make his profession his first object in life. Any officer entering the Army with ambition, moderate ability and determination, had a more reasonable chance of success than in most professions. The door was open to all; but was it wide enough open?

One section of the opponents to any form of National Service was composed of those who saw, or professed to see in it, another means to enable the rich and powerful to enslave the poor and weak. They, with some show of reason, regarded the Army as a body from which political bias was by no means absent. They feared a powerful weapon which would be, from their point of view, entirely in the hands of their rivals. Whatever foundations such fears may have, in fact, we shall be wise in taking some steps to remove them. Some think that the Church of England has lost considerable opportunities in the past owing to its having shown a leaning towards one party, perhaps we may go further and say towards one class. Let us not fall into the same error with regard to our Army of the future.

Many of our clergy are in favour of the abolition of that negation of Christian principles, payment for seats in church, a custom for which we as Christians, and not our clergy, are for the most part to blame.

Special privileges are as harmful in Public Service as they are in Public Worship. Let us therefore not only make it easier for the man without private means to enter the upper ranks of our Army, but let us insure that having gained a commission he may be able to live with happiness and comfort in his position. Up to the present the avenue of approach to an Army career has been a severe uphill obstacle course for the poor man, a smooth gently descending slope for the man of property.

To imagine that any steps taken in this direction will at once place at the head of our Army a number of men drawn from a social stratum lower than that of those now occupying the seats of the mighty is

pure vanity. A community which has for generations been taught the power which such social levers as good manners, tact, and a commanding bearing confer, is not likely to be easily dispossessed of what it has so far regarded as its birthright. On the other hand, a very superficial study of the lives of Napoleon's Marshals lays bare the fact that the most ardent and indigent republican very soon adapted himself to an aristocratic environment when he rose to high estate and gathered wealth. Until men become angels, so it will always be. In these days of well-diffused education with its resultant crop of young, human plants rising from new seed, as opposed to grafts of old stocks, we must be careful not to narrow our choice by trampling on the newly planted saplings before they have had time to establish themselves firmly in the soil.

Much can be done to prove that we are in earnest in our endeavours to found our Army on a truly democratic basis, and that the principle of equality and opportunity is going to be kept honestly in view.

CHAPTER II

OUR REGULAR ARMY-PAST AND PRESENT

Any proposals to introduce methods, which if put in practice might enable officers without private means to live in our Army on their pay, as they can, and do do, in nearly every continental Army would probably be met by the remarks: "Were not our young officers before the war good enough?" "What splendid work they have done!" "I don't see how you can improve on them." "Much better leave well alone!" And so forth. Though in entire agreement with these anticipated ejaculations they are not quite to the point.

We are about to consider a National Army, and an essential to its success is that as many sections of the community as possible should feel that they have a close personal interest in it, and are properly represented. As long as a man who possesses all those qualities which promise success in the profession of a soldier is practically excluded because he has no private means, things are not as they should be. There is no wish to handicap the well-to-do, the aim in view is to equalise the chances of success so far as this is possible.

Hitherto it has been deemed an essential towards the formation of an officer, that he should be passed

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through a kind of professional mould. Part of this process consisted in forcing him into a certain mode of life which necessitated his expending his salary in an extravagant manner.

We want to put ourselves in the position of a poor man who is anxious that his sons should follow the profession of their father, perhaps that of their grandfather and great-grandfather as well.

As a first step it is possible he may have to send

them to a crammer.

This should not be necessary if they have been at a public school with a good military side. There are, however, cases in which the crammer is necessary. The next serious expense occurs on the boy

getting into Woolwich or Sandhurst.

He has, under existing conditions, to keep him for the two years he is a cadet, when he has to be provided, amongst other things, with a uniform which is no use to him on joining the Army. On obtaining his commission he has to pay for an outfit whose cost is far in excess of that of any other European Army and which the State makes no effort to reduce.

Finally, he has to make his son a private allowance to enable him to live in his regiment, unless the boy is clever enough to get into the Royal Engineers, Indian Army or some other department in which it is possible for him to exist without private means.

Is all this expense necessary? How much of it can be avoided? This is what it is proposed to discuss in the present chapter. The proposals made later to establish cadet schools at which students

would be prepared to pass the final examination of Woolwich and Sandhurst, the curriculum of which it is proposed to make identical, would save parents the expense of the long training which the Woolwich and Sandhurst cadets at present have to pass through. The technical and practical part of the course would be much better taught to them on joining their units.

The technical training of Cadets after they have been promoted second lieutenants with temporary commissions would be undertaken by the respective branches of the Service to which they had been appointed, and would in the opinion of many of us be much more soundly and rapidly carried out than is at present the case.

The measures necessary to reduce the cost of officer's initial outfits and to enable them to live on their pay when commissioned are next dealt with. The object of these measures is—

(1) To secure as good value as possible for the officer in return for the money he has to expend.

(2) To save him all unnecessary expense and to allow him to live as his means admit. Not interfering with his private life so long as he performs his

public duties in a satisfactory manner.

In most professions a considerable number of the second and third generations gradually ascend the social ladder. Many public servants, for instance, are able to start their sons at a higher rung than the one they commenced to climb from. The faithful and capable clerk may become in time the junior partner. But how few of the sons of our best Warrant and N.C.O.'s are able to get their well-educated sons commissions in an Army except by going through the ranks. The difficulty is almost entirely one of money. No matter how careful a boy may be, it is impossible for him to live on his pay in the Regular Army in England—under existing conditions.

Take, for instance, the case of a young man, well-educated, of good physique, a typical leader of men, with the further recommendation that his father has fallen fighting for his country. He is anxious to become an officer. He has everything to recommend him but money. His only means of entering the Army is by passing through the ranks and possibly wasting some of the most valuable years of his life in sterile routine.

It is useless to remind us that there have been cases in which men who have passed through the ranks have achieved eminence in our Army. Their case merely proves what can be achieved by men who would have won distinction in any profession.

Up to about the sixties our Regular Army might almost have been described as a playground for the rich. Even in our day whatever difficulty they may have in getting into heaven, the wealthy have very little trouble in getting into our Army; none in remaining there. And why not? There was no harm in the Golden Calf. It was when people began to worship him that the sin was created. It is not the rich who do the harm in our Army, but those who meanly admire and endeavour to imitate them. All their poorer comrades are asking for is what

schoolboys used to say when some fortunate companion has annexed something especially good, "Halves!" Little girls to insure the impartial division of an orange have devised the well-known formula, "You divide and I choose."

When, however, the same side both divides and chooses the other finds itself in possession of the pips and the skin. Let us have a fair division of our orange and then the choice of halves will be a matter of no importance. Too many of the prizes in our Army have in the past fallen to the men with the large handicaps. Too few to those starting from scratch and below that figure.

We still have a scale of merit which is too much graduated according to property. At the conclusion of the war we shall have a rare opportunity of placing matters on a more equitable basis. The foundation of some Secondary Military Schools open to the sons of men of all ranks who had fallen in the Service of their country would enable us to, to some extent, repay a debt of honour which the country owes to its noblest citizens. The Education would be provided at the expense of the State to boys who desired to become officers. Entrance would be by competitive examination after attaining a nomination. These latter would be in the hands of the War Office and County Associations. Before competing, candidates would have to appear before a Selection Board to test their fitness to become officers. In the selection for nominations, to avoid suspicions of favour, marks might be awarded on a fixed scale. For instance, if the boy's late father had died in the

performance of some gallant act for which he had been awarded a V.C., D.S.O., M.C. or D.C.M., etc., he would receive marks accordingly. Marks would also be awarded for such qualities as physique, general intelligence with any certified records in the boy's favour from former masters.

Suppose the age of entrance to be 14: up to 16 might be devoted to a general education with a few Military subjects, such as drill, rifle-shooting. languages. At the end of this period, from 16 to 18. the boy would pass into the Upper or Secondary Military School, having the same curriculum as Sandhurst and Woolwich under the proposed scheme. All candidates, whether from Sandhurst, Woolwich, or the Secondary Military Schools, competing at the same final examination for specialisation into a certain branch of the Service. Thus, from the Upper School he would pass straight into the Army, and so escape the two years' expenses of a Sandhurst or Woolwich Cadet.* One at least of these proposed Colleges might be started after the war, in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales.

By this means young men suitable in every respect for officers would be able to enter the Army without practically any expenses. We must also increase the number of commissions from the ranks by enabling a certain number of young N.C.O.'s to get commissions by passing a special examination.

^{*} There is nothing new in the proposal so far as the R.A. is concerned. The "Persons" at the time of the Crimean War, and a batch of officers in 1887, did not go to the R.M.A., Woolwich. Can any one to-day distinguish the goats from the sheep?

Marks in a certain proportion being awarded for their work as N.C.O.'s. This would both encourage a better class of man to enter the Army as an N.C.O., and would be another mode of entrance for young men suitable for officers, but unable to afford to go through Woolwich or Sandhurst.

On leaving the Military College and entering the Army some sons of fathers who had fallen fighting in particular regiments might be, so to speak, adopted by the latter. These young officers would have special concessions made to them and would enjoy certain privileges on the same principle as Foundation Scholars at Eton, Winchester, etc. For instance, they might be made Honorary Members of the Mess for life without entrance or subscription.

Having got our young officer his commission in

the Army let us help him to remain there.

The chief compulsory expenses of officers arise from two main sources. Clothing and Maintenance.

With regard to the former we desire two things—

- (1) Deliverance from the thraldom of the Military Tailor.
- (2) His replacement by an officers' branch of our Army Clothing Department, both able and willing to meet all the demands of our Dress Regulations.

When a young officer joins a regiment he is in many cases informed that it is customary for officers on joining that particular unit to get their clothes from Messrs. X., their boots from Messrs. Y., and their head-dresses from Messrs. Z.

He accordingly delivers himself into the hands of Messrs. X.Y.Z. for their profit and his loss. Any officer who has spent twenty to thirty years in our Army knows how much of his money has been wasted, I use the term advisedly, on uniform. The vagaries of our Clothing Regulations, the different climates we have to be prepared for, and our national extravagance, have all conspired to produce the most undesirable consummation. The Military Tailor has not been slow to profit by the opportunity. During a service of forty years I do not think that £1000 would be an extravagant estimate of what many of us have expended in uniform. This includes clothes, boots, head-dresses and accourtements. A considerable proportion of this expenditure being due to changes in uniform.

No army in the world was so expensively, and in some respects so senselessly dressed, as the British Army. Has any one ever seen anything to compare in hideousness and uselessness to the Infantry and Artillery helmet? Imagine any one in private life putting on such a head-dress for comfort or adornment. Our full dress is too ornate and much too expensive. The constant changes in uniform with regard to which few of the officers most concerned are ever consulted, would cease if those introducing them had to pay a percentage of the extra expense they too often thoughtlessly impose on the long-suffering army.

The following proposals are made:-

(1) To establish a well-managed officer's branch of the State Clothing Department, and to make it compulsory for all officers to make use of it.

(2) To allow no departures of any sort from the

sealed pattern, and to confine all changes introduced to stated periods, biennial, triennial, etc.

(3) To treat the clothing of our Army as a serious matter, not one to be entrusted to men who, though perhaps very worthy soldiers, have little or no aptitude for this special work. It seems unnecessary to confine the Members of the Clothing Board to soldiers, expert civilians might well be co-opted as members.

A large proportion of officers would gladly consent to the establishment of a good Officers' Clothing Department. A certain number might, however, demur at the idea of making the use of it

compulsory.

A few years ago an Army measure was introduced with a view-to reducing the expenses of officers on joining the cavalry. It enacted that all cavalry officers should be provided with chargers from the Remount Department. By means of this a saving of between £200 and £300 would be effected in the initial expenses of the young cavalry officer on joining his regiment. It was, however, foreseen that unless the regulations were made compulsory a certain number of commanding officers would evade them and practically insist on their officers continuing the old system of purchase, which meant their being provided with a very useless type of horse for which they had often to pay a fancy price.

It was very wisely, as many of us think, made compulsory for officers to ride Remount Department, in other words, Government, horses on parade. The wisdom of this step has been amply justified. Why cannot the same procedure be followed with regard to our uniform? Certain regiments might be made exceptions of, with regard to their full-dress uniforms, but no others allowed. Such a movement is only in keeping with the modern tendency towards monopolies of all kinds.

Even if not made compulsory, if some of our oldest and most respected regiments would set the example of going to the Clothing Department for their officers' outfits, others would soon follow the

fashion and our object would be achieved.

A well-conducted Sub-Department of the State, which would merely mean an extra branch added to the present Pimlico Clothing Establishment, would provide well-made uniform of the regulation pattern and of the best material at a fixed and moderate price.

There need be little difficulty about this, as uniform is a description of clothing that does not

lend itself to fantastical treatment.

Under the present system a young officer is often compelled to pay an excessive price for inferior clothing. If he happens to be a poor man who has to pay for his own outfit he starts his career hampered by a considerable debt which it may take him years to liquidate. Some years ago Military Tailors advanced money to certain cadets on a written promise that they would purchase their outfits from them on gaining their commissions. Some, no doubt, succumbed to the temptation. Had a Clothing Branch for Officers been then in existence, it would have been a benefit both to the cadets and to their

parents. A Military Tailor must, however, under present conditions, live, perhaps even thrive. He is naturally interested in the introduction of changes in every form of uniform, and if he cannot introduce some new garment will so alter the shape and form of an old one that the provision of a new one becomes imperative. Some years ago a frock coat was introduced for the infantry. The officers in the British Infantry Battalions in India had to provide themselves with it. To those acquainted with life in that country it is difficult to imagine any occasion on which an infantry officer can appear in this form of dress, which in many cases merely served to nourish moths and white ants.

If changes in uniform became necessary they should only be permitted at stated intervals, and after a thorough inquiry into how far they are necessary. Quite recently a minor change was introduced which had been so weakly thought out that considerable modifications had to be made soon after, thereby causing a considerable amount of trouble, and some quite unnecessary expense to the officers concerned.

Dress in our Army has been much too expensive. A heavy shower of rain will ruin a scarlet tunic which may have cost over £20. Officers who are quartered in India, and in many other stations abroad, have to be in possession of tunics, etc., which they are not likely to wear for more than three or four hours in a year.

Our Mess uniform might well be made simpler by leaving out the gold lace, without detracting from

its appearance. Under such circumstances a Government Department could probably turn out a jacket at about a quarter of the price we have to pay at present. Our Service dress is neat, comfortable, sensible and becoming. We shall have worn it for years on end; this for ordinary work, with Mess Dress and a dress for ceremonial occasions, should suffice.

Having reduced our officers' outfits to the dimensions of sense, let us see to it that what they have to get is provided in the cheapest and best form, that irksome and unnecessary changes are avoided, and that when changes are made they are for the better and not for the worse, as has too often been the case in the past.

This accomplished we shall have removed at least one obstacle which stands in the path of the young officer without private means—and a considerable one.

After this war we shall have become thoroughly accustomed to the sight of uniform. Now that it is both a comfortable and a suitable form of clothing it will be much more commonly worn than in the past. This will mean a considerable saving to officers who are not well off.

Maintenance.—Maintenance includes the compulsory charges a young officer has to meet on joining his regiment and living in it, such as messing, servants, band, etc.

The time seems to have arrived for a consideration as to whether Military messes in their present form are necessary as compulsory institutions. Those in favour of them claim that they are a good school in which to bring up young officers, and that in them regimental traditions and esprit de corps are fostered. This may be quite true, but is not the price we are paying too high?

If the price were paid by the State, well and good: unfortunately the existence of messes is one of the chief difficulties in the way of an impecunious officer

dependent upon his pay.

To give a man a certain amount of money and to tell him to do his best with it is sense. To make large deductions from his small stipend by forcing him to live a life for which he has not the means, seems to many of us the reverse of sense.

Messes have the following drawbacks:-

(1) If made compulsory they force officers dependent on their pay into an environment beyond their means, and encourage extravagant habits.

(2) They are wasteful of time and enforce what is practically an out-of-date parade. Officers who have to make their way in the world could employ their time more profitably.

That they are not necessary either for discipline

or efficiency the following facts go to prove :-

- (1) In no branch of the Service are young officers more strictly and carefully brought up than in His Majesty's Foot Guards. In London the Foot Guards have no Messes in the accepted sense of the word.
- (2) A married officer, no matter how short the period of his Service may be, cannot be compelled to dine at Mess.
 - (3) The Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps,

and R.A.M.C. have only Messes at their Headquarters, and a very few other large stations. Their efficiency has been abundantly proved during the past war.

(4) Lastly, Messes are a peculiarity of the British Army. No foreign Armies have them. At least not in our extravagant form. They have not been

adopted by our Dominion Armies.

Are they therefore a necessity? There is no reason to abolish Messes in the case of such regiments as may desire to maintain them, and they will always be necessary in India and most stations abroad. If officers can afford a certain mode of life, allow them to do so as they please. And if an officer elects to join a certain regiment he must be prepared to fall in with the wishes of the majority therein.

At the same time let there be some regiments into which a poor man can enter and exist. Let our home Messes be optional. Some may prefer to have them established on the restaurant system, either catering or contract. In such, an officer can obtain the meals he desires at hours that suit his mode of life, and at moderate prices. He has not a six-course dinner forced upon him, nor is he obliged to pay for it whether he partakes of it or not.

The continental system where the officers are allotted a couple of private rooms in one of the best hotels in their town, and where they can get what they want when they want it, seems well suited to the requirements of a poor professional man.

Messes are a survival of the days where the officers of the Army were rich men who paid for

even their commissions and their promotion. They have done a certain amount of good, but also a certain amount of harm. That some of us have passed very many happy days in them is not to be denied.

It is more freedom in Mess life than their total abolition that seems desirable. We have no right for the slender balance of advantages that they may be thought to confer to force them on those who are unable to afford such a mode of life.

We want more freedom in the social life and thought in our Army. Why should all be turned of the same mould and be made to think in much the same straight line? In ordinary life a man is allowed to select his own dining place. In the Army he is forced into a Military restaurant and is obliged to eat the dinner it provides.

There is another manner in which officers might be saved expense. Servants intended to be an amenity have been converted into an encumbrance by the custom of dressing them in plain clothes.

Leave to do this should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. As far as is known it is only in the British Army that the senseless custom is tolerated. Some officers can afford to dress their servant and groom in civilian clothes. Most young officers certainly cannot afford to do so. The Authorities should come to their aid and discourage the practice by either forbidding young officers' servants to wear anything but uniform, or limiting the privilege to do so to a certain number per unit.

The question of officers' servants has occupied

attention for some time. A system of having time-expired men in local employment in various barracks, and who can look after the wants of several officers, appears to have much to recommend it. There remains the difficulty of the supply of officers' servants for manœuvres and active service. At the conclusion of this war the question will no doubt be settled by the light of past experience. The employment of soldiers as servants has been the subject of inquiry in other armies besides our own.

Closely connected with Messes are Regimental Bands. Up to the present these have been paid to a large extent out of regimental funds. As long as the majority of the officers were well off and could afford the considerable "something" over and above what Government granted, all was well. question arises, Are battalion bands necessary or desirable? In India some of the recently raised battalions have decided to do without them. This is certainly wise if they cannot afford them. If bands were made optional it is probable that the majority of battalions would, from a conservative feeling, continue to maintain them. When, however, one considers how many years we have now done without them, also that they were never intended to go on active service, it seems to some of us that a good local Brigade Band would fulfil all peace requirements, leaving battalions with their fife and drum bands and their pipes.

The conclusion of the war appears to be a wellchosen moment to review the whole question of Military Bands, To sum up then. Let an officer be well-dressed at a reasonable cost, and encouraged to wear his uniform, let him not have expenses and a scale of living forced on him that he cannot afford, and let him be granted certain amenities, and there seems no reason why he should not be able to live on his pay during the earlier years of his career, until he has been able to lay his hand on some of the prizes of his profession.

The increase of amenities.—Like the possession of land, the possession of a commission in His Majesty's Forces carries with it certain amenities. First and foremost an officer on joining is always presented to the Sovereign and has the privilege of, from time to time, attending His Levées. His rank, especially if accompanied by the possession of some Order, gives him a more or less assured social position. He has also some small concessions made to him in the matter of travelling by rail, and of education for his children, provided he sends his sons to Wellington College, or is fortunate enough to get a King's Cadetship for them at Sandhurst. The fact of his being an officer so long as he lives up to his position gives him a certain standing.

Formerly an officer's rank counted for a good deal. In our day, however, the grant of substantive rank to the Administrative Services, to our Colonial and Territorial Forces, and also the colossal proportions of our present Army, have all contributed to increase the numbers of Captains, Majors and Colonels to such an extent that Military rank has very much depreciated in value. We must therefore

endeavour to replace some of those amenities of which an officer has been deprived by others which will be of real value, especially to a poor man.

A scheme for the education of the sons of officers and men who have fallen in the war has already been outlined, and we can only emphasise the wisdom and importance of enabling the descendants of families which have for generations fought in our Army, to continue in a profession for which they are so well fitted and for which they have done so much. The sons of every soldier, whether officer or private, who has fallen in the war, and who is in need of it, should be provided by the State with the description of education he had every prospect of receiving prior to his father's death. He should also on the completion of his education be offered a post under Government in accordance with his capabilities and fitness to fill it.

Mothers who have given sons, and widows who have lost husbands, should receive some public national recognition. What form this is to take can be decided later. In France, I have been told, relatives receive a certain kind of certificate acknowledging in the usual graceful terms of their beautiful language the gratitude of the country, the simple words, "La Patrie reconnaissante," which can be kept as a family heirloom of priceless value for all time. We should not miss our opportunity.* We

^{*} Mr. Herbert Baker's letter to the *Times*, 17th of November, 1917, under the heading "The New Heraldry," suggests a revival of the heraldic art, by the introduction of shields of honour to be handed down to the descendants of our country's defenders.

do homage to families who have done great things for our country in the past, in some cases in the very distant past. History is not always a reliable guide with regard to past National Services. Happily we do not require her aid in the cases of those who have made such great sacrifices in the present day, their claims need no proof. When our Army has become a thoroughly National one there will be little difficulty in securing positions for deserving officers, N.C.O.'s and men in posts suited to them. Certain Government appointments open to Sailors and Soldiers who have served their country well and faithfully should be defined and reserved for worthy incumbents.

In case of the nationalisation of the railways it will be possible to do more for the Navy and Army in the matter of travelling concessions. Many officers have no objection to travelling in third-class carriages so long as they are not travelling with their own men. At large military stations a certain number of "Officers' Carriages" might be provided for going to and returning from London in which officers could travel for third-class fares. No special tickets need be issued, but officers travelling in plain clothes should be provided with special certificates to prove their identity and to satisfy the railway authorities. All officers going for and returning from their annual long leave might be given free passes.

Another amenity which has been proposed is the issue of free rations to officers. These have, I understand, been given for some time to officers of the

Royal Navy. Had such a privilege been allowed to officers of the Army in pre-war days it is doubtful whether it would have been taken full advantage of. The Government ration would probably have been bestowed on the Mess servants, possibly eventually upon the Mess cat; or bartered in bulk to a local tradesman in exchange for some inferior but more ostentatious form of food. We are now accustomed to the word ration, and four years of war have taught us to recognise the value of good plain food. The grant of free rations to an officer, especially to a married officer, would be a great boon, and would go some way towards solving the difficulty which exists of enabling him to live on his pay. Even if Government does not grant free rations it might enable officers to purchase them at reduced rates. Estimating the value of the ration at 2s. a day, the total grant would amount to £36 10s. a year. Considering the increases in salaries which are being made in civil life, this would not be at all a disproportionate rise, and if compensation in lieu of rations could only be drawn in very exceptional circumstances, the allowance would have to be drawn nearly always in kind, and would thus constitute the real benefit it is intended to be to the officer who has to live on his pay.

We also require some good quarters for the widows of officers who have been left badly off, not apartments in palaces, but suitable homes for women who have been brought up in a certain environment where they can live in comfort surrounded by those who are in the same situation as themselves at a moderate cost and rent free.

When one considers the sums that have been spent in hideous memorials which are a continuous eyesore and profit no one, one cannot escape from the thought how much better the money could have been expended in these more useful objects. Many of us hope that the days of "Graven Images" are at an end. Surely we can find some better form of perpetuating the memory of those we desire to honour?

We also require schools for their daughters where they will receive such an education as will fit them to make their own way in the world and be independent of their mothers. The position of the women of to-day renders this more easy of attain-

ment than it has ever been before.

Some decades ago, within the memory of a few of us, an officer had to spend fr a month on the hire of furniture for his room. He received an allowance of fuel and light in kind which might or might not meet his requirements. He was regarded as the rightful prey of the Barrack Department, who always produced a bill for barrack damages at a moment when it was quite impossible to check the items. This malpractice was well known, but the fraud had become such a patent and recognised one, that it had come to be regarded in the same light as an incurable disease. The sum of these charges and abuses added up to a total of from £20 to £25 per annum, which had to be paid out of an annual income of froo. Since these bad old days many improvements have been made, but an inquiry into the expenses of the young officers of to-day will perhaps prove that much remains to be done.

With electric lighting, central heating with stoves and radiators to replace coal fire-places, a sufficient supply of essential furniture free of all charges, good bath-rooms, with hot and cold water, basins with hot and cold taps in each room, and a local attendant paid by the State, our officers should be able to live in comfort without incurring extra charges. If, however, any scheme of this sort is to be a success, commanding officers must take a much closer interest in, and a stronger line with regard to, the domestic comfort and well-being of their young officers than they have considered it their duty to do in the past.

CHAPTER III

THE TERRITORIALS

Owing to our vast colonial empire and to our unlimited responsibilities in all portions of the globe, we must always maintain an Army which is prepared to serve in any part of the world.

As no country can demand a service from her sons which expatriates them, this Army for duties beyond our shores, must always be maintained by Voluntary enlistment. It has been known to us as our Regular Army. Quite apart from this we must have an Army for the defence of our native land, fit to take part, if need be, in a great continental struggle. It is this Army we are now considering.

Partly owing to the unpopularity among the masses of, what has been termed, our Regular Army, and partly to the fact that our Regular Army was a thing apart from the lives of the people, our attempt to form a National Army, known as the Territorial Force, did not succeed in the manner it was expected to. There were other reasons for its failure—

(1) The Territorial Force had two serious enemies. The old Volunteer who felt that his generous gift of years of patriotic effort had been treated with ingratitude. The Compulsionist who saw in the

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success of the Territorial Force the death blow to his most cherished aims.

- (2) It was not fashionable among the classes which should have provided the officers and men. Its best chance of success would have been if its ranks had been difficult to enter, when commanding officers would have been in the enviable position of being able to select. Once resort had to be made to the highways for the men, and any who could be caught collected to keep battalions up to something approaching a respectable strength the force was doomed to failure.
- (3) Without some sort of compulsion life in the force became a life of shams. Everything in reason, and some things out of reason were resorted to to tempt men to enlist and to make the Force popular, even at the expense of discipline, training, and efficiency. The sites for summer camps, for instance, were chosen more with a view to the enjoyment of the men than for the benefit of their training. While considerable sums were spent in clothing and equipping the Force, little was obtained in return in the shape of trained and serious soldiers. A considerable number of men had joined very young under the pressure of persuasion, and were out to get all the advantages they could, and to give as little back as possible.
- (4) Nobody exactly knew what was to be expected of the Force. Most people pictured it along hedgerows manfully repelling invaders whom they did not in their hearts believe would ever be able to land on our shores. No Minister of the

Crown dared to tell the people that the Territorial Force would have to fight on the Continent opposed to the conscript armies of Europe. Very likely, in the light of what has been revealed, they did not guess that this might be possible. We had, indeed, nothing to guide us but the Valour of Ignorance.

In spite of all this the Territorial Force was a very great advance on anything we have ever had before to represent a National Army. Lord Haldane, who many of us regard as one of our best War Ministers, will always be gratefully remembered for his creation of the Territorial Force County Associations, which will remain the initial foundations on which to build a really National Army. In this great war the Territorial Force has done splendid work, and their respective counties have every reason to be proud of and grateful to their gallant and patriotic representatives.

It was not the officers and men of the Territorial Force who failed in August, 1914. It was their administrators. Where were the arms and ammunition which should have enabled them to complete their training? Had a good boarder scheme for the supply of horses existed, producing 100,000 trained and fit animals, one of the many difficulties in mobilising the fourteen Territorial Force Divisions would have disappeared. Unfortunately our Higher Command had never envisaged a scheme on such a scale, and for certain reasons were little interested in the success of the Territorial Force in which they had no real belief. This lack of faith in our

Territorial Force organisation led to the formation of Lord Kitchener's New Army, thus creating a rivalry which placed the Territorial Force at a serious disadvantage. The better plan would have been to have placed our existing fourteen Territorial Force Divisions in the field without delay, and to have at once raised fourteen more by means of the same machinery, thus utilising the County Associations which, with their past experience, and some strengthening by the War Office, would have met all requirements and saved time and expense. Neither trusted nor understood by the officers of the Regular Army. who had always been encouraged to regard it as recognised fraud, the Territorial Force was eventually made to take the field handicapped by several serious disadvantages. Its splendid men were commanded by gallant, but less experienced, officers than those in the Kitchener Army. The majority of the non-commissioned officers were only halftrained and quite new to their work. The divisions were armed with an inferior and obsolete gun, which did not fire a high-explosive shell, and with an outof-date howitzer for which the supply of ammunition was very limited. The rifle also was of an obsolete type, and owing to the shortage of ammunition, the men had not received the amount of training in musketry which gives a man full confidence in himself and his weapon. The number of machine-guns per division was less than in either the Regular or New Army. In spite of these depressing disadvantages the men displayed the finest fighting qualities and accepted their treatment without complaint, although

they were placed in some of the most difficult positions in the line of battle, and subjected to heavy shelling to which they could not, owing to weak gunpower and paucity of ammunition, make an adequate reply. This is no overstatement of the case, and to show how unjust and undeserved this treatment was I may add that in 1914 one of the best battalions I had in my whole division was a battalion of the Territorial Force, which had just come out from home, and which has at the present moment as fine a record as any in our Army.

Let us exert our imagination for a moment and picture the Territorial Force as having taken the field as an entirely separate body similar to the other Dominion Armies. For want of a better name we shall call them the "Territorians," and so place them in the same category with the Australians and Canadians. What would have been the result? Briefly this, that unless we are prepared to make the quite unfounded admission that the officers and men of the force were inferior in intellect and military capacity to the personnel of our Dominion Armies the "Territorians" would at the conclusion of the war have been commanded and staffed almost entirely by representatives from their pseudonymous tribe. Had we no members of the Territorial Force equal in capacity to Sir A. Currie and Sir John Monash and to a number of capable but non-professional generals commanding corps and divisions to whom our Dominions confided the care of their splendid men? If we had, where are they? If we had not, what is the reason for our apparent national

inferiority? Our Higher Command can no doubt answer these questions.

In the eyes of the pre-war regular soldier any individual who was unfortunate enough to be branded with the letters "T.F." could never rise from the depths into which these disqualifying tokens had plunged him. He had become a species of military pariah doomed to everlasting inferiority. Without wishing to minimise in any way our debt to our Regular Army, we must recognise that it was quite incapable of widening its view to the necessary amount. It had imprinted on its mind a certain type of officer and man and could see no good in, or have respect for, any other. The Army has always been a worshipper of the past; dominated as it has been by an arm noted for its conservative tendencies this defect has been magnified.* While applause was being won by the advocacy of young leaders we were bringing back from retirement old officers and reinstating them in our Army as we were apparently unable to find any young Territorial Force officers fit to be promoted. We are aware that the Territorial Force was merged into the Regular Army, and we shall probably be assured that no distinctions were made. If this be so we may be permitted to ask, out of 28 divisions which represented the Territorial Force original formation in

^{*} One often hears officers of the Army declaiming against trades-unionism. An introspective glance at what has been taking place in our Service during the last four years will convince any unprejudiced soldier that something very like it permeated our pre-war military mind.

our Army, how many Division and Corps Generals had been selected? Also if it were not a fact that at least one cavalry regiment has produced generals to the amount of half the officers serving with it at the commencement of the war.

It also seems reasonable to inquire whether men who had served for between four and five years on active service in the infantry and artillery in the Territorial Force were not capable of producing some officers fit to occupy the position of a Divisional General. They might well have found among their number some officers as fitted to command a force composed mainly of these two arms as those who had been trained in a mounted branch and had in some cases been transferred to command infantry brigades straight from their own arms with no experience of any other. Has any General ever been placed in command of a cavalry division who did not belong to that arm?

Although the Army had increased in size to such an extent as to practically include all the finest manhood of the nation, and had become a national institution, the military mind which directed its movements had made little or no expansion since the commencement of the war, and had even shrunk to a size which was limited to the mental product of a self-selected sect. Our Army in this respect resembled a human being which had grown up without its mind expanding in proportion to the increase of its body. The result was an unconscious endeavour to fit a national army into the old circumscribed framework of the pre-war regular one. Few officers

are now in high command (except in our Dominion Armies) who did not land in France or Belgium during the first six months of the war.

In the American Civil War a considerable number of Generals on both sides who won fame commenced the campaign without any military training, and the story will no doubt be repeated when the history of the present war is written. It seems singular that, with the exception of our Dominion Army, we should have failed to produce any examples of military eminence from among our non-professional soldiers. Can a sound National Army be built on such narrow foundations?

With the carefully selected and abundant staff officers now provided, the higher an officer ascends the less has he occasion to absorb his energy in technical minutiæ. War is merely a large business concern, and in all such undertakings it is the man with large views combined with the knowledge of men and the capacity to select his human implements that succeeds. Had we none such in our Territorial Force?

Turning from the past to the future it appears certain that our National Army must be constructed on much the same framework as the Territorial Force. This structure founded on a good system of cadet training, backed by a light form of compulsion equally and honestly enforced, would appear to meet all our national requirements, and would have the advantage of making clear to all what our actual fighting value as a nation was likely to be. This would tend to stability in our foreign policy, as our

value as a fighting asset could be with some degree of accuracy gauged, instead of being, as in the past, a very uncertain quantity. There is little doubt that it was this uncertainty about our actual war value which tempted our enemies into their recent venture. Had we possessed a really good National Army in August, 1914, the peace of Europe might have been preserved.

Through failure to enlighten the bulk of the nation with regard to the true political and military situation, and so to be able to exact from them a light form of compulsion, we have in the past allowed the finest fighting material in the world to remain totally untrained, and the physical condition of the manhood of our nation to remain a matter of unconcern to us. Men pronounced unfit by the medical authorities to serve their country would in time occupy a lower place in public estimation than those declared fit to act as the defenders of our homes.

Large sums of money were being annually wasted to support the Voluntary principle which was maintained by economic compulsion in the case of the Regular Army and by thinly disguised bribery in that of the Territorial Force.

The end of this war finds us equipped with all the requisites for the formation of a splendid National Army. Officers and men with war experience. Horses, clothing, equipment, arms, and ammunition in abundance. The task before us is to weld it into a warlike machine suited to our national requirements. To determine its strength, and the exact

weight of the burden that is to fall on each section of society.

We shall now take the training of the different arms of the National Army in detail. While we are fixing our annual quota steps should be taken to medically inspect the whole manhood of the nation, and all of the military age should be organised. Those unfit for military duties should have some other national duties assigned to them, so that the burden of national service may not fall entirely on the most virile portion of our youth.

Great care should be taken with the selection and education of the N.C.O.'s, and a certain number of the officers in the National Army should consist of promoted N.C.O.'s who have done a six months' training course and four annual trainings as N.C.O.'s.

We shall also have to form a strong reserve of young officers. We have not in the past devoted enough care to the selection and training of our junior N.C.O.'s. Their flow of promotion to the higher ranks should be quickened by a better system of promotion from the ranks, and once it has been made possible for an officer to live in the Army on his pay, and to gain his commission at an age when he has some prospect of rising to the higher ranks; we shall get better men, also when our Army has become a really national one a certain number of State posts will be reserved for both officers and N.C.O.'s of the Navy and Army who are capable of filling them. Once it has been made clear that certain Government posts will in future be filled by ex-sailors and soldiers, and towns, municipalities,

district and urban councils reserve certain posts for the purpose, the class of man entering the Army

as a profession will certainly be improved.

With the general spread of education the mentality of the men in the ranks of the Army is much higher than it has ever been before. This war has certainly taught us the value of schools of instruction for both officers and N.C.O.'s. The great difficulty in obtaining good N.C.O.'s for the Territorial Force was well known to those who had anything to do with the Force.

But most important of all we must take up very seriously the question of boy training. What is difficult to make the mothers of Great Britain believe is that the objects of military exercises are to procure the health and strength of their children, and to instil in their minds habits of order, punctuality and obedience, and not to inculcate in them a

spirit of aggressive militarism.

The great maxim of Lycurgus, the Spartan law-giver, was that as children belong to the State their education ought to be directed by the State, and the views and interests of the State only considered therein. It was for this reason he desired they should be educated all in common, and not left to the humour and caprice of their parents, who generally, through a soft and blind indulgence and a mistaken tenderness, enervate at once both the bodies and minds of their children. What was difficult to make mothers believe was that these hard and laborious exercises tended to procure their children's health.

BOY TRAINING, ANCIENT AND MODERN 45

If we go back still further to the time of the Persians under Cyrus, who overthrew the Babylonian

Empire, we read—

The public good, the common benefit of the nation was the only principle and end of all their laws. The education of children was looked upon as the most important duty and the most essential part of Government. It was not left to the care of fathers and mothers whose blind affection and fondness often render them incapable of that office; but the State took it upon themselves. Boys were all brought up in common after one uniform manner, where everything was regulated, the place and length of their exercises, the times of eating, the quality of their meal and drink, and their different kinds of punishment.

The above was the experience of some 3000 years ago. Are we not at last coming to realise

the truth of it in the present day?

We shall, however, have to exercise some discretion, as signs are not wanting that there still lingers a good deal of opposition to anything approaching to, or having the appearance of, military training in our schools.

It is no secret, I believe, that cadet training was to have formed the basement of our Territorial Structure. With its removal from the edifice the strength of the entire building was impaired. Let us for once take a lesson from our colonies and adopt the Australian system of boy training!

Among other matters for consideration are: The strength of the annual contingent of recruits. The period of their training. The periods of annual training for the men who have passed their recruits course. The formation of a reserve formed from men who have completed their annual trainings, with the usual formations for second line and home defence.*

Up to this period of our history our Regular Army has been almost our only one. In the future it should be second to our National Army, which, with the Armies of our Dominions, will form our Great Imperial Army. The present Regular Army becoming our Colonial Army.

The education of our regular or professional officers is dealt with in another chapter. Our National Army will have to be strengthened with a

strong blend of this professional essence.

The Staffs of Divisions and Brigades, all commanding officers of units, and all adjutants and a large proportion of officers will certainly be professional soldiers. We shall also require a strong educational staff and Schools of Instruction for the education of the officers and the N.C.O.'s of our National Army.

Above all things our system must be one which enables us to rapidly expand our Army from a peace to a very largely increased war footing. We may now cast a glance over our future National Army,

^{*} A great defect of the T.F. was that it provided no real reserve of trained men. There was no fixed standard to insure a certain degree of efficiency for a man before leaving the force. There was no system of training officers or N.C.O.'s and no standard demanded. No attempt had been made to form a reserve of officers.

the groundwork of which will probably be a territorial one, and to some extent the present fourteen Divisional Areas may be accepted as a basis. It also seems likely that the annual training of the recruits will be carried out at the large training centres like Aldershot and Salisbury. If the Mixed Brigade formation, advocated in a later chapter, be adopted, it would be a suitable one for the annual training of the men who have passed their recruits course when manœuvres on a large scale were not deemed desirable. A Mixed Brigade might also go from time to time to the Artillery Practice camp of the division and take part in exercises in which live ammunition is used.

At the end of this chapter will be found a proposal for utilising the services of officers of the Indian Army as instructors in our National Army.

The Regular Officer never appreciated the fact that the Territorial Force N.C.O. received no more training than the men he commanded, and his selection to be an N.C.O. often rested on his self-confidence and self-assertion. If our National Army is to do its best we shall require a very strong staff of trained N.C.O.'s.

The average Briton experiences a certain amount of natural diffidence when called on to command others unless he is conscious of that superiority that a leader should have and feel.

A well-managed school should be able to dispel this feeling, and at the conclusion of it the young aspirant assumes authority boldly, and soon commands respect and cheerful obedience. So far no organised attempt has been made to assist our young N.C. officers over this difficult step in their career. They should in the first instance be special selections from all the infantry N.C.O.'s in a division, and on passing out of the school should, if possible, return to the same units they came from. The case of these Divisional Schools should be the special care of the Divisional Instructional Staff.

THE NATIONAL CAVALRY

When the Territorial Force becomes the National Army, among the first questions to be decided will be the dimensions of the whole force, and what proportion each arm is to bear with regard to the whole. In other words, we shall have to decide what is to be the establishment of the cavalry. The men composing the Yeomanry were the cream of the Territorial Force. There will be no difficulty in filling the ranks of our squadrons with suitable recruits who will naturally be drawn from counties and districts which produce horsemen. Cavalry is, however, for reasons which will be gone into later, a most expensive arm to equip and to maintain, and we must on this account at least be careful to see that the importance of the arm is not magnified beyond its proper limits. One of the most important subjects in dealing with cavalry is the provision of horses. The chief expenses connected with these latter is not their purchase, but their maintenance. For example, assuming that a horse cost £42, and that its working life is eight years, the annual capital expenditure works out at five guineas,

whereas the cost of keeping (estimated at twelve shillings a week) amounts to £31 4s. This is a very moderate estimate and does not include cost price and up-keep of the Government stables, and Veterinary Hospitals, the salaries of the Veterinary Surgeons, Farriers, etc. In civil life the horse pays back by his productive labour what he receives from his master in food and care. The Army horse in the majority of cases gives little or no productive return, except in time of war.

In a National Army we must be economical. We must have at least two types of horses.

A. Those which will be used all the year round for training officers, cadets and recruits, and are therefore earning their keep. This type is represented by the Army horse before the war.

B. Those which are only required for annual training and war. This class should be the property of the State, but maintained by the public to whom they will be lent on favourable conditions as boarders. Whenever these "boarders" are taken for Government Service they will be maintained at Government expense. Some legislation may be necessary to put the "boarder" scheme on a satisfactory basis. From an economic point of view its advantages are incontestable.

A copy of Colonel Mulliner's boarding scheme as published in the *Field* is given in the Appendix. It makes the whole matter perfectly clear.

I was in command of the South Midland Division before the war when the scheme was given a practical trial so far as light draught horses are concerned. It was, in my opinion, an unqualified success. The future of cavalry is not altogether certain, but even if it be reduced we shall always require a certain amount for service with other troops.

Having provided our National Cavalry with horses, we have provided them with the chief means of mobilisation which to some extent they will have

to practice annually.

OUR NATIONAL ARTILLERY

This war has revealed the fact that a well-educated man with a desire to learn can very soon be taught the essentials of an artilleryman's duties, and that he soon submits to and imbibes modern military discipline. The practice camp where he handles and fires live ammunition is, next to active service, the best place for his instruction. Our artillery must have good ranges and must carry out service practice every year, as often as possible in combination with the other arms.

Unless they are provided with their own horses for their training a great deal of the best instruction will be wasted. When they are on good terms with the "lessees" they will take a pride in their horses and make their care a special object of interest, quite different will their attitude be to a number of hirelings who they have never seen before and will never see again. Also when hired horses are provided, the men lose the experience of entraining and detraining their horses, and that feeling of pride in their unit which is such a factor of efficiency.

The tactical training will best be taught in

combination with other arms as in a Mixed Brigade, when the artillery will be permanently associated with their infantry, R.E., mounted troops, and aerial Service.

OUR NATIONAL INFANTRY

The Commander of the Infantry Brigade will command the Mixed Brigade for which he will be provided with a suitable Staff.

No infantry can be properly trained unless they are provided with ample facilities during their period

of training.

Each Divisional Area should have a camping ground for each Mixed Brigade and a Divisional Practice Ground for its Artillery.

Each Brigade training ground should have rifle ranges and spaces where digging, bombing, and every form of modern military instruction can be

given in a practical manner.

Modern drills will have to be on the "change rounds" system of the gunners where each member of the smallest fractions has in turn to learn the duties of leader, so that when casualties occur some one is ready to step in and take command.

Modern war has taught us that when actual fighting begins it is often impossible for even a battalion commander to personally control his unit. This must be recognised, and nearly all our energies devoted to the training of our company platoon and section commanders so that they will always act promptly on their own responsibility when an occasion so demands. Above all things we must

insure that our young infantry officers on joining have a definite job and actual men to command. It must also be recognised that modern encounters depend for their success on the most detailed fore-thought and in the entrusting of the operation to subordinate leaders who have been tried in the past. In other words to the best junior officers and N.C.O.'s. It is on their experience that modifications in plans for attack and defence are made. These experiences are collated and put into form by the trained Staff. They form the hands and fingers which grip the enemy by the throat after he has been, and while he is still being, pounded by the artillery.

Superior officers must aim more at being directors

and trainers than actual leaders in the field.

As to manœuvres, it seems logical to suppose that these will be framed with a view to practising troops in accordance with the experience gained in the last war. Future frontiers will doubtless be so protected that any break through by an opposing army must be a matter of time, and our larger tactical exercises will no longer have for their object rapid movements in an area of country, but the practising of rapid and secret concentration at points from which it is proposed to deliver a sudden attack. The encounter battle will probably be confined to the practice of comparatively small bodies in open warfare, such as advanced and Rear-Guard Actions.

R.E.—The Engineers will be drawn from trades akin to their calling. They will assist to train a considerable number of infantry in the rough work

of their special arm.

The A.S.C. and R.A.M.C. always find good men ready to enter their ranks. Men who are anxious to serve their country, but who prefer to do it in their own way. The splendid services rendered by both the above is well known. Like other branches of the National Army they must have proper opportunities of practising the art of their special branch. A liberal supply of good draught horses is absolutely essential.

The employment of officers of the Indian Army for the training of our National Army.

One of the most important requirements of the Indian Army is a good reserve of trained officers for both cavalry and infantry who are conversant with the language of the men they command.

Lord Kitchener recognised this, and increased the establishment of British officers for both branches. That this higher establishment is in excess of peace demands there can be no doubt. The suggestion about to be made is one that if put into execution would give useful occupation to this surplus. During six months fifty per cent. of the officers on the increased establishment could be spared from their regiments. At present all go on leave for certain periods, those who can afford it, mostly the unmarried, go home, the remainder to some place in the hills in India.

By Indian Army leave rules an officer on the Staff or belonging to the Indian Army is entitled to two months' leave in the year on what is called Privilege leave. He can in addition to this have whatever period of General leave he can be spared for. If he goes home on what is called *Combined* leave, *i.e.* two months' privilege and whatever additional general leave he can be spared for (call it X months), he receives full Indian pay and allowances for the two months, but not for the X months' General, for these he is placed on furlough pay on a sliding scale according to his service. If he be on the Staff and belongs to the British Service he gets his two months' privilege leave on full pay, but is put on English pay for his period of X months' general leave.

I have gone into this question of pay because what I am eventually coming to, i.e. the employment of officers of the Indian Army to assist in the training of the National Army during the summer months, so far as it concerns the officers themselves, is mainly a matter of manager.

is mainly a matter of money.

Turning to the wants of our National Army we find that extra officers will be required.

(1) To train the recruits for some months during the year.

(2) For the annual training of the men who have

passed their recruits course.

There will, of course, be the regular Staffs for this purpose, but past experience tells us that these are as a rule cut down to a minimum, and the larger the number of good active regular officers employed the more rapid will be the training, especially as the time of year that officers can best be spared from India synchronises with the time they are most needed for training purposes at home.

The suggestion made is that an arrangement should be arrived at between the Home and Indian Governments by which the former undertakes to employ a certain number of British officers quartered in India for training purposes in Great Britain, with a view to both benefiting the officers financially and also improving the training of the National Army. Such an arrangement would probably be popular with the officers if their full Indian pay and allowances were made up to them by the Home Government while employed in England, so that instead of being only two months at home on full pay they could be four or six. An arrangement of this sort if liberally financed might become a considerable boon to married officers.

There seems no reason why officers of British units in India should not be available on much the same terms. For instance, there are 29 officers in a British Infantry Battalion. During the summer months 10 might certainly be made available for service in England, provided the terms offered to them were sufficiently attractive.

One of the chief arguments against such a proposal from the Indian Army point of view would no doubt be that officers are already too much out of India, and consequently out of touch with the men they command. That year by year the gulf which separates East from West is growing wider. But is this the case? With the rapid increase in and improvement of our means of communication the West is rapidly infusing new life into the East. The Eastern is running towards the Western at a pace-

which is increasing every year. There is in many ways more understanding between the East and the West than there has ever been before, and it is on the increase. So long, however, as the vie intime of the two races remains jealously locked up in its own house, to talk of us having any real understanding of Orientals is misleading. In every case the real social intercourse must be between the women. Lady Chelmsford has not been slow to grasp the situation, and is opening up this, the real avenue approach to the mind of the Oriental. When our women can associate with theirs on the same terms as our men in many cases do, with their fathers, husbands, and brothers, then, and only then, will the first real advance have been made. This is the only real entrance to the mind of the Oriental. What children learn from their mothers is often what they remember when they grow up. What are the mothers of India instilling into the minds of their children in the present day? "Khuda jane!" (God may know.) We also may know some day, but not through male sources.

Were such a scheme put into practice it would both benefit the officers of the Indian Army and also the National Army at home. Instead of the senseless life many of our officers are forced into at hill stations they would have their minds rubbed up by the life at home and would return to India improved in body and mind and have their professional ideas brought up to date.

A question of this sort might well be discussed at an Imperial Army Conference where the exchange of officers between our different Armies, either as professors and instructors at the different Staff Colleges, or as exponents of some new war-like appliance, would naturally be a matter of common interest and probable discussion.

I am unable to say to what the services of officers of our Egyptian and African forces could be

utilised in a similar manner.

My chief object in bringing to notice the above proposals is to show a manner in which the different armies of our Empire may co-operate and work in unison as a single corporate body.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIAN ARMY

No survey of our Armies would be complete without a glance at that portion of them which forms the garrison of India. The Imperial Army of India was about 240,000 strong, of which roundly 78,000 were British; the remainder various creeds, and races of Indians; the proportion aimed at being one British to two native soldiers. The officers are all British. There are also Native Officers, but these occupy subordinate positions with no prospect of promotion to the higher ranks.

India may be regarded as the benefactress of the young officer without private means, or with only very slender ones. There it is possible for him to live on his pay, and he is to some extent removed from an environment of wealth and its worshippers. The society which surrounds him has, as a rule, to make its way in the world with what its own efforts can produce. He is not forced into a groove, and has many jumping-off places from which he can better his position, provided he is capable of making the necessary spring.

India has also its compensations to offer to the young and enterprising man in the way of sport and travel, to console him for his expatriation. There is an independence about the life which appeals to many who may have hitherto been enclosed within the limits of an ordinary home circle.

But India is a young man's country. To enjoy the life there, health and strength are indispensable. All the compensations she has to offer, and they are many, are those which appeal to youth. A deficiency in Anglo-Indian life which should not pass unnoticed is the weakness, almost the lack, of European

public opinion.

Life in India is ruled by bureaucracy; practically all precedence in society being determined by salary or by official status. There is an absence of that robust criticism of officialdom which acts as such a healthy tonic in our home intercourse. Except from the Press in the chief towns like Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, where there exists a considerable non-official commercial and mercantile community, there is little expression of European public opinion. It is no doubt regarded as unwise to encourage or permit a too free criticism of the actions of government. There is, however, a considerable middle space between the abuse of free speech, and the use of the Press as a mere official megaphone.

The "Mesopotamian Muddle" would never have reached the climax it did but for the absence of a timely expression of Anglo-Indian public opinion. The English writing press must have known that all was not well before anything appeared in the home-papers, and should have combined in a determined campaign to force the Indian Government

to take prompt and satisfying measures to remove the scandals which have since been revealed. That some Indian papers did take a strong line is well known. It is the want of combination that is regretted. When one compares the action of our home Press under similar circumstances one cannot help being struck by the failure of the English writing press in India to grasp this great opportunity of protecting our Army in Mesopotamia from the unnecessary hardships it has been made to endure.

When Lord Kitchener created an Army of nine divisions out of the multifarious aggregation of units, which had hitherto constituted the unwieldy mass, known as the Indian Army, he made it possible for its higher training to be conducted on sound and modern lines.

A work of this magnitude, opposed as it was by a certain number of Indian officers, who no doubt felt it a reproach to their administrative capacity that the Army in India had so long remained in this chaotic condition, naturally took time to develop.

In order that full advantage may be taken of the improved position certain further steps forward

appear desirable.

Up till some years ago the Indian Army consisted of the Punjab Frontier Force, and the rest of the Army. The P.F.F., as it was called, was a small and efficient body, petted and admired by the Head-quarter Staff of the Army, many of whom had been educated within its fold. Its record of past services on the Frontier was a very fine one, and it enjoyed

special privileges. With all its advantages, however, it was not the best school in which to bring up leaders destined to command armies in a first-class war. The custom of skimming the cream off the rest of the Army left the skimmed milk poor, some of it indeed so poor that it was hardly worth keeping.

This process, combined with a vicious habit, too common in those days, of filling all the extra and staff appointments on a small frontier expedition, not with those who have been enduring for years a hard and anxious life, but with every one who was anybody in Simla, tended to produce a rather chauvinistic type of Indian Officer who worshipped the Wardens of the Marches under whom he had served and the horizon of whose professional ideas was bounded by mountain warfare.

The marked improvement that has recently taken place both in the Staff of Indian Army Head-quarters, and also in that of Divisions and Brigades, is due to a better Staff organisation, but chiefly to the influence of the Indian Staff College which has done splendid work since its foundation, and is now recognised as one of Lord Kitchener's most priceless gifts to the Army in India.

On return to England after a long tour of Indian Service one could not help being struck by the fact that a much higher standard and better work was demanded of Divisional Generals in England than from those in India.

In the latter country the criticism of these officers was confined to Staff tours and their performances at biennial, or even triennial manœuvres.

This criticism has in the past been confided to seniors who might possibly have been selected for their purely administrative merits, having risen to their positions by what the French term "Une carrière du bureau," some of whom were quite out of touch with modern military ideas so far as the training of large bodies of troops in the field was concerned.

Through no fault of their own they had not that confidence in criticising the work of their subordinates in the field so necessary for progress; nor did the Army receive their dictums with much faith or confidence.

The Commander-in-Chief in India cannot always help, even if he were capable of doing so, which is not always the case. His duties are for the most part consultative and administrative, and he perhaps stands too near the picture to be the best of critics.

If India is going to keep pace with the times she must submit to the inspection of the Inspector General of the Imperial Forces, an eminent and up-to-date soldier who, coming fresh from our own and continental manœuvres, would be in a position to make useful comparisons and thus to raise the standard of the higher training and staff work in the field of the Army in India. His position and experience would entitle his criticisms to respect, and his presence would strengthen the hands of the commanders of our two great Indian Armies. Owing to the differences in the seasons he could arrange a biennial, if not an annual, visit to India during large concentrations. Many soldiers in India who have

the welfare of their Army at heart would, I am sure, warmly welcome such a proposal.

There were also some minor matters in connection with Divisional and Brigade training which required attention if full advantage was to be taken of the fine organisation India now possesses, her splendid troops, and her limitless training areas.

In England we had a great deal of keenness for practical training and manœuvres with great difficulties in the way of obtaining suitable ground. In India the difficulty about ground is a small one, but manœuvres, partly owing to the insufficiency of the training grant, and partly on account of the way in which they have been mismanaged in the past, were not popular.

The ground round most Indian cantonments is, as a rule, quite unsuited to Military Exercises, and in order to concentrate even a brigade for its annual training a certain amount of movement by rail is in many parts necessary. A training grant is required, and with regard to this Indian Military Administration erred in two directions.

(1) The money it spent on training was so small that it was impossible to take advantage of the fine training grounds at their disposal. Up till quite recently the entire annual training grant for the whole of India was less than the sum allotted for training the Aldershot command.

(2) Instead of working out the cost of concentrations for each Brigade and Division to suit its own peculiar needs, and allotting funds in proportion, a fixed sum was given to each unit with the result

that in some cases it was insufficient, in others in excess of requirements.

One of the chief items of expense in the concentration of troops in India is the hired transport. To reduce this item of expense to a minimum the restcamps for marching-troops should, where railways exist, correspond with convenient stations on the line of railway so that all the baggage which has usually to be taken by hired transport can be taken along the railway from stage to stage in trucks, thus saving both money to the State and hardships to the local inhabitants whose carts are quite legally impressed. Where troops had to move entirely by rail, and the journey is a short one, not exceeding 24 hours, there seemed no reason why they should not go in trucks, or closely crowded in carriages: but here stepped in Regulation, who, not content with the fact that an insufficiency of money was given for training, checkmated the attempts of keen officers to make the best of what had been given them by insisting on their being tied down to the spacing allotted for soldiers travelling long iournevs.

There was also an over meticulous check exercised over money spent which interfered with the best results being obtained. After a Divisional Grant has been allotted, let each battalion commander submit his accounts to his Brigade Commander, and each Brigade Commander his to his Divisional Commander, and let this suffice. If you are to make Generals, your only chance is to trust them. You will in this manner get better value for State money

and save time and money in audit. With adequate, even liberal, training grants laid out to the best advantage, excellent manœuvres could be arranged at which the work of Divisional Generals and their Staffs could be criticised by the most respected authorities, and thus a school of instruction for our senior officers equal to any in the world could be created. Bad departmental arrangements and schemes lacking in forethought have in the past inflicted unnecessary hardships on our troops, while the most impossible actions on the part of their leaders has been allowed to pass without comment or criticism. The failure of the Staff arrangements in the first phase of the Mesopotamian Campaign is in part traceable to defective peace training.

We have also room for some reforms in the Administrative branches of our Army in India. Indian bureaucracy has created the Babu, who, after the manner of Frankenstein's monster, up till quite recently ruled the Indian Army by means of a typewriter and a library of red books filled with regulations, many of which he had written himself.

The Babu is a native clerk, and is one of the enduring things we have been able to create in the course of our long stay in India. There are nearly as many Babus as British soldiers in India. They are increasing every day.

During six months in the year the Headquarters of the Army in India "summernates" less seriously, perhaps; but with the same amount of "cut off" from the rest of the Army as the Laplander from the

rest of his kind during his annual hibernation.* The opportunity was one made for the Babu. Red tape and red ink tyrannised over flesh and blood. The infection seemed to spread to Indian Staff officers, many of whom, living side by side, appeared to prefer, in quite trivial matters, a paper controversy to a personal interview. The disease had even infected the higher ranks, with the result that officers of the Major Staff during their winter tours of so-called inspection generally arrived at their destination with a clerk and a box of files, conducted their business by consulting the officer most likely to agree with them, and departed more convinced than ever that their view of the case was the correct one.

We wanted new methods—the methods of conference and discussion. These were, I believe, being introduced into some of the Departments in the Simla offices four or five years ago. They had, however, not penetrated beyond that circle at the period concerning which I am writing. When special information on a certain subject was sought for it was not gained by visiting the stations from which it was most likely to be obtained, and there summoning a conference of all concerned, and so hearing the views of those on the spot, having previously supplied them with agenda papers giving the range of the subjects to be brought forward; the old methods were still in vogue.

^{*} To conceive a parallel to the existing position Lord Sydenham invites us to imagine a Government of Europe, excluding Russia, operated from Righi Kulm with a winter change of habitation to Rome.

The Conference system has the following advantages:—

(1) It permits the matter under discussion to be thoroughly thrashed out on the spot by men with

practical experience of it.

(2) It gives the Staff officer a chance of meeting and becoming acquainted with the different officers, most of whom he only knows by their signatures, and so forming a first-hand opinion of their capabilities.

(3) It creates a general interest in the matter among the officers on the spot who, as a rule, know little or nothing of the views of their seniors, or of

what is taking place quite close to them.

The long and wide separations between the Indian Headquarters Staff officer and those for whom he administered, had created such a gulf between them that he had become a stranger to those whom he should have known intimately.

There was often too much desire on his part to conceal ignorance by isolation; too little initiative to enable him to quit the path which had been

trodden bare for him by his predecessors.

Some concrete cases may serve as examples to compare the two methods. The lighting of the British soldier's barrack rooms in India had for many years been a recognised disgrace. Some of the lamps in use were forty to fifty years old. What was desired was to get the best illuminative value out of the oil supplied, not a great outlay of money. Some conferences at the leading stations in India where British Infantry were quartered, combined

with some visits by the officers of the Headquarters Staff to the barracks at night would doubtless have led to a removal or mitigation of the real grievance, which was constituted by the men being compelled either to provide their own lamps or to pass their evenings in Cimmerian darkness.

The subject of improving the lighting of the barracks of British soldiers, possibly still remains a "big case" in the Q.M.G.'s office, where it was in my time waiting to be dealt with by the Supply and Transport Department. The matter is in itself unimportant, it is the failure of the system I wish to accentuate.

Another concrete case concerns the compilation of a Military Gazetteer for all cantonments in India. Some people will ask, What is a cantonment? It is a Government estate, at times of thousands of acres in extent, on which stand the different buildings, etc., erected for soldiers and their dependants.

In my time the officer commanding the station to which a cantonment belonged seldom knew anything about it.

All information on the subject was difficult to obtain. His chief informant and adviser was known as the Cantonment Magistrate. The chief duties of this official are really those of a land agent, in which he received no education whatever. The man who knew all about the estate and profited by his knowledge was the head native clerk who existed on a humble stipend and amassed a considerable fortune. It would be well if some system of transfers of the native clerical personnel of cantonments were

insisted on. A regular roster should be kept and no clerk allowed to become a permanency. The creation of an Inspector of cantonments during Lord Kitchener's term of office did much to improve matters, but much remains to be done. What each cantonment requires is a compiled printed statement giving a short history of it, supplemented by the usual information contained in an ordinary Gazetteer and a good map kept up-to-date, showing clearly the different kinds of land under cultivation, and what progress in the reclamation of waste land had annually taken place. The estimate should be self-supporting and at least capable of paying the salaries of the Cantonment Magistrate and his staff.

Some generals have so far interested themselves in cantonments as to make public gardens and plant trees, but the business side of them has been in most cases left to itself. The extent of some of the older cantonments is out of all proportions to their requirements, and it would be for the benefit of the State if certain portions of them which are too highly cultivated for Military purposes were exchanged with the Civil Administration for portions of waste land more suitable for training and manœuvres.

Experience leads us to make the following proposals:—

- (1) That all Cantonment Magistrates should be educated as land agents in addition to the present education they receive.
- (2) That periodical meetings be held to explain the economic working of the cantonment to all concerned, and that a continuous policy be insisted on.

(3) That a Gazetteer be compiled for each cantonment. That all officers residing in a cantonment be encouraged to take an interest in its welfare.

(4) Insist on all cantonments being self-support-

ing or nearly so.

This question of Military Gazetteers, which I brought to notice some years ago, was pronounced at the time to be another "big case." It is, however, only deserving of the name so long as one department and its staff of clerks attempts to deal with it, not when the men on the spot are invited to help, and their advice and assistance is taken full advantage of.

Up to the time of which I write the mistrust by some of the Indian Higher Staff Officers of any one but their clerks has been a serious handicap to

progress and efficiency.

The Q.M.G.'s branch in India was then only just beginning to realise its new rôle. In the pre-Kitchener days it was overloaded with the duties of the Chief of the Staff and the Intelligence Branches. These have been removed from its shoulders, and it can now give its undivided attention to its own allotted tasks. It will only succeed in its mission if it be wise enough to enlist on its side the sympathy of all officers concerned and to cease that senseless isolation which has brought it under the suspicion of ignorance and created a certain amount of hostility against it.

India is at last emerging from its obscurantist age when a few men of average ability and little foresight carefully guarded the arcana of Indian Military knowledge as pictured by their own imagination. Lord Kitchener forced open the secret chamber and found it, like Mother Hubbard's cupboard—bare.

Much has from time to time been written regarding the impossibility of working Lord Kitchener's scheme, and great emphasis is laid on the amount of work it throws on to one man, the Commander-in-This would appear to presuppose over-Chief. centralisation and incapable subordinates. Indian Army Administration-is much too centralised. A great deal more power and responsibility should be thrown on Divisional Commanders, and a good system of their inspection devised which should be in a personal form, and does not mean merely an increase in paper work. The original intention of Lord Kitchener was to gradually increase the burden of responsibility and to widen the devolution of command as the Divisions and their Staffs became more capable of dealing with the work which was at first quite new to them. How far this has been carried out it is not possible for me to sav. With well selected Divisional Generals aided by a financial branch staffed with the specially trained Staff officers who have been through the School of Economics and passed some other financial tests, there seems no other reason why a heavy load should not be removed from the shoulders of the Commander-in-Chief. The modern General, if provided with a suitable Staff, will, I am sure, be found quite capable of financial responsibility. Once give credit for good work in this connection and progress is

assured. A large amount of the useless correspondence which took place could have been saved if the A.G. and Q.M.G. had held conferences during the summer months at certain convenient centres where they could have met the representatives of Divisions and Brigades of Armies and discussed the most important major questions of the moment. To say that they had no time for this was merely to pronounce judgment on themselves. In this manner matters which often take up months of correspondence could be settled in a few hours. India had not in those days realised the increased powers which the motor-car and the telephone have given us to replace reports and writing by direct observation and personal interviews.

THE SILLADAR SYSTEM

The future of the Indian Cavalry will doubtless be discussed after the war. The Silladar System has had a fair trial during the past four years. As few people outside India know what is meant by the Silladar System, it may be as well to explain, without going into detail, that the Indian Cavalry is something quite apart from any other branch of the Service, British or Indian. It traces its origin back to the days of the old Irregular Cavalry, the days of Fane, Probyn, Skinner, Cureton, and various other well-known Indian Cavalry leaders, who raised and maintained these regiments on the feudal levy system. The men still own their horses and equipment. On joining a regiment a man has to produce a certain sum which pays for the provision of these.

Government pays the man a monthly sum, supposed to be sufficient to maintain him and his horse. On leaving the service the man receives a sum in full repayment of what he has advanced in the first instance.

The above is a very rough outline of a very complicated arrangement known as the Silladar System for the provision of a mounted force. Amongst others the system has the following advantages:—

(1) Cheapness.

(2) It attracts a very good class of man of the

best fighting stock.

(3) It encourages a spirit of independence and self-help, and is not tied by red tape. Very useful qualities when faced by the unexpected. On the other hand, some ask whether these advantages are not purchased at too high a price, and whether the time has not come to change our methods.

Among the disadvantages are-

(1) The system, though in many respects well suited to peace, breaks down in war, as Government has then to replace all wastage in horses and equipment and to ration the man and his horse.

(2) Owing to the spread of railways and to the general increase of mechanism, the type of man who has ridden from his boyhood is becoming rarer every day. A larger number of the men now joining have to be taught to ride.

(3) The provision of the horses and the arrangement for their feeding is thrown upon the Commanding Officer of the regiment, who has to spend time which should be devoted to tactical training

in dealing with contracts for grain and stores, management of farms, horse breeding, etc. Many express surprise that comparatively few of the officers of the Indian Cavalry, who are the pick of the young Indian officers, achieve distinction. A certain amount of the falling off in the higher ranks is no doubt due to the fact that the success of the C.O. of an Indian Cavalry Regiment depends largely upon his business capacity and administrative powers. Unlike the Cavalry officer in the British Service, he is not a comparatively young man at the time he reaches the command of his regiment, and therefore falls an easy victim to the seductions which a life of this sort presents to a man who is beginning to prefer a seat in a motor-car to one on a horse.

(4) Another disadvantage of the system is that it interferes with training, as for six months in the year, to save the men's pockets the horses are put on a lower scale of feeding, and therefore there is little desire on the part of the officers to use them for any form of training which goes beyond the limits of the parade ground and the riding school.

The above very crude statement of the case suffices to make it clear that this question will probably come under review at the end of the war. Should it be decided either to replace the Silladar System by the ordinary Cavalry one, or to reduce the amount of Indian Cavalry maintained in India, the extent of the necessary changes will probably have to be considered.

We live in the age of the machine, and it has occurred to some of us that many of the functions

demanded of cavalry in India could be at least as well, if not better, performed by an up-to-date Air Service supplemented by one of subsidised motor-cars with bodies adapted to various military requirements. We must always have Cavalry, and as long as the country produces an abundance of natural horsemen, let us take advantage of it. The question arises, have we not too much cavalry in India to meet the wants of the situation, and cannot some of the work now performed by, or expected of that arm, be better and more cheaply performed by other agencies?

A scheme based on the following proposals has much to recommend it from a Military point of

view:-

(1) The design of a standard form of chassis which could be provided with an ambulance, light transport, machine-gun mounting, or any other form of body. We will call it the I.P. (Indian Pattern) car.

(2) The I.P. chassis to be made by Government, either in India or at home, and sold at nearly cost prices to officers and others, who would put thereon the kind of body they preferred on the understanding that the car could be claimed by Government under certain conditions.

(3) All cars not of the I.P. type to be taxed, and at the same time registered for employment by the

State in case of emergency.

(4) Large stores of petrol to be kept at suitable places in India. The turnover being secured by selling at a very low rate to owners of I.P. cars up to

a certain amount per month, and by issues to Government Services.

(5) Standard motor cycles and side cars to be treated in the same way.

Measures of this sort would enable us to dispense with a certain number of cavalry regiments and to reduce the establishment of others. The money so saved being devoted to other services.

A machine-gun on a lightly armoured car is a much more efficacious means of overawing a turbulent crowd than a squadron of Native Cavalry, and much more mobile.

The provision of a certain number of mounted Scouts for each battalion of infantry would greatly increase its mobility and independence, and from the infantry point of view provide better protection than the present system of Divisional Cavalry.

It is, naturally, opposed to cavalry principles, but if infantry officers were for once consulted about an affair which concerns their own arm, there is little doubt as to the opinion of a considerable majority.

There remain a few minor points with regard to our Army in India which may be worthy of consideration.

Clothing.—(r) The present tight starched white uniform seems to many of us who have endured hot weather in the plains a most inhuman form of clothing. It is not a service dress, is a cause of considerable extra expense to the men, and they

have to unhook and unbutton it to avoid suffocation when called upon to perform the most moderate form of work. In West Africa and America, where there exist no past prejudices to warp their common sense, they have adopted a very neat form of shirt; this with a pair of loosely made trousers which with puttees resemble knickerbockers, or simply with "shorts," makes a dress in which a man can both live and work in comfort.

The contrast between our stiff, stocked soldiers and the sensible comfortable dress of our sailors must have struck any one who has seen them side by side in a town like Bombay. By all means let us have our men well dressed, but let them be clothed in accordance with the rules of sense and service-

ability.

Training of Junior N.C.O.'s.—(2) A long felt want in India is a good Divisional School in each of the nine Indian Divisions for the careful instruction of young soldiers anxious and recommended to be N.C.O.'s. Their first step from the ranks to that of a junior N.C.O. is perhaps the most trying time in their career. A feeling of confidence goes far towards success, and in order to have confidence you must have a certain feeling of superiority. It is this that should be implanted in all young men about to become N.C.O.'s. Our Military schools in France have taught us much. The lesson should not be forgotten.

Libraries and Reading.—(3) I have already written on behalf of Soldiers' Libraries in India. At the conclusion of this war there will be a great chance

to obtain a number of surplus books collected for men at the front. It is in the hills especially that men often feel the want of good books. Officers with literary tastes might from time to time recommend books for men to read.

Cinemas.—(4) The time is approaching when each station in India will have its own cinema for both recreative and instructional purposes. We do not make sufficient use of the gramophone for educational purposes. Hindustani might be taught by a series of gramophone records. Every British Battalion Library should have a public typewriter which can be used for a small fee.

Compulsory Service.—(5) The introduction of Compulsory Service into India, now introduced for all resident Europeans and Eurasians, is a measure which has been too long delayed. It will add to our power of internal defence and give us a tighter hold over the non-British European residents who had no patriotic feelings and were a source of danger rather than strength. There were too many photographers with German names, and we have been much too confiding with regard to the stranger in our midst. Some of the Volunteers in India were excellent, a certain number, on the other hand, were worse than useless. While a large proportion of the white population, many of whom had a big stake in the country, made no effort to protect themselves or their property.

(6) The desires of a number of young Indian gentlemen to enter our Army as officers are daily being more loudly expressed. British Military

opinion will have to undergo a complete change before such an innovation will be at all cheerfully accepted. Some relations of the ruling chiefs might, as a preliminary measure, be given commissions in some of our best regiments at home after a public school education and passing through Sandhurst in the ordinary way. To appoint young Indian noblemen with large private means to our average regiments of the Indian Army would not be wise. On the other hand, men of no caste are altogether unsuitable as leaders of native troops. The more simple solution would appear to be the further advancement of the present Native Officers so that some of them might in time command units. This would, however, in no way accord with the aspirations of those who are directing the present agitation.

In pre-war days our India garrison was divided into two armies, to one of which was assigned five, to the other four of the nine Military Divisions which Lord Kitchener created. It was his principle to decentralise by strengthening the Staffs of the Division, and thus freeing the hands of the two Army Commanders from administrative work so as to enable them to devote their whole time to the training and fighting efficiency of their commands. Notwithstanding the fact that in this war the Division and not the Corps has proved to be the most suitable unit, this principle has been departed from, and we have taken a reactionary step and have reverted to the former plan in which the Army and

not the Division was the channel of communication in administrative matters with Army Headquarters. This is not the place to discuss the respective merits of the two systems, but, as Lord Kitchener's plan has been abandoned, it is not fair to attribute to it any failure that may result from the existing system. The future progress of the Army in India depends largely on devolution of authority, and any scheme of decentralisation in India must largely depend for its success upon the knowledge and efficiency of Brigade Commanders. The term Brigade as applied to India is rather misleading. It is exceptional for a general to have the four battalions which will compose his Brigade under the Mobilisation Scheme concentrated under his command. He may be in a large station with a compact command, or in a small one with his command in several out-stations. In the majority of cases he has a mixed and varied garrison to deal with, and multitudinous and multifarious duties assigned to him, concerning which he may possibly have no knowledge whatever on first appointment. A man whose previous experience has been limited to the command of a regimental unit with possibly a little staff duty thrown in, may find himself with two or three cantonments to administer, and has to be prepared to deal with farms and finance, public works and the planning of manœuvres, cantonments. schemes for defence and sanitation, and a host of other details with regard to which he has had no previous training or experience.

Writing of India up till 1911 there were then

41 Brigade Commanders in the country, 28 of whom belonged to the Indian Army. Ten of these had received their training in the Cavalry, 18 in the Infantry. Of the remaining 13, all of whom had been selected from the Home Army, 3 had been trained in the British Cavalry, 2 in the Artillery, and 2 in the Royal Engineers. The remaining 6 in the British Infantry. Certain stations were more or less "earmarked" for purely cavalry generals, and some, where complete Brigades of British Infantry existed, were reserved for British Infantry Generals; in the main, however, it appeared to be pure chance where a general was posted. Before Divisional Generals can with confidence devolve administrative authority they must feel assured that their Brigade Commanders are capable of exercising it, and as it must be known some time before their actual appointments which colonels are likely to be promoted generals, courses of instruction might with advantage be held at which these officers would be thoroughly instructed with regard to the different duties they may be called on to undertake in their new rank, so that they may come to their commands with a certain assurance, and with some idea as to what their chief duties will be. It would also be a good plan to arrange for two or more conferences of Brigade Commanders at Simla or Delhi, where they could meet to discuss matters of common interest and make the personal acquaintance of Headquarters Staff. In such cases the bringing together and keeping in contact of a number of officers, all of whom would be keen to learn something

of the life they were about to commence would, if stimulated by a well-planned and well-carried-out course of instruction, do much to remove a certain amount of the stagnation which has in the past retarded the full progress and development of our Indian Brigade Areas and the well being and efficiency of their occupants.

Thirty or forty years ago it was the custom of the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff to process leisurely through India, making the acquaintance of the different generals and of the Staffs. This rather patriarchal proceeding had its merits. abandonment has left a gap which has never been filled. Unless the Chief of the Staff takes some trouble to know officers personally he cannot form any opinion of them and their capabilities. A man who judges men solely by reports and paper work is not the best arbiter of their careers.

When the Indian garrison becomes once more a normal one, and a post-war view of the situation will become possible, more attention may well be devoted to domestic legislation. Two subjects are well deserving of attention, domestic servants and housing. There is also the general question of the better development of our cantonments. A bill enforcing the compulsory registration of native personal servants would exclude from our towns and cantoninents many worthless characters, would be a wise precaution against spies, and would protect our young and inexperienced officers from imposture and theft, against which at present neither insurance

nor redress is possible. Local efforts to deal with the evil are quite useless, and until each servant is compelled to have a licence and to present it for verification on arrival at any station, no measures will be effectual. The registration fee need only be a nominal one, but if lost there should be a fee for the replacement of the licence form. At the same time servants should be protected against illtreatment and wrongful dismissal.

The arrangements for housing officers in cantonments are not good. Envious eyes are often cast at the houses occupied by the officers of the Indian Civil Service, but the soldier has no one but himself to blame for the comparative inferiority of his residence. If every general, staff officer, and commander of a unit was allotted a house as his official residence, the rent of which was in proportion to his salary, and the amount of which rent was deducted from his month's pay, we should have both better housing and more contented landlords. The latter should be regarded in such cases as Government Contractors, and should be bound by certain rules with regard to repairs in return for having their houses regularly occupied.

Our garrison in India consists of between 70,000 and 80,000 British soldiers, a not insignificant portion of the manhood of our islands at its most useful age. Have we done in the past, or are we about to do in the future, the most we can do for these men so as to make them the valuable asset they ought to be to our Empire?

We should educate them better with a definite

purpose in view. Offer them better prospects, both inside and beyond our Army, so as to attract men of ambition who have a desire to better themselves and who can foresee the prospect of a good career before them, provided they prove themselves fit and worthy to fill it. Make their life in India a less monotonous and more intellectual one, one, in fact, more suited to their enlarged range of mental vision. Give equal encouragement to mental and physical culture.

We may in the near future have to consider the prospect of a separate Army for India. We shall certainly replace the present garrison of India by a permanent one of a slightly higher mental level than that before the war, a level which will rise rapidly as the effect of the New Education Bill begins to make itself felt. We must, therefore, be prepared to face a new situation and to make more of, and do more for, our expatriated soldiers than we have ever done before. Lord Roberts did much to improve the well being, morality and general social status of the British soldiers in India, whose health, military efficiency, and physical culture received much attention during Lord Kitchener's régime.

If we are going to keep pace with the advance now taking place at home in National Education a considerable advance in mental culture is called for. India is both remote and isolated, and immersed in her own smaller happenings, she too often fails to note the great strides which are being made in the world beyond, and so devotes little or no time to the contemplation of possible results from new

conditions. The General Education of the soldiers of the British Army in India has been hitherto on too low a plane. This might with advantage form the subject of a special inquiry conducted by some wellqualified and independent experts and up-to-date authorities from home. Such an investigation will doubtless reveal the fact that we have lagged behind the times, and that the instructional appliances in our Army Schools, our methods of instruction and the general encouragement given to teachers and scholars have combined to create the failure to make the most of the material which it should be capable of turning into the finished article we require if we are to fit our men in India for such careers as will attract a really good class of man. Our aim should be a high one. It should be directed with a view to creating by means of good inducements a demand for service in the Army of India greater than the supply so that we can pick our candidates. achieve this we must improve our entire system of Education in India, and place at the head of this branch of the Adjutant General's Department an up-to-date Chief Inspector of Schools with an assured status and good rank and pay. He need not necessarily be a soldier as general education is not a direct branch of military life. Divisional Generals should be urged to take a special interest in this matter and their Staffs encouraged to watch its progress and results. So long as our Army Schoolmasters and Mistresses in India are underpaid and, to a certain extent neglected, so long will the education given be below its rightful standard. Not many

years hence when the present Education Bill commences to bear fruit, if proper education facilities have been provided, every N.C.O. and man in India should be in possession of a second-class certificate of education. There is no better preparation for all occupations in civil life after leaving the Army than a good education. Having stimulated the appetite for learning and provided the necessary facilities for reading, progress will continue unaided. General Pershing once remarked about his men: . . . " the greatest safeguard of the American soldier's health will be his high and developed intelligence. That is where we gain an immense advantage from the fact that we are so nearly a universal literate nation, and from the fact that our literates are such eager readers of the newspapers."

As has been remarked, we have need to better the prospects of our soldiers both inside and outside our Army. How can this be done? From the inside by selecting out of each draft that lands in the country a certain number of promising young N.C.O.'s or privates, and, sending them to a good Divisional School for a six-months' course of special training in the hills for the summer. During this course a certain number would, with proper encouragement, probably obtain a first-class certificate of education.

More commissions from the ranks should be given annually to suitable N.C.O.'s, not necessarily to those who had been through the course mentioned, but to any recommended by the O.C. unit. The services of the best N.C.O.'s should also be made free use of

for training the Home National Army. It might even be desirable to make service in the Indian and Colonial Army a sine quâ non for the best paid instructional billets in the Home Army. A good many military instructors would be welcome in Australia and Canada as permanent colonists.

Regarding posts outside the Army much more might be done by encouraging the visits of accredited government emigration agents, and allowing them to lecture at military stations and to explain the advantages offered by a life in the colonies. The formation of an Indian Labour Bureau affording to men about to leave the Army would also be an advantage. Men who have been in India for a certain period might well be allowed a free passage home and six months' furlough pay before taking up an occupation in the colonies or outside England. The main principle should be to make service in our Indian and Colonial Army as attractive as possible.

In contemplating our home land problem one of the lions in the path of progress is represented by the depressing dullness of the life which drives the more enterprising rural workers into the towns. The Americans have for some time recognised the evils arising from this serious handicap to an agricultural life, and have made efforts to mitigate the disadvantages with their usual energy and ingenuity. Can anything be duller and more monotonous than the ordinary round of cantonment life during the summer months in the hills or plains? The modern up-to-date municipal libraries and the various

societies which exist for providing forms of recreation which combine instruction with enjoyment have no counterpart in a military cantonment.

Great and far-reaching changes are taking place with regard to the status of women in Great Britain. They are about to exercise a more powerful influence, and to take a more active part in the conduct of public affairs than they have ever done before. The combined force of the effort of a large number of the six million female voters will certainly be exerted in two directions, the mitigation of the drink evil and a different aspect with regard to sexual immorality. These have been the two besetting sins of the British soldier in India. That he has in the past been more sinned against than sinning is now recognised. Lord Roberts, by his wise and prudent measures, dealt a death blow to drink in the British Army in The efforts of men like Lord Kitchener and India. Sir Horace Smith-Dorien were for years directed with a considerable measure of success towards the prevention rather than the cure of the last-named social evil, in this matter; as we have learnt by experience in dealing with drink, our efforts should be devoted rather towards the gradual removal of the chief causes than to the support of that impatient idealism which demands a drastic and violent remedy. A well-organised and influential Women's Welfare Society, with branches in every cantonment in India, might do much to improve the amenities of the ordinary life of the British soldier in India and that of his wife and children. We could with advantage double or treble our married establishment

in each unit, and multiply our efforts for child welfare, good maternity administration and the care and up-bringing of young European children. Much of the evil reputation enjoyed some years ago by the British soldier in India arose from the neglect of his social welfare, when some forms of vice were regarded almost as manly virtues. While freely recognising how much has been done in the past there still remains a wide scope for the amelioration of the lot of those who have to pass their lives in a foreign land, often in an unhealthy climate, and whose long hours of leisure unless filled up with interesting and to some extent intellectual forms of recreation, will yield opportunities for sloth and vice. I feel assured that the opportunity exists, and that if the wives of some of the leading officials (not necessarily soldiers) will take the matter up and form a strong committee of ladies, their inquiries will show in which direction their efforts can be best directed. Opposition and assurances that all is well and for the best there is sure to be, but perseverance will soon reveal paths along which the road to social progress lies. We are about to see great changes at home, in departments which specially belong to women. Let India not lag behind in the advance.

Our senior Generals in India have up to the present been, as a rule, too old. The Indian Civil Service has wisely recognised the fact that a man in India ages faster than he does at home, and have fixed the age for retirement, except in exceptional circumstances, at fifty-two. Had we followed their

example we would have been saved some pitiable examples of officers in high command broken in health and quite unfitted for the duties which their office demanded, being unwillingly dragged round their commands by their staff officers without interest, energy or progressive force. So long as it remains necessary to provide occupation for a certain number of Generals of the Indian Army this evil will recur. Either we must have an entirely separate Army for India with drastic age limits for Senior officers, or if we must continue the present system of two separate armies under a combined system we should make officers from Major General upwards liable to serve in any part of the Empire. If such a system were honestly carried out it would doubtless soon be found that certain senior officers who were quite capable, or incapable of carrying on in India would soon prove unequal to the strain of a home command.

Unless we have active, energetic, up-to-date and progressive generals in command of our two Indian armies we shall lag behind in the onward march which we must always maintain in our great Eastern dependency.

A SEPARATE ARMY FOR INDIA

Whether our whole system of Imperial Defence would work better under the old plan, or by giving to India a completely separate Army is not so much an Indian as an Imperial question, and as India will certainly have a representative on the Imperial Army Council this question will no doubt be discussed

there. In order to reduce our costly voluntarily enlisted army to a minimum we shall have to remodel our system of Army reliefs under which each regiment had one battalion abroad and one at home. If we deduct the number of Europeans required for the Garrison of India, reduce our contribution to the Expeditionary Force to two Divisions, and garrison some of our coaling stations with Indian troops, there will be very few men required for general service at home beyond the Foot Guards and the Marines. The Indian Army consists entirely of Native Troops, and comprises cavalry, infantry, and engineers, and a few mountain batteries of artillery. In addition to this the Home Government lend to the Indian Government, who pays for them, a contingent amounting to about 78,000 men—cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The question is whether this contingent should continue to exist under the present system, or whether it would be preferable to hand over this number of men to the Indian Government. and for their future upkeep to assign them their own depôts at home, and allow them to manage their own enlistments, arrange their own reliefs, and train their own officers and N.C.O.'s, bearing in mind that India has always paid for its own Army, and to-day has its own Staff College.

The subject of the provision of recruits for a separate Army for India suggests some interesting possibilities. Up to the present drafts have been provided from different Home Battalions and have received the ordinary military training a Regimental Depôt is capable of imparting. The recruits have

to be enlisted at the age of 17, in some cases 16, and are not allowed to proceed to India until they are at least 19 years of age. As a rule, therefore, two years are available for their training at home. This could be much more satisfactorily carried out if these young soldiers were formed into cadet battalions of about 1000 strong, each of which would be under an instructor specially selected for the work, instead of being under men whose fitness to educate them to the best advantage is a mere matter of chance. These units should be as much as possible governed by the public school form of discipline with under-officers and N.C.O.'s, instead of Prefects, and supervised by the necessary staff of officers; the form of instruction tending much more towards a general education which inculcated a good tone and high ideals, than being of a purely military character. Their special technical instruction being delayed until their arrival in India, where it could be well and thoroughly carried out according to the ideas of the battalion commander. It is urged in favour of a system of this kind that it would not cost the country any more money, and would produce a very much better mentally and morally equipped recruit for the Indian Army.

Estimating for fifty British Infantry Battalions in India, and two hundred recruits as the annual contingent required to replace wastage, we should require about 10,000 young men every year. A certain number of these would be sufficiently educated eventually to obtain commissions, a liberal number of which should be given in our Indian Army

if we desire to raise the standard of the man joining the ranks of the Force.

An argument against a separate Army for India was that a Force permanently stationed in India would deteriorate. This may have been so in the days before the Suez Canal was dug, the Baghdad Railway was in our hands, and aerial communication with the East had become a rapidly approaching certainty. Under our existing Army system when a man only serves between seven and eight years with the colours, in future probably less, and the system of inspection is a very searching one, the danger of deterioration is hardly worth considering.

The decline of Russian prestige in Asia, the dismemberment of Turkey, and the loyalty displayed by India during the war, are important factors in considering the future of our Army in India; we shall, however, have for some years to maintain an Army of occupation in Mesopotamia and in other parts of Turkey in Asia which we have conquered, this will mean a considerable force in addition to the

pre-war Indian garrison.

Several causes have contributed of late years to make service in our Indian Army less popular among the officers than it was at the commencement of the war. For this unrest the Indian Government has only itself to blame. It will be wise to lose no time in examining and redressing the undoubted existing grievances before the fine type of officer they used to attract has been driven to offer his services elsewhere.

CHAPTER V

THE DOMINION FORCES

As a writer in the Times recently remarked, "Great Britain is no longer in anything but sentiment and tradition 'The Mother Country.' The household of the British Dominions is a household of grown men." Canada and the other Dominions have in the words of Mr Doherty passed from the status of protected colonies to that of participating nations. It is the last time in our history that a general of the Imperial Army will ever command one of our Dominion Armies. The leaders of these are no longer in statu pupillari. They have had years of war experience and have been able to study the Art of War in the same school as their former tutors. In future the Dominions will supply their own generals and their own Staffs. They have had their own experience of war, have learnt their own lessons, and can draw their own conclusions. Whether they will adopt our Brigade and Divisional formations with corresponding Staffs remains to be seen. The Mixed Brigade formation has much to recommend it, as it gives both generals and their troops an excellent opportunity of combining the work of the different arms. Their chief difficulties, which were the provision of regimental officers and the staffs for their

higher formations, have been removed. After this war the British officer will have to extend his military horizon. So far this has been to a great extent limited to that of our Regular Army. He has been looking at our Imperial Army through a narrow loop-hole instead of over the parapet. The officer of the Regular Army felt, as a rule, little sympathy for the Territorial Force, still less for our Dominion Armies. He neither understood their difficulties nor appreciated their aims. His eye, which had been educated to the most meticulous order, winced when it chanced to encounter some violations of the Dress Regulations, or of established tradition, which he had been brought up to regard as unpardonable. He could not, for instance, bring himself to believe that one of the most brilliant French Generals could really be a great soldier, because he was reported to wear button boots and gaiters!

I have dwelt on this because our National Army will necessarily always supply a strong well-trained professional element, to whom the armies composing our Imperial Army will look for guidance and a high standard of excellence, and it must not fail in setting an impressive example. It is, therefore, more than ever necessary that all the officers should come to their work taking a comprehensive view of the military landscape which an Imperial Army presents. One of the chief difficulties that the Armies of our Dominions had in the first instance to contend with was the provision of suitable officers. The power to command men is not a natural gift common to all, and the existence of a governing class in a nation has

up to the present been a great asset for the provision of the best kind of commanders. Men who have no axes to grind, who are not dependent on votes, who have for generations been trained in the art of commanding men, and whose integrity is beyond question, are much rarer in a nation which has been raised from purely democratic seed, than in one in which an aristocratic essence has been diluted by a

strong democratic infusion.

This war has supplied a temporary solution, but the same difficulty may possibly recur in the future. Canada has in the meanwhile solved the difficulty by only granting commissions to selected N.C.O.'s who have proved their worth on active service. These were sent back to England for a three-months' course in a Cadet School, and, if approved, became officers in the Dominion Army on the termination of their probation. The system is an excellent one, but searching and practical tests of this nature can only be applied in time of war, and if this type of officer is to be maintained some better test than that which was in force before the war will have to be discovered and strictly enforced. Now that compulsion has been accepted this will be easier than hefore.

As this war progressed, and the contest became one which practically included the whole world, our outlook changed. The contending sides, instead of the narrow view of mere territorial gain, or money indemnification, kept steadily before their eyes the all-important principle involved in the upholding of the rights of man as opposed to his subjection to

the will of an autocrat whose super-mental endowments and capacity to rule over millions of subjects were no longer believed in. During this prolonged contest the conduct of the British Dominions has given no encouragement to our enemies, and has been marked by unswerving loyalty and devotion to the common cause. The Armies of our Empire are representative of the different States which compose it. We are about to include in our landscape some of those who are known as our Dominion Armies.

CANADA

When the war broke out, in August, 1914, both Liberals and Conservatives in Canada, where there is no Labour Party, were in agreement as to the necessity of the country joining in the war. In peace time Canada, with a population of 7,250,000, maintained a Militia Force of 71,000, with an estimated war strength of 75,000, under a Voluntary system with the power of conscription reserved. At Kingston, Canada has a long-established and very good Military College at which many officers in the Imperial Army have been trained.

The continued duration of the war with its constant drain (up to August, 1918, Canada had suffered over 100,000 casualties) on the best manhood of the nation, caused Canada to have recourse to some form of compulsion. It cost her a new session of Parliament to confirm the Act passed, and in operation, which made universal service obligatory. The case for conscription being strengthened by the

timely entrance of America into the war with a complete scheme for conscription from the very start.

On December 17, 1917, the Union Government of Canada came into power well backed by the nation. The total votes for the Government was 206,626; for other candidates, 15,016. So strong was the feeling in favour of conscription that many Labour Unionists voted for the Government who, in the ordinary political election, would have supported the ordinary official nominee of labour.

Ninety-three per cent. of the votes of soldiers were polled for the coalition and for conscription. It devoted its labours to two main objects. The supply of fighting men and stimulation of

agriculture.

The valuable services rendered to the Empire on the Western Front are well known to all. In most of our great battles the Canadians have taken a leading part.

Canadian thoroughness and determination to put their house in order has found expression in the new Bill for National Registration, by which every Canadian of both sexes over sixteen years of age is required, under severe penalties for non-observance, to answer questions which will determine the manner in which he or she can best serve the State. The collection of this information does not necessarily mean compulsion, but makes manifest the determination of the Government to utilise if need be the whole human power of the nation in the most effective manner possible.

We embarked upon this struggle without a National Organisation such as is necessary for Modern War, and have suffered much in consequence. In the war of to-day, when every unit of human power has to be turned to the best advantage, good peace preparations will always form the prelude to the successful prosecution of a war.

The Canadians have also determined to root up, or at any rate to mitigate, the patronage evil, and we shall do well to make an attempt to follow their example. The bed rock of our dealings should be justice. So long as patronage over-rides justice we are building on a foundation of sand. The advance in power made by patronage since we have adopted a system of dual control in our Army can only be revealed when the curtain goes up and the muzzle has been removed at the end of the war.

AUSTRALIA

The splendid type of manhood both as regards appearance and character presented by the Australian soldiers has won the admiration of our race and the respect of our enemies. Their national traits of keenness and determination have enabled them to maintain a very high percentage of their numbers in the firing line. Next to New Zealand, they supplied the largest numbers of men in proportion to their population. They have maintained five Divisions in France and a mounted one in Palestine. Up to December 31, 1917, 310,000 soldiers out of a population of five millions had been transported 12,000 miles to the scene of battle;

50,632 of these had been killed, and they had suffered 253,588 casualties—a pride inspiring record, especially when we consider that before the war Australia had an actual Militia strength of 105,000, with an estimated war strength of 150,000, service in the Militia for Home Defence being compulsory. While we in Great Britain had, through want of education in patriotism and general softness, submitted to the emasculation of the Territorial Force Bill by removing from it the support of a preliminary boy training, cadet training in Australia became compulsory in 1910, a Federal law of that year ordering all boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen to devote annually sixty-four hours to Militia training. On June 27, 1911, the Military College of Duntroon was opened by the Governor General, where 150 cadets (including a certain number from New Zealand) are trained. The effect of their manly measures has been too often overlooked. Much of the excellence of their soldiers and the comparative ease with which they adopted military modes has been, like their warlike predecessors of Sparta, due to their juvenile military training. The Australians have not for political reasons been in a position to adopt compulsion. In their country for various reasons the formation of a truly Coalition National Government was practically impossible. The new labour school, led by what have been termed the industrial extremists. placed a fusion of political parties and a temporary political truce beyond the range of practical politics. The General Election of May, 1917, brought in the

Coalition Government, or "Win-the-War" Party, who gave the pledge not to enforce conscription unless the national safety demanded it, when a second referendum was to be taken.

This second referendum, which had become necessary because the 7000 men per month necessary to maintain the Divisions in Europe were not procurable under a voluntary system, was taken on December 20, 1917, when it was decided by a majority of 166,588, and in spite of the following pledges, not to adopt compulsion.

(I) That the power asked for be limited to the

period of the war.

(2) That the limits of powers will not be exceeded.

(3) That the number of Divisions will not be increased.

(4) That married men will be exempt.

(5) That sufficient labour to carry on the necessary industries of the country, including the rural

industries, will be exempted.

The overseas returned a small majority in favour of compulsion—91,642 "Yesses" against 89,859 "Noes," a majority of 1783. Had we possessed a military orator capable of making a stirring and eloquent personal appeal to the Australian soldiers in France such as Napoleon would have done, this majority would probably have been largely increased. The opportunity was there, but not the man.

NEW ZEALAND

The following extract from the report of the Defence Expenditure Commission of New Zealand,

published in 1918, speaks for itself: "Forty million pounds has been spent and there have been no frauds. An army of 100,000 men excellently and fully equipped has been carried to the other end of the world." In this report the hospital services

are specially praised.

On the basis of population New Zealand holds the leading place in our Dominion Armies for the proportion of men enrolled. With a population of about one million it has raised one soldier from every ten of its inhabitants. The quality of these troops is of the very best. At the commencement of the war the New Zealand Army suffered from a considerable disadvantage in one respect. It had no officers' training establishment, a certain number of officers were, however, trained at the Australian Military College at Duntroon. Since the war began. however, New Zealand has solved this difficulty in the same manner as Canada and Australia, by obtaining the large majority of its officers by promotion from the ranks. For some years previous to 1914 the country had adopted compulsory cadet training, and had also a light form of universal compulsory training. Compulsion for service beyond their native shores was not adopted until later.

The Maoris have supplied a very fine Pioneer Force. They represent one of the finest types of aboriginal races.

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa had one great advantage in comparison with the other Dominion Armies when the

war began. The Boer War had left her with a large number of men who had not only knowledge of, but practical experience in, fighting under the most modern conditions. At the head of her forces stood men whose past record as leaders in the field entitled them to the confidence and respect of those whom they commanded. They soon justified that confidence by their successful conduct of the South-West African campaign under General Botha, a success which was soon followed by another when General Smuts, one of the finest leaders the war has produced, after a most arduous and brilliant campaign, freed German East Africa of its Teuton tyrant, reducing its former garrison to a nomadic armed caravan which endeavoured to play out time till the war should terminate its gallant defence.

South Africa has a population of about 6,000,000. Service in its army is voluntary, with the power of conscription reserved. The actual strength in Peace was 20,000, with an estimate war strength of 28,000. They have no system of cadet training.

In addition to the two campaigns referred to above, we have always had on the Western Front a South African Brigade, with a very fine record for fighting efficiency. The Kaffirs, Zulus, and Basutos have supplied some very important and useful contingents for service in rear of the fighting line.

Ask any one who has seen much actual fighting from our side in this war whom he considers to be the best troops with whom he has been associated. He will probably reply, "The Guards and the Cantralians" (an imaginary name for some of our

Dominion troops). The discipline of these two denominations is in both cases effective, it is, however, of a very different type. Judged by pre-war peace standards some of us would probably have described the Cantralians as "hopeless" or "impossible." The Guards represent physically the pick of our manhood. They are led by perhaps the finest type of officer in the world, the incarnation of aristocracy, conservatism, and tradition. The Cantralians impersonate a complete contrast to all those qualities. They are democratic, progressive, and natural. They, with every right, claim to be second to none as a fighting force. The verdict of many who have fought side by side with them in the field supports this view. We have here the embodiment of two distinct types which remind us what our old Regular Army was, and suggest what our New National Army should be. In building up the latter it will be as well if we keep this picture before our eves, as it may serve to remind us that Victory is not always the exclusive reward of those who are, in the opinion of some of us, most deserving of her favours. We shall never get in a National Army the fine finish and outward discipline of the Guards, who are a corps d'élite, and will always remain a model of the highest standard of these soldierlike qualities. In our islands we have a weakness for unconsciously mimicking those whom we in truth regard as our social superiors. In the eyes of some it is a much worse offence to eat peas with a knife and jelly with a spoon than to do any of the don'ts of the decalogue. In our colonies there is not the same temptation.

Our Dominion Armies may almost be described as the Military Nonconformists of to-day. Let us hear what a successful Dominion General has to say on this point.

In an interview published in the Observer, September 22, 1918, General Sir John Monash

is reported to have said-

"Our success was due in a large part to the devotion and skill of our junior officers. Of these 93 per cent, are from the ranks. We have a democratic army. We were told that our system of wholesale promotion from the ranks would deprive us of our officer caste, and that this would be a bad thing. We have found the exact contrary to be the truth. Our democratic system has been a success in every particular. By opening the way to ambition it has stimulated ambition, and we have reaped the benefit of the enterprise of ambitious men. There is only one doorway into our commissioned service now. and that doorway is through the ranks. Many of our junior officers who rose from privates have been dazzling successes. Two of them have won the V.C., the D.S.O., and the M.C., with a bar to each. thus doubling the highest honours in the Service. In the whole Australian Army at this moment there is only one brigadier whose regular profession is that of soldiering. The others are so-called citizens or civilian soldiers, like the officers of the American State Militia.

"One has heard a good deal of scepticism on the question of the discipline of the Australian troops. Some thought we had too much freedom in our Army,

too much of the spirit of civil life, too little of the character of a machine. Now, look at those men out there (we were spinning past straggling groups of Australian soldiers in a field near the roadside), the General is passing, but they carry on. We do not make too much of the mere signs of discipline, but discipline itself. There is one supreme and final test of discipline. It is that every man at the appointed time and place should be on hand and resolute to do his job. By this test the Australian Army passes 100 per cent. clean. Cohesion we have, team-work we have; but within their proper range we release the intelligence and initiative of the individual.

"Australians are sportsmen. They are used to co-ordinate effort on the football field. They are used to working together in their unions and other societies. As in civil life they succeed in reconciling a healthy individualism with an effective collectivism, so do they on the field of battle. We have no evidence whatever that the soldiers of an autocracy and of a military machine built of the bodies of men can claim any superiority over an army composed of the citizens of a free and educated country who carry into their military enterprise much of the spirit of their unhampered life in peace. Not only do we not lack any such evidence; we possess abundant proof to the contrary."

Those of us who remember the days when the Indian Civil Service was thrown open to unrestricted competition will recollect the dismal prophecies as to the bad effect the "competition-wallah" would

have on those entrusted to his care, the dangers ahead if the right men were not selected for these most important posts. We all know the actual result. The numerous cases of men of humble origin who have through merit won well-deserved promotion to commissions, combined with the fore-shadowed and far-reaching intellectual progress which may be expected as a result of the new Education Bill, alike demand that an equal share in the officering of our Army should fall to all shades of social status.

A retrospect cannot fail to convince the unprejudiced that we had got our military picture somewhat out of focus in pre-war days. Compare, for instance, the losses suffered, the rewards given, and the results achieved in connection with the battle of Omdurman (at which a single officer was killed by a chance shot) with those of the campaign unostentatiously carried out by South African troops, and which resulted in the complete conquest of German S.W. Africa. We need from time to time a George Washington, or a Louis Botha to remind us that paid soldiers, however good, will never be a match, man for man, for brave men fighting for imagined rights and imbued with intense patriotism.

Educated men, and all will very soon be educated, can very rapidly be made into the soldiers of to-day. The conditions of modern warfare preclude great surprises, especially at the opening of a campaign, and therefore the long periods of Military training hitherto considered essential can be considerably

curtailed. With trained nations in arms the highly trained professional soldier loses his value, other things being equal, the expert professional few are no longer the complete masters of the semi-trained many.

In these days of trench and machine-gun warfare the costly maintenance of mechanically drilled men, who are little better than volunteers for actual fighting, seems out of date. The question of equipment is a more important factor in winning battles, and points to the necessity of developing our industrial plants and arsenals rather than of expanding our

highly trained standing Army.

The Anzac and Canadian Corps had the solid advantage of always preserving the same formation which permitted the general in command of each body to have an intimate acquaintance with all his Divisional Generals and their Staffs. This intimacy fostered that feeling of fellowship which created a sentiment seeking a common credit throughout the whole Force. Unlike most continental nations which started the war with a thoroughly organised system of localised corps, each drawn from and based on its own special district like the Bavarians, Pomeranians, etc., we endeavoured to build up our corps system as we went along; the original idea being a corps composed of three Divisions, one of which was to be a Regular Army one, a second taken from the Territorial Army, the third being a New Army (Kitchener's) Division. As I have explained elsewhere, the composition of our Armies and Corps was in a state of perpetual flux and unending change

which militated against the best and most efficient system of higher training, and although it increased the patronage of General Headquarters, overstrained

its powers.

The equal distribution of rewards and appointments between officers of the Regular Army, Kitchener's New Army and the Territorial Force Army, complicated by a different system of promotion in their cavalry, artillery, engineers and infantry, did not vex our Dominion Armies. They have one category for all officers and made no distinctions with regard to promotion. There was no strong professional coterie, saturated with pre-war prejudices who opposed the advancement of an officer who has started the war in the Territorial Force, because he had had no previous training in the Regular Army, in spite of the fact that he had had several years' experience in the matchless school of active service. Patronage lost influence in our Dominion Armies as the war progressed, and political claims, so strong at its commencement, were soon merged into a general desire for the advancement of the most efficient.

Our Dominion Armies will teach us many useful lessons, and upheave many deep-rooted traditions. They will not have Dress Regulations which necessitate a large volume of explanation, illustrated by numerous plates, nor will they be under the heel of the Military tailor. Their promotion list will be quite a simple one. The monotonous Mess Parade with its six-course dinner and expensive establishment will find little favour with them, nor will they

maintain brass and string bands at the expense of their officers, which in no way add to modern military efficiency and have to be left behind when active service commences. They will not waste weeks of time in writing that one man has the honour to be the obedient servant of another, nor will they ever submit to that procrustean precision and automatonlike discipline dear to the eve of the old professional soldier. Will they be any worse soldiers in consequence? We can certainly point with pride to the deeds of our officers in the past, but have we not too much exaggerated the influence of Military tradition and esprit de corps, and given too little credit to simple patriotism and to the inborn qualities of our race? Is one member of a family a braver man than the others because he dons the dress of a sailor or soldier? Does any one maintain that our troops fought with less bravery and determination at the end of the war than at its commencement? Yet simple patriotism had to a great extent replaced esprit de corps, and the rivalry for mere regimental renown had become merged into the sentiment of a common national credit. There was more thought of the common cause, less of the mere exaltation of the unit.

This war has been won not by our strategy, tactics or organisation, but by the grit and determination of our race from all parts of the Empire. Had we been the decadent people our enemies imagined, no Military prowess on the part of our leaders would have availed. Happily one can still with national pride repeat the stirring lines of

Goldsmith, descriptive of the Britons of his day, and which applies with equal force to their descendants.

"Pride in their port, defiance in their eye,
I see the lords of human kind pass by,
Intent on high designs, a thoughtful band,
By forms unfashioned, fresh from nature's hand,
Fierce in their native hardiness of soul,
True to imagined right, above control,—
While e'en the peasant boasts these rights to scan,
And learns to venerate himself as man."

When Lord Kitchener presented India with a Staff College, he bestowed on it one of the things it needed most, as has been proved by the splendid work it has since accomplished. Our Dominion Armies require the means of training their own staffs. and if they are wise each of them will establish its own Staff College. All officers who aspire to fill high commands should have had a Staff training in their youth so that they understand the working of the Military Machine in all its details, and thus feel that superiority which results from knowledge of their work. It is not sufficient to have ideas, you must also know what are the precise duties of each officer on your Staff. The man who can at once put his finger on the part of the mechanism that is not doing its proper share, is the one who will always have the engine running smoothly. On the other hand, the man who suddenly finds himself in command of a Division or a Corps without previous Staff experience, either clings too closely to his Chief of the Staff, or with a jealous mistrust impedes him in his duties by too closely circumscribing his action.

The officer who has had previous Staff training knows what is his exact share of the burden, and while giving him a free hand retains the full power of control in his own. Another advantage of Staff Colleges with an interchange of the teaching staffs, is that, if properly managed, they lead to that unity of doctrine throughout the whole system of Armies which is so essential to combined effort. In Staff Colleges also the latest Military literature is studied. and so the Army is kept up to date. As some misconceptions with regard to a Staff College training exist, I may lay stress on the point, that every student is so to speak under a Military microscope for two years, during which period a number of receptive minds in close contact are exchanging information with regard to the higher branches of their profession. The professors merely instruct, it is the students who educate or draw out power from the different characters.

A proposal has been made that our Dominion Armies should be invited to consider a scheme whereby they would always keep ready the skeleton of a small contingent which would form part of what we have hitherto termed our Expeditionary Force, and thus take a share in the responsibility for the common defence of the Empire of which they form a constituent part. For too long the Dominions have been content to accept as a matter of course the good things granted them by a generous Imperial power. They have neither shared the responsibility for the manner in which this power is used, nor taken their full share of the sacrifices necessary for its sustenance.

Up to the present the financial burden of Imperial Defence has rested entirely on the shoulders of the tax-payer of the United Kingdom. The functions of this force have already been explained. It would be almost entirely composed of volunteers engaged for the period of the small war on hand. The objects of this proposal are—

(r) That when volunteers are required experience tells us that once you are in a position to reject you will always obtain a better class of applicant than when it is known that practically any one will be accepted. In England we might possibly be unable to get enough men of the desired stamp to volunteer and might therefore find ourselves in the latter unenviable position.

(2) The Dominions can in some instances provide us with the type of man we want, but which we cannot procure in England. Australia and South Africa, for instance, can furnish us with the best type of mounted infantryman, a more useful auxiliary for uncivilised countries than the ordinary regular trooper.

(3) The raising and equipping of such a contingent, and the experience given to staffs and junior officers who accompanied it, would be of great service to the Army which supplied it, and would do much to keep it up to date in modern methods and in warlike appliances.

(4) This common service would help to tighten the bonds which unite our Imperial Army.

Stress has been laid upon the importance of holding an Imperial Army Conference at the end of this war, and we should not allow such an opportunity to pass. We hope that, therefore, before long our Imperial Council will be firmly established on a lasting basis with defined functions and real power. The corollary to this would naturally be the formation of an Imperial General Staff with full executive powers to co-ordinate our Imperial Forces so that we may be able to get the best out of each portion of it and all may combine as a harmonious whole.

These are the days of standardisation in ships, guns, motors, even "dug-outs." The armament and equipment of our Imperial Forces will be both cheapened and improved if we can adopt one standard for all, so that a surplus in one Army can be transferred to another for the common good. In the past, private interests and local jealousies have interfered with the best measures being taken for the common weal.

The Ross rifle may be taken as a case in point. Had a really representative Imperial General Staff been in existence, it is possible that the Canadian Government might have yielded to the desires to have one pattern of rifle for all troops throughout the Empire.

A Council or Assemblage in which such matters would be freely discussed with a view to arriving at a fair and final decision which would be accepted by all, is much more likely to be successful than when it is the case of the "Mother Country," as we have styled ourselves, endeavouring to persuade a wilful child that it should buy something with its pocket money that it does not want, but that it is told is

good for it. We all know the attitude of the child under such circumstances.

The harmonious union of our Imperial Naval and Military Forces is an ideal well worth striving to attain. To accomplish it concessions, even sacrifices, will have to be made, and we shall be wise to make them. This war has revealed to us many defects in our armour, and has entirely altered the focus of our Imperial defence picture. The lesson that radius of action of a Territorial Army is not confined to the defence of its own country is one that has been laid to heart both by ourselves and by our Dominions.

It is a remarkable fact that while our Imperial Army very much increased the power of patronage and narrowed its field of choice with regard to its officers as the war progressed, our Dominion Armies offered increasing opportunities for distinction, advancement, and rapid promotion to officers of all ranks who displayed outstanding ability, irrespective of their social status or arm of the Service.

At the commencement of the war we acted as the military tutor of our Dominion Armies. The pupil has now learnt his lesson and may in turn be able to give some useful instruction to his former preceptors.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIVE TROOPS OF AFRICA AND THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

As long as we have to fight in tropical countries we shall require the aid of native troops. They are as necessary to us as sun helmets and summer clothing.

Selections from the martial races of our Indian subjects have for centuries been trained to fight for and against Europeans. The native tribes of Africa, who are suitable for soldiers, have only comparatively recently been instructed in the art of modern warfare. It is true they commenced their education with quickfiring and machine guns, instead of with flintlocks and jingals. Our Indian Army is a much more finished force than anything we attempted to produce in Africa prior to the war, the troops of Central, West and East Africa were, for the most part, merely Military Police administered in the majority of cases by the Colonial Office. The African native is not nearly such a civilised being as the Indian, and takes a long time to train. Those of good fighting tribes are of little use before they have had fully a year's training with officers conversant with local conditions, and even then they must be used with care. This was the experience of the officer who had to take command at a period when many of the European

troops had left East Africa and the organisation and training of the new battalions of the King's African Rifles, which in part supplied the place of the white troops evacuated, was being pushed forward with all speed. A comparison of the two races has been made by the statement that if you left a number of Indians alone on an island cut off from the rest of the world and returned in one hundred years, you would probably find some marked signs of civilisation in the form of buildings and art. Treating the Africans in the same way, you would in all likelihood return to find nothing but the savage enthroned in the midst of his savagery. However this may be, there is no disputing that the Asiatic native stands on a much higher plane of civilisation than the present inhabitants of Central Africa. One of our coming problems in India will be to meet the aspirations of a certain section of the population to become officers holding an equal position with European officers. No such difficulty will for some time arise with regard to our African troops. Sir Theodore Morrison has made the proposal that German East Africa should become the colonisation ground of the Indian, who is excluded from Australia, South Africa. and Canada, and seeks a territory for expansion. The culture of the Arian could in this manner insensibly be transmifted to the untutored savage of Central Africa. There is too-great a gap between the present African native and the Modern Western. We require a preparation process which can well be performed by the intercourse between native and native. In so far as this would mean the peaceful

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development of the country and the gradual elevation of the mental powers of its present inhabitants, the proposal would appear to offer a possible solution of the African problem. Beyond a comparatively small force of police or armed gendarmes to keep order, there would be no necessity for the up-keep of a large armed force.

During the present war the employment of coloured troops became more widely advocated as our man-power decreased and as it became more and more evident that superiority in numbers would lead to ultimate economy in life in bringing the war to a successful conclusion. To get the best out of these auxiliaries you must be careful to employ them in the proper place and in the proper manner; when this is done, provided they have been carefully selected from the proper fighting classes, there will be no doubt with regard to their efficiency. In the last stages of our campaign in East Africa we had to employ a larger number of Native African troops than at the beginning on account of the great heat which had commenced to tell against the Europeans; the decline in the moral of the native troops employed by the Germans having made them a less formidable foe than they originally were. The results proved the wisdom of this procedure.

In an interview after his arrival in London General Smuts said (Times, 13.3.17):-" All South African white troops have, with few exceptions, left the country and the campaign will be brought to an end by the native battalions I have trained. I soon saw that white troops could not stand the climate

for long. The native troops, who make splendid infantry, have proved very good fighters, and have done magnificent work, and when the campaign is over will be available elsewhere." As a result of these steps over 12,000 white troops were evacuated from East Africa between the middle of October and the end of December, 1916. places were to some extent taken by the new King's African Rifles battalions which General Smuts was forming and training with the sanction of the War Office, as well as by the Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe, which reached Dar-es-Salaam in the second and third weeks in December. The Askaris appear to have fought well, and as they have met some of our Indian troops, we should be able to form a fair estimate of their relative value. It is only just to admit that the German officers and N.C.O.'s have proved themselves to be better trainers and leaders of native troops than we were inclined to acknowledge. Under their guidance the Askaris made good and faithful soldiers and, although subjected to hardships and discouragements, do not appear to have deserted in any considerable numbers.

The Askaris (derived from "lashkar," an army) were not, as was at one time supposed, recruited from a particular warlike class as from a definite section of the native population. They were as mixed in composition as the elements composing our King's African Rifles—Arabs, Somalis, Nubians, etc., all found places among them. The remarkable fidelity they displayed to their German masters was due to two things—pay and prestige. They were better

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paid than our native troops and were permeated by the spirit of German militarism which loses no opportunity of placing the military above the civil.

We might perhaps with advantage enlist as many as possible in our African Army and employ them in some other theatre of the war. With regard to the quality of these troops the following quotation from a speech delivered by General Smuts at Pretoria on his return from East Africa on January 26, 1917, is of great interest.

"Young South Africans at the outset had thought they could easily conquer the black German troops, but they soon revised that opinion. His fellow officers declared they had never fought against

better or braver troops.",

The French have made considerable use of coloured troops in the Western theatre, and it will be-interesting to hear their opinion of them at the conclusion of the war.

In a paper read before the Society of Arts in May, 1917, Captain Phillipe Millet estimated that Algeria, Morocco, and Tunis alone had contributed an aggregate force of at least 270,000 men to the French armies, but whether as combatant or non-combatant troops was not stated. There were, besides these, Anamites and residents of Cochin China. Most of our Eastern armies have all their work behind the fighting line performed by black or yellow men.

We have not always been wise in the employment of our native troops. In Mesopotamia, for instance,

religious prejudices that might have been foreseen occasioned what appeared to be quite unnecessary trouble, which culminated in the disgrace of one, at least, of our best regiments. In France a little forethought might have warned us that the Germans would be certain to concentrate their efforts against our Indian troops as soon as they appeared in the front line, with a view to destroying their morale. These tactics could have been foreseen and avoided by interspersing the Indian battalions among our British troops and thus both mystifying the enemy as to their location and also giving the native troops more confidence. This was the course pursued with regard to our first landed Territorial battalions, and it was certainly a wise one. I am aware that there were food difficulties to be overcome in adopting such a course, but these would only have been of a temporary nature, for as soon as the natives had gained confidence and become accustomed to the shelling it would have been possible to make them into Brigades with an equal number of Europeans to natives. The original proportion of I British to 3 Indian battalions per brigade is not a sufficient stiffening for European warfare.

During the latter stages of the South African War some of the mobile columns made use of companies of Kaffirs for digging, especially during the "drives." The principle might have been extended in the Eastern theatre of this war and the experiment made of attaching so many natives to each company for digging, road-making, carrying parties, and general fatigue works. Something of this kind is

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done in the German Army where in some cases the diggers are an entirely separate body from the fighters, to keep the latter fresh for their duties. The average Briton is a good fighter, but an indifferent worker. The German prisoners opened our eyes with regard to their power of work. Natives are, as a rule, much more at home in the dark than Europeans, a useful asset when so much has to be done at night. The splendid physique of the Kaffirs and Zulus would enable them to do much more labour than could be expected from our town-bred lads.

The question of the employment of native troops in civilised fighting opens a big subject. They were used in the American Civil War, and by the French in 1870.

We brought Indian troops to Malta with a view to using them against Russia in 1878. There is, however, a difference between using them as mere auxiliaries and using them to perform a duty which ought to be carried out by the citizens of the State on whose side they are enlisted to fight. We are now engaged in a struggle for liberty, and we believe that the nations of the world will be more happily governed under the principles we advocate than under those professed by our enemies. At the commencement of the war there was a marked tendency in some quarters to advocate the employment of large numbers of natives to perform a duty which should primarily have fallen on the citizens of Great Britain. During the first days of our reverses people asked. Where are the Russians,

French, Belgians, Indians, Canadians, Australians, but seldom what the British were about to do. This attitude completely changed as soon as the real nature of the war was grasped, and now we are fighting our own battles and there seems no reason why we should not make every use of the undoubted power over subject races which our just and beneficent ruling of the weak and ignorant has given us. We can certainly use them with a clear conscience against the Turks, Arabs, and Bulgars who have joined themselves to the side and cause of Germany. I do not think we require the assistance of native troops in the Western theatre, but can see no reason why we should not employ them on suitable portions of our Eastern front. It is not, however, so much the quality, or the fighting value, of the African native troops that counts as an imperial asset, it is the splendid training-ground for young officers that both the Egyptian and African armies afford. 1914 there were over 200 officers attached to the former, about 400 to the different forces of the latter. These were all detached from different regiments and loaned in the case of the Egyptian Army to the Government of that country, to the Colonial Office in the case of the various African corps. Of the value of the training there can be no question. It is a life that brings out all the best qualities in a young man, and one that specially appeals to the instincts of our race. What India was in the old days and Egypt in more recent times, such is Africa in many parts to-day. A life which offers independence, responsibility, sport, and

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adventure of all kinds. What more can a young man desire?

A system of reciprocity has been proposed between the officers of the Home and Indian Armies, and provided liberal terms are offered and the periods of leave synchronise with those when officers are needed for training, there seems no reason why some arrangement of the same kind, to the mutual advantage of both parties concerned, should not be possible between the Colonial Office and the War Office. This appears to be one of the many directions in which an Imperial General Staff might combine economy and efficiency in our Imperial

Army.

Our African Army has a special interest, as it may, under certain circumstances, play an important part in the future. So far we have made no serious attempt to exploit our African warlike races. certainly not to the same extent that either the French or the Germans have done. The former were in 1914 credited with having 30,000 coloured soldiers raised in their African colonies fighting in France. At the beginning of the campaign in East Africa the latter were reported to have had a total force of 16,000 men, two thousand of whom were Germans. I have no reliable details to hand, but I do not think that the combined total of our African forces, not including those in Egypt and South Africa, could in 1914 have amounted to over 12,000 all told. This force was mainly composed of the following units:—The West African and Nigerian Regiments. and the King's African Rifles, the Sierra Leone Battalion, the Somali Contingent, and the Gold Coast Regiment, some batteries of Artillery, and

auxiliary troops.

The wisdom of training numbers of African natives in the use of modern weapons and in the art of modern war is much questioned by a white population that is destined to live in a country in which the problem of coexistence with a virile, rapidly increasing, and self-asserting, black majority is an

ever present one.

Africa contains many of what have been termed the "child" races of the world. The position of the country possessing African Colonies should be one of trust not ownership, and the population should not be exploited for the benefit of any single nation. It is not the militarisation of Africa that is wanted, but its development as a great source of supplies and producer of raw material for other nations of the world. The object lesson provided by the treatment of subject races like those inhabiting Egypt and Mesopotamia by Turkey, where some of the most fertile countries in the world have been reduced to a partial desert through misrule, should not be lost on mankind.

Should we return German East Africa or any portion of it to the Germans they will soon re-establish their Native Army and make every effort to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the natives, and so regain their lost prestige; while, on the other hand, we should not lose the present opportunity of impressing on the natives that we are the superiors of the Germans and have driven them from Africa.

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As in the old days of our struggle with the French in the Indian peninsula we should have to maintain a force to counterbalance the German native contingent. In view of what has been already stated, some limitation of the forces to be trained in Africa seems worthy of consideration if the progress of the present native races in civilisation is to be placed above their mere exploitation for the temporary pre-eminence of this or that European nation.

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

The modern Army of Egypt has been likened unto a garden in the desert which was sown and cultivated by a great gardener. He planted it with the best English seeds, and these in time brought forth beautiful flowers and fruit. One day the great gardener left. The garden still remains, but it is a very ordinary garden, and only produces a few blossoms and some native vegetables; no longer the profusion of flowers and fruits once so much admired by us all. These have been transplanted into every part of the Empire. Many of them have thrived, a few flourished; some have not stood the transplanting.

At the zenith of its pride the Egyptian Army attracted many of our ablest and most ambitious officers. It was a land of promise where captains commanded battalions, colonels blossomed into generals, and where efficiency was the quickest road to success. Lord Kitchener could pick and choose his officers. No one was more capable of making the best selection. His Staff officers were trained

to fend for themselves and to make the most of what was given them; sometimes even of what was not given them.

Those were the days of "corn in Egypt," and in some respects the situation was reminiscent of a rush to newly reported gold diggings. Soldiers flocked to try their luck, instead of gold they won promotion, military reputation and decorations. The South African War saved our Army from the domination of a set who had won fame too easily, and soon taught us that Boer farmers armed with the latest weapons and actuated by common sense, were at least the equal of men on whose breasts shone rows of military decorations and whose training seemed to have ruled out adaptability to a form of warfare to which they were unaccustomed. The purifying fire of the two and a half years' campaign in South Africa slowly but surely separated the gold from the dross and left us with the foundations of an Army which was, twelve years later, to prove its worth in another and far more exacting trial of strength.

During the present war Egypt and her voluntarily enlisted army have played a useful part. The ranging of Turkey on the side of our enemies, followed by the desertion of the ill-advised Khedive, removed from our path the troublesome suzerainic claims of the former and the disloyalty and veiled hostility of the latter. By Proclamation issued on November 6, 1914, Great Britain took upon herself the whole burden of the war, so far as Egypt was concerned, and we have remained true to our pledge.

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Egypt has, however, contributed generously both directly and indirectly to the successful prosecution of the war. Our wise and just rule, which insured the well-being of the toiling masses, produced a contentment which was proof against all attempts made by the numerous paid political agitators of Germany and Turkey to seduce these from their loyalty and to stir up among them religious strife. So successful has been our policy in this respect that, instead of having to keep a force to guard the interior of the country from insurrection, we were able to send an army to the Sudan and to accomplish the reconquest of Dafur, a work performed almost entirely by Egyptian troops led by British officers. From first to last there has been an absence of agitation and disaffection in the country.

. In addition to her actual fighting troops Egypt has furnished two very useful bodies for Labour and Transport—the Egyptian Labour Corps for work in the back areas and the Egyptian Camel Transport for the conveyance of supplies from railhead to the front lines. The Labour Corps has increased until it is numbered by thousands, and has detachments in France, Salonika, and Mesopotamia, where it has freed many of our soldiers for work in the firing line. The native of Lower Egypt, though robust and a hard worker, has few martial qualities, and this would appear to be his most useful rôle. Centuries of oppression seems to have crushed all independence out of his character. Even in the days of their greatness the Egyptians were never a warlike people. "Egypt loved peace because it loved

justice. It maintained soldiers then, as now, only for its security. Its inhabitants, with a country which abounded in all things, had no ambitious dreams of conquest. The Egyptians extended their reputation in a very different manner by sending colonies into all parts of the world and with them laws and politeness. They triumphed by the wisdom of their counsels and the superiority of their knowledge, and this Empire of the mind appeared more noble and glorious to them than that which is achieved by arms and conquest "(Rollin).

The Sudanese, from the land of Cush, are descendants of the Ethiopians; when led by British officers are brave soldiers. They have the good

and the bad qualities of the savage.

Egypt standing alone is not, however, yet capable either of keeping the peace within her own borders or of defending herself from outside aggression. She will for many years to come need a force trained, organised and commanded by British officers and stiffened by a small contingent of British soldiers. This force will not add to the fighting strength of the Empire. It will, however, serve the useful purpose of insuring us against internal outbursts which might embarrass us at a critical moment.

The Sudan is a fine training-ground for young and adventurous officers. Its subjection has cost us a considerable number of valuable lives, but it will ever remain a monument to the ability of the British race to conquer, rule, and administer those portions of the world which Providence has confided to their care.

CHAPTER VII

MEDEN AGAN!

This chapter may give rise to a certain amount of comment. I wish therefore to make it quite clear at the outset that it is no part of my object to detract from the very great services rendered by our splendid

Cavalry in this war.

Special sectional privileges should, however, find no place in a national army, a primary essential of which is rational justice. What has resulted from an unequal system of promotion and leanings towards a particular type of officer is plain and certainly calls for redress. The statement of what has taken place in our Army since the suspension of the Selection Board is a straightforward one, and can be either defended or disproved by those concerned. I am quite content to await the judgment of the public after they have heard the evidence on both sides.

- (A) "I am going to put my boy into the Army. He is very keen to get on, and wants to make a real profession of it. What branch of the Service should he join?"
- (B) "What allowance do you propose to make him?"
 - (A) "Between £300 and £400 a year."

(B) "In that case it is quite easy to answer your question. Put him into the Cavalry every time."

The above imaginary conversation between (A), an anxious parent, and (B), an intelligent officer of experience, must often have taken place in reality in the pre-war days. The soundness of this advice is amply justified in the following pages.

"Let every man praise the bridge he goes over," says an old saw, more especially let the fortunate cavalryman praise one which is passable by Cavalry in fours—by the other arms in single file only.

The concluding operations of the South African War were conducted almost entirely by means of small mobile columns, with the natural result that the mounted arms of the Service came into prominence. The end of the war found us with not only a strong Cavalry contingent at the head of our Army, but, also with a large number of young officers of that arm whose numerous opportunities had proved them to be men fit for rapid advancement, and whose future career was an assured one.

We commenced the present war with high hopes of what our fine Cavalry would be able to achieve. Without in any way detracting from the splendid services they have on all occasions rendered, and magnificent spirit they have displayed throughout, there is no disputing the fact that the opportunities for Cavalry action, as were conceived in the past, have not arisen on the main Western Front. Nevertheless as the war progressed and our Army expanded, a preference for higher commands was very rightly given to young active men and, as was natural,

more particularly to those who were known to their friends in office, and so it comes about that at the present time a very large proportion of Cavalry officers are at the head of our Army. The following figures will give some idea of what has actually occurred.

The Army Estimates for 1914 show that, exclusive of India, the number of officers in the different branches of the Service was as follows:—

| Foot Guards and | Infantry | | . 3414 |
|--------------------|-----------|----------|---------|
| Artillery (R.H.A., | R.F.A., a | nd R.G.A | .) 1313 |
| Royal Engineers | | | . 705 |
| Cavalry . | | | . 507 |

In other words that for every Cavalry officer in the Home Army at the commencement of the war there were nearly 10 of the other branches of the Service.

During the war no increase has been made in the Cavalry. It is difficult to say by how much the other arms have increased. We began with 6 divisions, and so far we have over 70. Allowing, however, that they have increased to tenfold we may safely say that there are at the present moment at least 100 officers of the other arms to each Cavalry officer!*

In spite of this disparity Cavalry officers are holding and have held the following appointments. They cannot certainly be accused of not profiting by their early teaching to rapidly seize favourable opportunities.

^{*} As the number of officers in the Royal Artillery has since the commencement of the war increased from 2500 to 28,000, this can hardly be termed an overestimate.

Lord French, C.-in-C. in France, C.-in-C. in England.

Sir Douglas Haig, C.-in-C. in France.

Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Staff, and C.-in-C. in England, C.-in-C. Army of Occupation.

Sir Bryan Mahon, C.-in-C. in Ireland.

Sir Edmund Allenby, C.-in-C. in Palestine.

Sir Hubert Gough, C.-in-C. 5th Army.

Sir Julian Byng, C.-in-C. 3rd Army.

Sir H. Lawrence, Chief of Staff in France.

Sir W. Peyton, Mil. Secretary in France.

Sir W. Birkbeck, Inspector of Remounts.

Sir Edmund Bethune, I.G.T.F.*

A considerable proportion of the Corps Commanders and a large number of Divisional and Brigade Commanders belong to this fortunate arm. I am only dealing with British Cavalry, so do not include Sir William Birdwood, commanding the 5th Army, and Sir John Nixon, who commanded the Army in Mesopotamia, both of whom belong to the Indian Cavalry.

In case we should not have a sufficient number of Cavalry officers to entirely control the affairs of our Army it was considered necessary not only to recall some of those who had retired, but to reinstate them in the Service.

So bankrupt were we in military ability that in order to fill the post of Chief of the Staff on the Western Front, one of the most important positions

^{*} To complete their predominance in our Army the aptly designated "mounted" branch has provided us with a Secretary of State for War, who, as all the world knows, is a retired Cavalry officer.

in our Army, we had to bring back from his retirement, a Cavalry colonel. As this officer had displayed no very outstanding ability while in our Army and had retired from it some years before the war to adopt another line in life, it is reasonable to infer that amongst the numerous young men who had shown capacity in this war and who had decided to make the profession of a soldier their chief object in life, none had been found worthy to entrust with so much responsibility. In this matter we seem to have displayed some inconsistency, for although we cast on one side officers because they had commenced their military career in the T.F., our action in this case seems to indicate that military science and art are so easy to master that the highest positions in our Army can be filled by men who have placed the profession of a soldier not first but second in their choice, and who have been reinstated in the Army owing to capacity displayed in some other calling. The oldest and one of the best of our Corps Commanders was in his 65th year. Although our Allies and our enemies*(always given compensating professional capacity) took no exception to men of this age, it was in our Army considered a period in life which, except apparently in the case of Cavalry officers, unfitted men for a command in the field.

I do not wish to create the impression that our Cavalry officers occupied all the best positions in our Army—Malta, Gibraltar, Aden, Bermuda, and Mauritius still remain open to officers of the other branches of the Service.

If any Member of Parliament cares to pursue this

subject further he might ask for a return showing the total amount of the salaries drawn by Cavalry officers serving on the staff and in commands outside their arm of the Service, during the war. A comparison between these figures and those representing the salaries of officers similarly situated in other branches of the Service would be interesting.

Without saying, or intending to say, that any of these officers are or were unfit for their appointments, it is doubtful whether a certain number of them would have ever reached the positions they were or are now holding, had they commenced their careers in some other branch of our Service. Friends always prefer friends. Any fair-minded man on hearing the case reasonably stated will, I think, agree that the present situation is not a satisfactory one.

For some time before this war it was plain to any young officer of ambition about to enter the Service that a career in the Cavalry offered decided advantages. A Cavalry colonel got the command of a regiment about the age of 43, an Infantry colonel at about 46. If the Cavalry colonel was willing to retire at the end of his regimental command, as the majority of them used to, well and good. For a man who desired to make the Army the profession of a life-time, and who had his eyes fixed on topmost branches of the tree he was about to climb, a start of three years was something worth trying for. Unfortunately many were debarred by the fact that to enter the Cavalry as an officer you must have a private income of at least £300 a year. Thus the advantages offered by a career starting in the

Cavalry were only at the disposal of the comparatively rich, many of whom will on arriving at positions of authority have little sympathy with movements having for their object economy in Army life.*

So long as rich men only represented our nation in Parliament the power of their advocacy, when dealing with the real social reforms, lacked that force which springs from strong conviction. This has been recognised and, thanks to the payment of Members, a poor man is now able to voice the views of his companions in poverty. Our Land question, and a very serious one it is, has arisen largely from the fact that for generations the bulk of our legislators have been large landowners, and therefore consciously, or unconsciously, biased towards a particular class.

History often repeats itself, and it is perhaps wise to utter a note of warning on what may possibly occur if our Army be represented too largely by one

particular arm or body.

As the impediments which exist to Cavalry action in the future, so long as the arm is employed in a civilised and populous country like modern Europe, are thought by some of us to be of a permanent nature, it may be as well to state them.

- (1) The enormous number of men now put in the field practically checkmates the wide flanking movements of the past. To take an example from the footballfield, the fast runner would have no advantage
- *"If a State run most to gentlemen and the husbandmen and plowmen be but as their work-folks, you may have a good cavairy but never good stable bands of foot." So wrote Bacon nearly three centuries ago. If for "good stable bands of foot" we substitute "a real National Army" we are face to face with our main military problem of to-day.

as a player if the forwards were always stretched out in a row from touch line to touch line.

(2) In a populous country like Northern France or Belgium there can never be much scope for Cavalry, as barbed wire and machine guns can always hold up Infantry, and therefore with much greater ease, Cavalry.

(3) The development of railways of all gauges, motor-lorries, motor-cars, motor-cycles, and motor-buses for transporting infantry combine to reduce

our dependency on Cavalry.

(4) The Air Service has supplanted the Cavalry in reconnaissance work. No one will ever depend on Cavalry reconnaissance who can make use of aerial.

(5) At the end of the war there will be enough barbed wire in Western Europe to enable every farmer to fence in his land without buying any more for fifty years. He will no doubt profit by this very cheap horse-proof form of fencing.

(6) It is only reasonable to suppose that in future most land frontiers will be quite prepared to prevent

an inrush of Cavalry on a declaration of war.

In spite of this we may expect to find that men who have been brought up in a certain arm, and that the one which is acknowledged by all nations to be the most conservative, will be slow to abandon its deep-rooted ideas and ideals.

It is not, however, the future of the arm that causes us concern, but the insidious ills which will doubtless arise from the domination in our Army of a particular sect which has been able to gain and maintain an unfair start in the race for promotion

and advancement with the result that the rest of the Army has been forced into the position of the residuary legatee of an estate the bulk of which had been left to certain Cavalry officers.

The establishment of a fair and reasonable system of promotion throughout the Army will be among the many changes we desire to see at the end of this war, for it will end once and for all those inequalities by which officers in one branch of the Service through no obvious merit win steps in rank some years in advance of their less fortunate comrades.

That our Cavalry officers have not won their present supremacy either by abnormal hard work or by the expenditure of extraordinary professional zeal the following figures from an official report will satisfactorily prove, it being generally acknowledged that a Staff College certificate has come to be regarded in the Army much in the same light as a University degree in most other professions.

The number of officers returned as examined for the Staff College during the five years 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, and 1906 are as follows:—

| Infantry | 230 |
|-----------|-----|
| Artillery | 96 |
| Cavalry | 32 |
| Engineers | 25 |
| A.S.C | 12 |
| Marines | 7 |
| | |
| | 402 |

Taking the average total number of candidates

at each examination in these five years to be so, the Cavalry annual contribution works out to about 8 per cent., the remaining 92 per cent. being supplied by the rest of the Army. I have no reliable figures to guide me, but I think I am right in saying that a considerable number of the successful Cavalry candidates who passed the Staff College have been "special nominations," i.e. non-competitive candidates, and further that this arm has in proportion received a higher percentage of these nominations than any other branch of the Service.

Cavalry is the most expensive of all the arms to equip and maintain. It would be interesting to know what the Cavalry of all the armies of Europe has cost in proportion to the Infantry during the present war. All soldiers know what the arm, as a

mounted branch, has been able to achieve.

To those of us who were not inebriated by the Cavalry spirit it had long been obvious that a large portion of the vast sums being expended in feeding Cavalry horses on the Western Front might have been much more profitably invested. The most determined Westerner is bound to confess that a considerable portion of the Cavalry retained in France might with advantage have been transferred to some other theatre which would have given scope for a far more artistic use of the arm, such as Palestine and Mesopotamia. The existing Western Front could hardly be described as one suitable for Cavalry operations. There was a habit of painting imaginary pictures of what was conceived would happen and of endeavouring to realise them instead of the more

prosaic method of adopting ourselves to actual conditions.

"The Break Through" was the great hope of some of our leaders. In this episode the Cavalry was to play a conspicuous and decisive part. The ideal had been realised with great success in South Africa and some continued to dream of its successful repetition. Our endeavours to reproduce it have cost us many valuable lives and thousands of horses.

The following extracts from Sir Douglas Haig's

Cambrai dispatch will furnish examples:—

(a) "Meanwhile, with no wire and no prepared defences to hamper them, it was reasonable to hope that masses of Cavalry would find it possible to pass through, whose task would be thoroughly to disorganise the enemy's system of command and intercommunication in the whole area. . . .

(b) "If this were successfully accomplished and the situation developed favourably, Cavalry were to be passed through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganise his system of command, damage his railways and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of reinforcements."

Was it "reasonable to hope"? The ideal appeared to some of us to be founded on an obsolete theory which had not allowed for the existing conditions of warfare on this battle front. An undemoralised infantryman with a breech-loading rifle and a bayonet was a match for a cavalryman in the past. Now that a large percentage of them are armed with light machine guns the contest is an unequal one.

The greatest victories of the past have been the result of a complete rout, one side being overthrown before it had time to rally in a new position with both flanks secure. In the encounters that have been taking place in France and Belgium the temporarily defeated force has merely retired to a new line of defence and has never been in any real danger of being cut off owing to an enveloping movement from either or from both flanks. The line has been bulged, but never actually penetrated. It has given way like an elastic band, not broken off short like a rigid piece of stick. The vision of masses of Cavalry dashing through a gap like water through a hole in the side of a torpedoed ship and spreading devastation in the enemy's backward areas has never materialised. It was envisaged before the days when the potentiality of the combination of barbed wire, pill-boxes, and machine guns had been recognised through intimate acquaintance with them in the field, and before the modern armed aeroplane and the tank had been born. Our brave Cavalry embarked on these ventures in the spirit of Hannibal's war-worn troops to take part in the final battle of Zama "with no fear but very little hope."

It is always wise to regard both sides. The following extract from the German view of this particular action is not without significance:—

"English and Indian Cavalry constituted the concluding part of the attacking force and entirely misunderstanding the situation endeavoured to push forward on horse-back."

In the light of the above we may be permitted

to inquire whether when the Germans made their attack in March, 1918, there was great anxiety on our side lest masses of Teuton Cavalry should devastate our back areas.

As has been pointed out, our Cavalry, after the South African War, which was a campaign peculiarly suited to the mounted branches, came into remarkable prominence. How was it that our Infantry. Artillery, and Engineers did not obtain their fair share of commands in the present war? Were their officers less efficient? Certainly not! The answer appears to be that our old system of preferential patronage re-asserted itself as soon as the Army in France practically cut itself off from the Home Army. Instead of a fair system of selection, officers' prospects were at the mercy of personal favour at times swaved by the reports sent in about them by a mysterious body known as G.H.Q. It must also not be overlooked that many of our successful soldiers send their sons into the Cavalry and also that the Cavalry officer, owing to his position in the Army and his relative wealth, is much more en evidence than those who are dependent on hard work and merit for their advancement. It may be asked. Why then do the Guardsmen not enjoy an equal chance of monopoly? The answer is twofold. In the first place, the officer of the Foot-Guards has a very high regimental standard and a quite exceptional esprit de corps. To many their sole ambition in peace time was to command their battalion. After that they were content to take up some form of public life or to retire to their estates. Also the Guardsmen

had in the past had a very good innings and at one time monopolised a large percentage of the

higher commands.

When Lord Wolseley's reforms came in and it became recognised that if the Army was to progress the gates of opportunity must be thrown wider open to unaided talent, the Guards were limited to a fixed proportion of commands. This proportion has been more or less preserved during the present war, and, although many Guardsmen have won fame and distinction, their rewards have certainly not been out of proportion to their desserts.

Great has been our advance in military righteousness since the Crimean days. Those, however, who study our existing methods of patronage fifty years hence may be as severe in their denunciations of present-day "selections" as we are of those who preceded us. That there has been a marked reaction in this respect since the commencement of the past war few with any real knowledge of the

subject can deny.

We shall very soon have to settle some serious questions concerning cavalry. Our action in the matter will to a great extent be guided by what takes place in other continental armies. It requires no prophet to predict that our Army will be the last to make any changes in, or reduction of, its cavalry; notwithstanding the fact that the R.A.F. have now taken over some of its most important duties and will in future attract many of the best type of officers who have up to the present entered its ranks.

Complaints are often heard concerning the increase in the number of public officials owing to the growth of bureaucracy. This new development may perhaps be ascribed in part to the aspirations of those who, weary of witnessing a system of exclusive privilege that still prevails in some of our public professions and public departments, have determined to gain their share of the spoil. We are often assured that a man in authority prefers to have as his subordinates men whom he knows. wisdom of giving full scope to such a theory depends on the limits of the great man's acquaintance. A man who seldom attempts to know any one beyond the circle of his intimate friends can hardly be termed a fair judge of the professional merits of the personnel of an Army of millions.

With regard to what I have written in this chapter I wish to make it quite clear that it is not the Cavalry as an arm of the service that I am concerned with, their conduct has always been beyond reproach and worthy of all praise. It is against a system which has permitted the inequalities which I have brought to notice to exist and multiply, and the creation of a strong Cavalry cabal in our Army that I am protesting. A species of military aristocracy has been created which excludes from the upper storey of our military edifice all who do not meet with its

approval.

CHAPTER VIII

SUGGESTED ECONOMICS

Why is our Army so costly? We are an extravagant nation. Even our poorest classes are not frugal, and have a disdain for petty parsimonies. There are, however, other reasons.

A once well-known general is reported to have said, that the attitude of the War Office to the Army was one of traditional suspicion. Without lessening our appreciation of the magnificent work done by that much over-abused British institution, it must be admitted that, as far as financial matters are concerned, the remark holds good for to-day. When you have money dealings with a man you begin to look into his innermost soul. Up till then you have probably only examined his exterior. We no longer have Muster Parades on the first of the month, when all work is dislocated for a whole day in order that a commanding officer may be able to sign a certificate to say that he has personally seen every man in his command on the date in question (some more conscientious than others even went through the form of personally counting their horses), but in all matters concerning money we in the Army are still not altogether free from grave suspicion. This suspicion is due to past failings on the part of

officers, when things were done by private contract and such words of command as "Puff Visage!" were in force.

At this word of command, so military report relates, it was customary for the men to inflate their cheeks when marching past an inspecting officer to show that they were well nourished!

In these days of almost over-inspection there seems little chance of a repetition of those past peculations which led the War Office to form such a low opinion of the financial morality of the Army.

At least two advantages would spring from devolution in Army Finance. (1) Generals would learn to take an interest in Military Economy. (2) A certain amount of reduction could be made in the clerical establishment of the Finance Department at the War Office. So far as most of us are aware no serious attempt has ever been made to put financial responsibility on General Officers. While considerable sums were at the disposal of County Associations of the T.F., no attempt in this direction has been made with regard to officers exercising high commands. Financial advisers at the War Office would no doubt tell us that attempts of this nature have been made, but that these experiments had ended in such terrifying revelations of incapacity that they had been hastily abandoned.

Is then Military Finance such an esoteric branch of learning that the mastery of its rudiments is beyond the grasp of the ordinary mind, which has not made a life-long study of its intricacies? It has occurred to some of us that a portion of the

years spent in the study of the Integral and Differential Calculus, Conic Sections, etc., once considered profitable for a Woolwich cadet and a Staff College student, might with much more advantage have been devoted to the study of the main principles of Military Finance and Economy. Has any one ever heard of a book on British Military Economy? We have books on Domestic and on Political

Economy. Why not Military Economy?

A portion of the time of the cadet at Sandhurst and of the student at the Staff College might well be devoted to this subject. The former, for instance, might commence his financial education by making out his own Pay Lists. A very unpopular but none the less practical proposal. Cadets might also receive some practical instruction in the Quarter-master's duties so as to learn where waste occurs and how it can be avoided. With the assistance of Staff officers specially trained in finance there seems no reason why a good deal of centralisation could not be curtailed, as with the help of their advice general officers in high commands would in time take an interest in and be made responsible for a certain amount of the financing of their commands.

We shall doubtless be reminded of the existence of the London School of Economics, through which a number of officers have passed. The course is, I understand, an excellent one. It is, however, economy as practised by our Government and not by individuals that I am advocating, and here we appear to have an object lesson. In order to carry out this course for instructing officers in finance and

money matters generally a certain amount of expense had to be incurred by the State, presumably for its ulterior benefit. What return was it receiving in the form of increased efficiency for our Army? Are the officers who have qualified in the course employed in special appointments where their technical training will be of special value? In the case of certain special appointments is a certificate that an officer has passed this course made a sine quâ non for his holding them? The obtaining of such certificates as the Staff College (p.s.c.) and the Advanced Class (p.a.c.) holds out to the possessors a reasonable chance of employment in a special line. For what appointments may officers who have passed the School of Economics reasonably expect special consideration?

If the time be now ripe to attempt some form of devolution in financial control, officers who have received this training would appear specially suited as Staff officers to Generals entrusted with financial

responsibility.

By all means let us have scientific education, but, having brightened the intellect, let us not let it rust through a faulty system of its application to our immediate national needs. It is no use educating a child as a clerk and then employing him as an errand boy.

The perennial friction which is from time to time revealed between the Finance Department and the Military Chiefs, both at home and in India, discloses the fact that the former both claims the right to, and also does, in time of peace, express its opinion on Military Policy. Most Military financial questions are matters of fact which admit of little discussion, while proposed Military reforms always find numerous critics. Thus it has been comparatively easy for the Finance Department to criticise Military proposals, but the Military Chiefs have in many instances in the past, from want of mastery of the subject, not made a strong initial presentment of their case, and have been unable to define with proper exactitude when the comments made by their financial critics ceased to have a purely technical bearing on the case under discussion.

This seems to have arisen from their lack of financial education which has, so to speak, deprived them of any argument for the prosecution, and they have, therefore, been driven into the passive rôle of the defendant. Once allow Military Economy and a rudimentary knowledge of Military Finance to become more disseminated throughout the Army and a better understanding will be reached between the two divisions of the Army Department; also more clearly defined limits to criticism will in time be established.

In building up our new Army much more attention will have to be devoted to Military Economy. We know from the ordinary affairs of life that the father who wishes to bring home to his son the value of money takes the earliest opportunity of putting him on an allowance. Under ordinary circumstances he does not concern himself with what the boy spends his money on, all that he demands from him is that he shall not exceed the sum allotted as his

allowance. A great deal of the waste of money and extravagance we have had to endure during the past war has been due to the fact that, while our Generals were not trusted with any financial responsibility in peace time, and so had come to treat the subject of Military Economy as one that had no concern for them: as soon as war broke out and all checks on expenditure were relaxed or removed, they were expected to entirely change that attitude into one of unremitting vigilance for the interest of the taxpayer; and to place the husbanding of their resources amongst their most important duties. far as has been ascertained no special credit was given for good administration, or to those who by careful control made the most of what was given them. In this matter we can learn many lessons from our allies the French, and before building our New Army we should be doing well to compare the two systems of Army Finance.

The Voluntary System has much to answer for with regard to our extravagance. So long as you have to please people so as to get them to give you something the bargain is in most cases driven to the advantage of those to be won over, sometimes very much to their advantage.

If we really mean to be less extravagant we must begin by a more reasonable attitude towards the Army Pay Department. Any man whose duties are to keep your pay to its proper proportion and to inform you when he thinks you are demanding more than you are entitled to for yourself or your department must be unpopular, whether he appear

dressed as a tax-collector, a paymaster, or even as a finance member. The feeling of hostility that once existed towards the A.P.D. in the Army is much less than it was. We must endeavour to reduce it still more and to increase mutual understanding and mutual sympathy. The Commander of an Army Corps in Germany receives nothing from his Government except money and cooking utensils; complete financial control is in his hands. It may be long before we can achieve such a triumph of decentralisation. We can at least make a valiant effort to approach the ideal. The creation of a spirit of economic emulation will be a bold step in advance. Under our present system a Commander of a unit may be twice as extravagant as another without incurring censure or notice.

Our aims should be directed towards the establishment of a system by which a balance is struck between efficiency and economy so that neither is

exaggerated to the detriment of the other.

To proceed to the concrete and give one practical example. We must be prepared to make some

changes in the status of our Quartermasters.

The Quartermaster is the last link in the chain of distribution to the troops of practically everything they receive from the State—food, clothing, equipment, harness, fuel, light, tents, forage, etc., etc., and a multitude of other necessities. It has come to be recognised that the post of Quartermaster is a reward given to a deserving N.C.O. who has done long and faithful service to the State. His present exceptional position, that of a commissioned

officer "without the fold," has arisen from two main causes.

- (1) Owing to the failure of the State to provide its faithful servants, who have given to it the best years of their lives, with some of the numerous public service sinecures which till quite recently fell to the lot of political adherents and vote hatchers, it became necessary to do something for the most deserving and best educated of our N.C.O.'s, to whom the mere granting of a commission with all its incidental extra expenses was something of a white elephant. The prospect of becoming a Quartermaster is one of the few army plums which attract ambitious recruits to enter the Army. It is in fact a bribe and, as many of us are aware, a very expensive one for the State.
- (2) Although regarded by our continental neighbours as a nation of shopkeepers, it is not fashionable among us to have anything to do with shops. Thus the office of Quartermaster with all its shoplike duties has always been looked down on by the officers. For years we have, speaking economically, suffered from the fact that few of our commanding officers have received the training or possess the knowledge which is necessary to get the best out of what they receive from Government. Most of them are entirely in the hands of their Quartermasters.

When Sir Redvers Buller set about that fine piece of work, for which he has never received sufficient credit, the formation of our present Army Service Corps, one of his first acts was to entirely change the system of officering the Commissariat Department as it was then called. The State has been amply repaid for the increased salaries it has since disbursed, and the nation is justly proud of its splendid Royal Army Service Corps. In regiments of the Indian Army the duties of Quartermaster are performed by an ordinary regimental officer with an increased stipend. This officer in many cases eventually becomes the Adjutant, in this position he finds his previous experience of Quartermaster's duties very useful. There seems no reason why young officers of the British Service should not be made Quartermasters for a period of two years. This useful experience might well constitute a certain claim to become Adjutant. In this manner the knowledge of a Quartermaster's duties would become more generally known and in time Commanding Officers would come into being who had been Quartermasters and knew their work first hand.

Some will no doubt urge that a young officer has not sufficient experience to undertake the duties of Quartermaster. There is an old story of two men A. and B. who entered into partnership. A. had the money, B. had the experience. At the end of a year B. had the money, and A. had the experience. We do not want men of B.'s class. Let young officers receive a good training with regard to the duties of Quartermaster, and let the inspection of the work of Regimental Quartermasters be a branch of the Q.M.G.'s Department, and the State will not suffer by the confidence reposed in them. Now that the squadron and double company system has come to stay, a good deal of devolution in the matter of

Quartermaster's stores and their issues is now possible. This will relieve Regimental and Battalion Quartermasters of a good deal of their present work.

This proposed change in the status of the Quartermaster will no doubt meet with a good deal of opposition. If, however, the measures proposed to enable a poor man to enter the Army as an officer and to live in it on his pay are carried out, two years' employment as Quartermaster of his unit, with the extra allowance pertaining to the appointment, will give a young man an opportunity of increasing his pay and adding to his knowledge and experience.

The following conclusions are therefore arrived

at :---

(I) That Army Finance and Economy are just as important as a number of other military subjects, such as Military History, Military Law, etc. So far a study of it by soldiers has been neglected.

(2) To encourage Economy you must give credit

to all ranks who practise it.

(3) The State must insist that the Higher Officials of the Army, from Generals downwards, both take an interest in and are responsible for the finance of their commands.

The above should form some of the general principles of our Army Economy. We may now pass from the abstract to the concrete and give some examples. I am not concerned with Army contracts, which to the ordinary eye appear to have been well fulfilled during the war, and am quite aware that I am only touching the very fringe of the subject

of Military Economy, the matters I am bringing to light being those only which are presented to the eve of the ordinary officer.

The principle that we are an Island Kingdom, and that our Navy should always have the best and be first considered, is a wise one, at the same time it does not strike one as a good arrangement that both Army and Navy should have to depend on the

same sources of supply.

During the war the output of a very important military requirement was curtailed because the First Lord of the Admiralty desired that the Navy should have a superior weapon to the Army for fighting on land, and to the end of the war the personnel of this particular weapon was furnished by the Admiralty.

The revelations with regard to the Air Board brought to light some of the difficulties in meeting the requirements of the two services from the same source. Without in any way suggesting that the measures I am about to propose for furthering future Army Economy are all, or even the most important, steps to be taken, I am sure that their cumulative effect if followed up would result in considerable saving to the country.

(I) Our Regular Army maintained by Voluntary Enlistment must be reduced to a minimum. The defence of Great Britain has now been recognised as a national duty, the mere preservation of order among some of our more turbulent subjects and small aggressive neighbours may well be left to our ever ready Expeditionary Force, the composition of

which is a matter of Imperial concern. Colonial armies are always expensive, and ours must be reduced to a minimum compatible with its ability to perform the functions demanded of it. If this be done a considerable saving can be made in our Army expenses. If we may judge by the wages at present prevailing in the labour market, it will be very hard to obtain voluntarily enlisted recruits for our Army at the pre-war rates of pay.

To pay men to do work and then not to employ them on the job for which you are giving them special pay is not an economical proceeding. It is for this reason that all the men we enlist for service beyond the seas should, with very few exceptions, be serving outside our islands. To neglect this principle in our future attempts to solve our military problem would, beyond doubt, lead to the unnecessary inflation of our Army expenditure. By presenting to the public our Army picture with a blurred perspective and proportion we have in the past prevented our citizen Army from being allotted its proper rôle in our imperial military defence system.

(2) A reduction of our Cavalry will enable us to

spend more money in other directions.

(3) We can also, as has already been pointed out, do much for the efficiency and economy of our future Army by working out a good Horse Boarder Scheme to be put in force at the end of the war. Unless this is done we shall either have an unprepared National Army, or saddle ourselves with a very unnecessary annual charge for the hire of horses for training purposes.

(4) By reciprocity with our Dominion and other armies in such matters as the composition of the Expeditionary Force and the interchange of officers we can effect a certain amount of saving.

(5) An Imperial Conference, an Imperial General Staff, and the introduction of Colonial Preference, will enable us to reduce our expenses by standardisation of warlike appliances and other co-ordinating

measures.

(6) An inquiry into our system of supply would reveal that neither at home nor abroad do our troops get the full benefit out of what the country pays for them; also that our system of supply is an extravagant one. What we want is more emulation with regard to economy by all officers and encouragement to practise it by the higher commands.

(7) The amount spent in moving officers and men to and from different quarters of the globe. A great deal of this arises in the case of our officers, and particularly our Artillery officers, from our complicated system of promotion. If we ever separate our National from our Colonial Army a good deal

of this can be avoided.

Our national extravagance combined with a hostility which has been created against the Treasury have conspired to create a very lax collective conscience in the ranks of our Army with regard to its economic duty to the State. When a high-minded patriotism replaces the incentive of mere esprit de corps, with which we have had for too long to be satisfied, we may possibly come to regard our National duty from a more exalted standpoint.

CHAPTER IX

OUR FUTURE ARMY

THE Defence of the Realm is now in the hands of four special Ministries, who control our Sea, Land, and Air Forces and our all-important Munition Workers. These each at present form an independent block. A good Registration Bill may perhaps in time allot to every boy and girl, on attaining a certain age, a place in the national plan of personal service to the State, thereby assigning an annual quota to each of these four branches from the adolescents of the country.

For the moment we are only concerned with our Land Forces and may to some extent summarise what has been written on the foregoing pages. At the conclusion of this war we shall have in this country a number of eminent soldiers senior in rank and superior in experience to almost all the members of our Army Council, men who have for years held high and important commands and are still vigorous in mind and body. How can we best profit by the collective knowledge of such men, and properly apply it in building up our New Army fabric? The opportunity is a unique one. A proposal is being made to found an Army Senate to act as an Advisory Council to the Secretary of State for War.

(1) To restore the strong central control of

our Army system, which has been for the moment seriously weakened.

(2) To provide a much needed Court of Appeal, so as to insure that the scales of justice may be held as level as possible.

(3) To free us from the sectarian domination

under which we have fallen.

There is much to be said in favour of such an assemblage, but in view of the conservative tendencies of the military mind and the sweeping nature of some of the much needed reforms in our Army, it would appear both unwise and unsafe to place the construction of our National Army entirely in the hands of a so constituted Senate. Labour, for instance, will certainly demand representation at the final settlement.

On the other hand, the over-zealous Army reformer with Bolshevist leanings will require that restraining influence which is always to be found among some of those who represent the embodiment of the old army saying that "All changes, even for the better, are to be deprecated."

We may subdivide our Imperial Armies in the three main groups.

No. 1. Home.

The National Army
The Colonial Army
No. 2. Dominion.

The Canadian Army
The Australian and
New Zealand
The South African

Provides a portion of Expeditionary Force

Also provides Contingent for E.F.

No. 3. Alien.
The Indian Army
The Egyptian Army
The African Army

Provides portion of E.F.

The time has come for us to consider the lines on which we propose to construct our future Army. First of all we must set our National Army in its proper place at the head of our Imperial Forces, and make all our other Armies subsidiary to it, including what we now term our Regular Army, raised by voluntary enlistment for service in all parts of the world, and which should become what other continental nations describe as their Colonial Army.

Having recognised the pre-eminence of our National Army, we must endeavour to make it really national in character, one where the door stands wide open to those pronounced fit to enter as officers, and wherein life is free from those trammels with which it was formerly considered necessary to surround the elect.

We shall never have such an opportunity of designing and building a perfect edifice, and shall be wise to entrust its construction to our best architects, and not leave it to those whose views are limited to government plans and standard patterns, and whose ideas have been warped by previous rulings and past decisions, infecting them with the non-possumus mind so common in the sealed-pattern official.

Thirdly, we must take a large view of our whole Imperial Army and so co-ordinate the different

fractions composing it, that each may feel its relation to and its reliance on the whole force. The only manner in which to accomplish this appears to be to hold an Imperial Army Conference at the end of the war, attended by representatives of all our Imperial Armies, at which to discuss the basis of the future of the Assembly.

Also such questions as whether the Conference is to be an annual one. Is it always to be held in England, or will it assemble at certain other places in turn? Who are to be the representative members, and will they be given votes in proportion to the importance of the force they represent?

Once we have put the framework of our Imperial War Machine in position we can proceed with the details of its completion as ways and means furnish.

Reference has been made to the future of our Regular Army and to the sphere of its activities. The eventualities we may be called on to face are:—

(r) A European conflagration to extinguish which we have to employ our entire national resources.

(2) A secondary but serious conflict such as an attempt to wrest a portion of our Empire from us either by means of an internal rising or by an external invasion, aided by a power of considerable strength.

(3) The ordinary "small war" expedition, in which we are from time to time called upon to embark.

To deal with (1) nothing but a trained and wellorganised nation will suffice. For (2) and (3) we require merely a Colonial Army comprising a small but efficient body, up to now known as the "Expeditionary Force," and which can act with promptitude in the right place and at the right time. The defence of the Empire must be clearly distinguished from

its mere policing.

With regard to the Expeditionary Force we require a definite understanding as to what it will in future be, and what will be demanded from it. Once it has been made clear that in case of a Continental War we shall have to depend solely upon our National Army, recruited from the manhood of the nation, the sooner we make this force fit for the task we have set it the better. Until we place our entire dependence on our National Army and determine that it shall be our real one, it will never reach the standard of efficiency it ought to possess. So long as portions of our Regular Army remained in our Colonies their local forces failed to acquire that self-reliance which is so essential to success.

At last they stand firmly on their own feet, and their future is an assured one. So it will be with our National Army, which must be made to feel an entire self-dependence.* There are still some in our midst who cling to the idea of an Expeditionary Force of

^{*} One reason for the want of success of our pre-war Territorial Army was the existence of our Expeditionary Force, which occupied entirely the foreground of our military land-scape and on which was focussed not only the eyes of our countrymen but also all their material and mental military efforts. Until our National Army steps forward from the background and becomes the central point of our picture, we shall neither view it in its proper light nor assign to it its proper value,

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six divisions of regular troops, which is, so to speak, to form the point of our weapon of attack. would seem a fatal conception of the true function of our future Expeditionary Force, a large proportion of which may possibly consist of voluntarily enlisted troops who are maintained at extra expense to the State for a definite purpose, viz., in case of what may be termed a second-class war breaking out in practically any portion of the globe, to proceed there at once, and so be able to deal quickly with the situation. Strategy chiefly depends on politics, geography, numbers, and readiness. It is the latter quality that, if taken advantage of, will turn the scale in our favour and frequently save us from a long and tiresome campaign, when we have for our opponents large numbers of the "Unready" tribe.

At the same time we may with advantage consider what is the best nature and composition for our future Expeditionary Force. Taking into consideration its world-wide radius of action, the idea suggests itself that in certain theatres our Dominion Armies might be able to furnish contingents raised on the voluntary basis to form portions of it. For instance, in case of trouble in South or Central Africa a mounted contingent raised in Australia or New Zealand, where horses and horsemen are plentiful, would probably be both more efficient and more quickly available than one which had to be specially equipped and sent out from home. This is a subject which might well be discussed at a meeting of the Imperial Army Conference.

Whatever decision may be arrived at it seems

probable that the Expeditionary Force will have to be established on a new basis and its future rôle made clear.

There is also the question of expense. No armed force is so costly to maintain as a Voluntary Army, especially one which it is difficult to keep up to its required numbers. All kinds of inducements have to be offered and sacrifices made to induce men to join the colours. If we ever reached the much desired condition of being able to reject second-rate men and to pick and choose our recruits, our efficiency would be much increased.

Unfortunately our Regular Army made too heavy demands on our population with the result that immature boys had to be accepted and kept till they had stopped growing and were fit for a man's work. If we reduce the size of our Regular Army to that which its future appears to demand, viz.—

(1) To furnish recruits for our Indian and the

Colonial garrisons;

(2) To make up its share of an Expeditionary
Force to reinforce the Armies of our Dominions or to take part in a second-class
war;

we shall not have the same difficulty in filling its ranks with suitable recruits, and might trust more to a selection of suitable volunteers from our National Army, who, when a chance of seeing active service is assured, are sure to be of the best quality. We can always depend on a sufficiency of good officers and N.C.O.'s for the force. The Expeditionary Force should in future be largely composed of

Volunteers from the National and Dominion Armies. Not peace Volunteers, like the Special Reserve, but the class of man who always volunteers when war is imminent.

These are the men we want, and are a much finer type and much more representative of the manhood of the nation than a number of second or even third-class men who often accept a retaining fee as an increase to the means of subsistence, a certain number in the hope that they will not be called on to fight. The Volunteers in war time represent all that is best in our nation. Under good officers and N.C.O.'s deficiency in their training will soon be compensated by their keenness and intelligence. As long as our nation exists young adventurous men will always be found ready to partake in any undertaking which provides the "Crowded hour of glorious life" which they so ardently desire. Men of this type do not willingly submit to the monotonous drudgery and unending routine of a regular soldier's life in the junior ranks in time of peace. With universal cadet training they will all have received a certain amount of previous training and will not be untrained recruits.

Having decided that our National Army is to occupy its proper place we can now turn to a closer examination of it.

As has been remarked, we shall never have such a good opportunity of putting our Military House in order.

The first step is the important one of combining economy with efficiency, and insisting on all ranks being impressed with the wisdom of husbanding the national resources. Give credit for economy, but do not allow it to interfere with efficiency. Be liberal, even handsome, in your dealings, but not extravagant. This subject has been dealt with in another chapter.

There are other points that require looking into.

They are as follows:-

(I) Dress.

(2) Promotion.

(3) Education.

(4) The provision of horses.

(5) Leave rules.

DRESS

Many of us hope that by the end of the war soldiers will be content with a less florid style of dress. With the probable decline in the apotheosis of Militarism the nations of Europe may not feel so inclined to incur extra expense by dressing up their citizen soldiers in attractive uniforms. The French are reported to have envied at least two things in our Army, its leave rules, and the soft collars and ties worn by the officers. We have certainly got a quite satisfactory form of Service Dress, which is both smart looking and serviceable. On this occasion we have not had to copy any one else. Our requirements may be briefly stated: (1) A good officers' branch to our Clothing Department; (2) simple and concise clothing regulations; (3) an expert Clothing Committee

With regard to (1) we must reduce our officers' expenses in the matter of dress, and there seems no reason why we should not be able to do so. A well-managed Department of the State could be made to furnish all the requirements of our officers at the lowest possible prices; those we have to pay for our uniform, compared with what the average continental officer pays, are unreasonable. There will always be officers who can afford to be extravagant in the matter of dress, and who prefer to employ expensive tradesmen. The State should, however, protect the average officer, and enable him to be as well dressed as most foreign officers are without paying more than they do for their uniforms.

(2) Our Clothing Regulations might well be more concise. In this matter we might take a lesson from the Navy. "The Uniform Regulations for Officers of the Fleet," including Dress Regulations for Officers of the Royal Marines, cover in all 27 pages, and are embodied in the Monthly Navy List, which costs is. 6d; while our Clothing Regulations require a special separate sartorial treatise of 134 pages, supplemented by 36 full-page plates of explanation, for which we are asked to pay half a crown. When our uniform has been simplified and reduced to the dimensions of sense, there seems no reason why they should not be published with our Monthly Army List when it resumes its normal dimensions. We might at least have the essentials without all the bewildering detail. There does not appear to be any special reason for informing the rest of the Army with regard to the intricacies of the full dress of a Highlander

or a Guardsman. This detail might be issued to regiments concerned in pamphlet form. We do not seem to require more than 3 orders of dress:—
(a) Service and working (khaki); (b) Mess; (c) Full Dress. All others should be abolished, and all attempts to introduce novelties of any sort resisted. White clothing for our Indian troops might well be abolished, and replaced by the shirts worn by our British troops in Africa, and by the American Army. The absurd custom of half strangling men in hot climates is neither humane nor sensible.

(3) We have suffered much at the hands of anonymous tyrants who have dressed us in such things as the Artillery helmet, the Wellington boot, and the full dress sabretache. May we not have a permanent clothing committee composed of men who have some special qualifications for their position, and whose names are known to us. We have, I hope, done with frogged and gold-laced jackets, and ceased to be at the mercy of any one in authority who invents a new boot or collar. I trust that full dress sabretaches and generals' saddle-cloths will in future only be found in the form of fire-screens and antique of naments.

Unlike most continental Armies, our Army has up to the present been compelled to hold itself in readiness to serve in any portion of the globe. As our National Army will not have to serve in tropical climates, the provision of its clothing will be simplified.

... Our Colonial Army and the British officers and

soldiers serving in Asia and Africa should be protected against expense and it would be well if in some respects their dress resembled that worn by the troops in our Dominions. In the majority of stations abroad practically the only occasions on which officers wear full dress is at the celebration of a few National Holidays and when attending Levées held by the local representatives of the Sovereign; a great deal of expense would, therefore, be saved if they were allowed to attend these functions in Service or summer clothing, according to seasons. It has been the custom in England during the war to do so, and were this privilege extended to and retained in stations abroad, it would result both in saving and in enhanced comfort to the officers concerned. In India, except at hill stations, full dress cannot be worn, as a rule, during nine months in the year. In the interests of efficiency and for smarter appearance, officers of the Indian Army should be dressed as much like their men as possible. The marked contrast in appearance between officers of the Indian Cavalry wearing the lungi and the kulta and those dressed in imitation of our Cavalry officers is a very pronounced one. A comparison is not in favour of the latter.

PROMOTION

Our system of promotion, which is imagined to be so simple, is in fact absurdly complicated. The climax of absurdity is reached when, as I have pointed out, an officer by joining the Cavalry can get three years' start of his competitors in the race towards that most serious of military obstacles, which guards the coveted step of promotion to Major-General, while the less fortunate Garrison Artillery officer is left hopelessly behind.

In the Indian Army there is one list for all. An officer, no matter what branch of the Service he belongs to, is automatically promoted after a certain number of years. He becomes a captain after nine years' service, a major after eighteen, and a lieut.-colonel after twenty-six.

The Royal Engineers also have a system of promotion based on length of service, which appears to work well. Why cannot it be made general throughout the Army? We shall never have a better opportunity of introducing it if we can only make up our minds to cast aside prejudice and pay no heed to vested interests.

There may be some disadvantages connected with the system. It has the following advantages:—

- (r) It is absolutely fair as, with the exception of those granted accelerated promotion, the flow is evenly maintained, and an officer can foresee his future with certainty.
- (2) A uniform system of promotion for the whole Army coupled with the separation of the R.H.A. from the R.F.A., would enable us to permanently group our Infantry and Artillery and so to give real life to our system of combined training.

Certain among us consider that the time has arrived for the separation of the R.H.A. from the R.F.A. As long as the present system exists we are

sacrificing simplicity and smoothness of working to old conservative ideas.

The existing system is briefly as follows:-

After being trained in the R.F.A. a certain number of subalterns are selected for appointment to the R.H.A. As soon as these are promoted captains they must return to the R.F.A. When their turn comes again, they are selected for appointment as Captains, R.H.A., and so on. The advantages of the system from the R.H.A. point of view are obvious. Any officer who falls off in keenness, or who for any other reason becomes an unsuitable candidate for R.H.A., is rejected, and his redemption entrusted to the R.F.A.

From the R.F.A. and general point of view the

system has the following disadvantages:-

(I) So long as these never ending transfers are taking place no system of dividing the R.F.A. into permanent workable groups like battalions of Infantry can be devised. Hitherto the chief difficulty in the way of forming these groups has been to arrange the promotions. With a single promotion

list for the Army these would disappear.

(2) In addition to unnecessary expense to the State and to the officers concerned these perpetual moves waste a great deal of time and are specially hard in the case of married officers. For instance, a subaltern in a field battery at Peshawar is posted to a R.H.A. battery at Aldershot; his predecessor, a subaltern promoted captain, falling to a field battery at Potchefstrom in South Africa.

(3) It will be easily understood that a system of

this sort is embarrassing in peace and distracting in war. Its evil results have been felt both in the South African and in the past war, when a considerable number of our best artillery officers were either condemned to inactivity behind the lines, or employed in the front line with an inferior weapon.

All this would be avoided if candidates for R.H.A. were selected by a representative R.H.A. committee in the same manner that the Navy selects suitable candidates while cadets at the R.M.A. They would then join the R.H.A. on two years' probation, and once accepted would remain in it for the rest of their service, always with the right to exchange into the R.F.A. with the approval of both C.O.'s.

The R.H.A. might be grouped in four-battery units and recognised as permanently a part of the Cavalry. So long as the R.H.A. insist on having a gun of inferior power to that used by the R.F.A. their services with infantry will not be in great demand.

LEAVE

It has always been the wisdom of the British Army to be liberal in the matter of leave. There is no greater blight on work than keeping men idling about when there is nothing for them to do. Let them work when necessity demands, and have leave whenever they can be spared. The amount of leisure our officers will have in the future depends to a great extent on the period fixed for the recruits' annual training. With a National Army there will

probably be about eight months of strenuous work and four months of comparative leisure. That is, supposing we accept a six months' training course for the recruits, terminating in manœuvres about September, in which the contingents who have passed their recruits course and are still serving in the active army will take part. Add to these six months one at each end for preparation and "washing up" and we have a total of eight months.

Many of us remember the days when leave was almost regarded as a right, and its refusal, except under very exceptional circumstances, constituted a grievance. This liberality was largely at the expense of the poorer officers who could not afford to go away and were left to perform the necessary routine duties. Things are now on a more equitable basis, and each officer has an annual allotment of

leave when circumstances permit.

Should experience prove that officers can be given a more liberal grant of leave than is at present possible, it is for consideration whether it would not be of advantage to retain a fixed period, say two months, as the allotted annual leave allowance, and allow any officers desirous of doing so to extend their leave beyond this period on condition that they forfeited a portion of their pay. This is in part the Indian Army system of combined leave, by the condition of which an officer can come home on two months' leave on full Indian pay; should he, however, extend his leave beyond this period of two months, he is put on a reduced scale of pay for the remainder of the time he elects to remain on leave.

A more radical change than this is, however, proposed, viz., that the money thus saved to the State should, in the case of our National Army, be credited to the unit for expenditure on a bonus to any officers who have done specially good work, or on certain other objects approved by the Corps or Army Commander. A committee of officers could make recommendations with regard to the officers who are recommended for a bonus. This may sound a strange proposal in the ears of officers accustomed to our old system based on traditional suspicion; if, however, you are going to encourage economy you must*be prepared to trust those you put in charge with a desire to do their best. The State pays an annual sum for the upkeep of a unit, if by the peculiar conditions which exist in our Army certain officers can be spared and are willing to forego a certain amount of pay in return for increased leave, the experiment might be made of exciting emulation among those officers who are not so favourably situated and by rewarding them for their extra labour at the expense of those who can afford it.

There are, therefore, the following alternatives:-

(1) To leave things as they are, every officer being granted a certain period of leave annually.

(2) To grant leave in excess of above grant

without deduction of pay for extension.

(3) To grant extra leave with deduction.

(4) To grant extra leave with deduction, crediting latter to unit for disposal.

Taking these in turn.

(1) Is the system in vogue. It has worked well, and is well constituted to meet the wants of our old Armv.

(2) Is what may happen in the future if it be found that our officers have more leisure in a National Army than they had in the Army before the war.

(3) This may be the result of (2).

(4) The advantages of this system are that without increasing the Army Estimates you devise a system which, while insuring that no officer will apply for leave beyond that granted as the normal allowance unless he really requires it and is ready to make a sacrifice to obtain it, at the same time compensates the hard-working and poor officer, who can thus both earn a little extra pay and be brought to special notice for his hard work and devotion to duty. The rewards of the regimental officer are few. The saving which the country would gain by insisting on the repayment of the extra leave allowance to the State would in no way balance the advantages that would accrue by the distribution of this money amongst the hardest workers in the performance of regimental duty.

THE PROVISION OF HORSES FOR OUR NATIONAL ARMY

There can be only one excuse for our not taking advantage of the singular opportunity of removing one of the many difficulties in the path of our National Army, which is now presented to us by adopting a scheme for boarding horses—the reduction

or removal of all armaments as one of the peace conditions at the end of the war. Few of us have faith in this modern millennium. Some time, however, before the terms of peace are made known the actual points of difference will be narrowed to small limits. We shall, therefore, have some time to make our preparations. Should we neglect the opportunity which Colonel Mulliner points out in his scheme will be presented at the end of the war, we shall only have ourselves to blame. A little foresight will save us from very great trouble and expense in the future. Inability to provide a sufficient number of horses for the National training will again compel us to have recourse to all the shams and deceptions with which an opportunist government can always hoodwink an ill-informed and gullable public.

The above was written some time previous to the Armistice. In spite of the fact that the Government have rejected the Boarder Scheme, it is still hoped that a sound system of providing horses for Army purposes may be devised.

IMPERIAL ARMY COUNCIL

The main direction of our different armies should be in the hands of an Imperial Army Council, which would meet at convenient periods at convenient places, and be composed of representatives from each Army, including our National Army. Unless such an assemblage is to degenerate into a mere debating society it must have something behind the resolutions it passes. Its representative members might be given

votes in proportion to the forces they represent, on the principle of the "Bundesrath," where Prussia had 17 votes out of 58, Bavaria 6, Saxony 4, Baden 3, Hamburg I, and so on. There would in the first instance be some difficulty in apportioning these votes, but once settled we should have a real council. and one which would go some way towards meeting our wants. A representative from India should certainly be granted a place in such an assemblage, as she pays for her entire Army, the composition of which differs widely from the rest of our Imperial Army. As long as the Indian Army remains a thing apart so long will the closed and barred door delay and even exclude that progress which is vital to our Eastern Forces, if they are to keep abreast in the race. The improved and improving communication between East and West renders this junction easier every day. The question concerning a separate Army for India has now become more an Imperial than a purely local one.

Stress has been laid on the importance of our National Army being specially represented on the Imperial Army Council. There are reasons for this. In the first place our National Army is much more akin to our Dominion ones than the Regular Army was. Many of the difficulties which beset the one are common to the others, and in many cases the National Army will see eye to eye with the Dominion ones in matters which an officer who has grown up amongst all the prejudice and aloofness of the Regular Army will have little sympathy with or understanding of.

As has been pointed out, our National Army should be the true model for those of our Dominions.

Such a Council working hand in hand with the Imperial Federal Council, one of whose functions will doubtless be the determination of our Foreign policy, would do much to strengthen the combination of our Imperial Military Forces.

We might do more to make use of the special military qualities possessed by our different Dominion Armies. If the true functions of our Expeditionary Force are recognised, there seems no reason why we should not take full advantage of the improved condition of our Armies beyond the seas and call on them to bear some of the burden. We should find a number of men of the best stamp ready to volunteer to take part in an expedition of short duration. The taking part in such operations would do much to keep the Staff up to date and give a certain amount of experience of active service to some of the officers. For instance, if the Expeditionary Force consisted of six divisions, three of these might be found in England and the other three in the Dominions.

We may, therefore, select the following as a few subjects for discussion at our Imperial Army Council.

The future composition of our Expeditionary Force.


The system of inspection of our Imperial Armies. The liaison and interchange of officers for educational and other purposes.

The standardisation of arms, equipment, material, and all other warlike appliances and stores.

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Similarity of organisation and unity of doctrine. What advantages, if any, would result from separating the European Garrison of India from our Home Army and incorporating it in our Indian Army.

UNIVERSITY



Military education should be entrusted to a semipermanent committee of officers assisted by some civilian educational experts, so that national and military education can advance hand in hand. Our present system suffers from two main defects—

(1) It is too expensive;

(2) Technical military education does not appear to have been sufficiently separated from general military education.

The former should be planned and carried out by the experts of each branch of the Service concerned

in a practical manner.

In the course of what follows reference is from time to time made to the plan which has been drawn to illustrate the proposed military educational ladder. This should be studied before reading the following.

With regard to the cost of military education I have already in Chapter II. explained the chief expenses inseparable from the process of getting the average boy a commission in our Army. supplementing of Woolwich and Sandhurst, at which the curriculum would be identical, by the establishments X, Y, Z, where the same form of education could be obtained at lower rates, would lighten some of the financial burden. Entry into the former would be as at present by open competitive examination. Into the National or Cadet Schools X, Y, Z, it would be by nomination followed by competitive examination, preference being given to those whose fathers had been killed or who had died on active service, and to those who had served their country during the war.

At the age of fourteen, the termination of a boy's course of study at an Elementary National or private

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School, he could enter the Junior Secondary Schools X', Y', Z', and so continue his education until he passed into one of the Upper Secondary Cadet Schools X, Y, Z.

Thus, while Woolwich and Sandhurst would receive the majority of their students from the Public Schools, the Cadet Schools X, Y, Z, would receive theirs from the National Schools and other establishments. In this manner a healthy emulation between the two systems would be created.

For the letters X', Y', Z', substitute the Duke of York's School, the Royal Hibernian School, and the Queen Victoria School, and add to each of these an upper school X, Y, Z, for the training of prospective officers, and you have the groundwork of the proposed scheme. If forty students in two batches of twenty each be taken as a start in each upper school, we might begin by giving the total of three times twenty, or sixty vacancies to be annually competed for at each final examination of Woolwich and Sandhurst.

I would/at the same time suggest the following alterations in our present regulations for the granting of benefactions to the sons of deserving fathers.

To replace the Sandhurst King's Cadets, Honorary King's Cadets, King's Indian Cadets, and Honorary King's Indian Cadets, by a fixed number of foundation scholars, similar to the present Prize Cadetships, to be educated free or for a small charge, reserving a certain proportion for the Indian Army.

For the selection of the candidates for these

foundation scholarships added to ninety at Wellington College now in existence, the following rules should be insisted on:—

- (a) That a test of real indigence be in all cases enforced; no boy being allowed to hold a foundation scholarships whose relatives could afford to have him educated at their own expense.
- (b) That for the present only the sons of officers or soldiers who had been killed in action, or died of wounds on active service, be considered as applicants.

The existing conditions are briefly as follows:-

A King's Cadet is appointed by the S. of S. for War. He is granted an educational allowance of £40 a year tenable between the ages of 13 and 17, also the following emoluments: (a) A remission of about £35 on joining the R.M.C., Sandhurst. (b) An outfit allowance of £65 on obtaining his commission.

As far as can be ascertained there is no fixed annual establishment of King's Cadets. The terms of their appointment and their emoluments coincide with the proposals for foundation scholars which would replace them.

Ten Honorary King's Cadets are nominated annually by the S. of S. for War. These appointments carry with them no pecuniary advantage and are open to the sons of officers who have performed long and distinguished service, and are merely a form of military patronage which possibly encourages the sons of distinguished fathers who are not sufficiently able or sufficiently energetic to pass the

open examination to enter the army by private entrée.

Twenty King's India Cadets are annually nominated by the S. of S. for India, the "length and distinction of the father's service being the primary consideration." Special consideration is, however, given to the sons of deceased officers.

A King's India Cadetship carries with it the right of appointment to the Indian Army, but it does not carry any pecuniary concession except in special cases. What these special cases are, and how often they have occurred, is not stated.

Three Honorary King's India Cadets at the R.M.C. are offered annually. These are nominated by the S. of S. for India, and are open to the sons of officers who have performed distinguished services in India; in other respects they appear to resemble the King's India Cadets.

Both the above appear to be merely forms of India Office patronage which could well be merged into one category, viz., that of foundation scholars or prize cadets.

What is advocated amounts to the repayment of a small part of a large debt we owe to our bravest countrymen. It is nothing more than the restoration to the necessitous of what the nation always intended should be theirs.

A published list of foundation scholars at Wellington and Sandhurst should merely be a repetition of names we had already read in the Roll of Honour of our country.

This war with its terrible toll has expanded the

circle of claimants for our military grants in aid to widows and orphans; and these should be adequately increased to meet the need.

With regard to (2), our technical military education, we shall have to commence by taking a glance backward into the past:

The Woolwich cadet of forty years ago received much instruction in archaic artillery, still more in very ancient fortification. A good deal of his time was expended in an effort to shape "block capitals" and to learn a now forgotten art called "hachuring."

There was a certain amount of drill with the most elderly natures of ordnance manipulated by antediluvian appliances. Military history was taught more as something to be remembered than as something to be reasoned from. Mathematics were accepted as an inevitable evil. The lecture on chemistry was looked forward to as a pleasantly recurring hour of amusement. We did occasionally hear of tactics. Military law and administration were quite unknown to us.

The majority of the instructors very naturally found it easier to teach what they had learnt than to keep their subjects up to date by a study of the latest wars and their lessons. The main defects of the system were, however, traceable to the examiners, as the professors and instructors had to dance to their tune.

Failure also lay in the fact that the framing of the curriculum was in the hands of the *Laudator* temporis acti, who was neither in touch with the modern thought of the time nor inclined to make any attempt to probe the secrets of the future.

In consequence of this training most of us on joining the Field Artillery found ourselves very poorly equipped with any knowledge of the essentials of our work. Further instruction was a matter of chance, as there was no organised system of regimental or technical training. In the present day it is much easier to arrange for a sound technical education where only essentials will receive attention on joining a unit than formerly, when anything like scientific education was regarded with a certain amount of suspicion. In our case it would have been much better to have shortened the period of instruction at the R.M.A. and omitted the courses before joining our batteries, if we could have replaced those attendances by well supervised practical in struction after commencing our careers, at a time we were beginning to feel our responsibilities as officers, and were full of a keenness which never returns. at least never with the same force and freshness.

In these days the young officer starts his career with a much more complete mental equipment than formerly. He no longer joins the Service in ignorance of subjects he should know by heart.

He receives a good, modern military education, and much is done to stimulate his keenness, and to interest him in his work. There is still, however, room for improvement.* Just as national education should begin with and be based on a sound,

^{*} Such subjects as Aeronautics, Army Finance, Munition Supply, England's Armies might be included in the list of subjects taught.

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general education, at the end of which the pronounced aptitudes and tendencies, inherited and acquired, of each student should be developed, in the direction which gives most promise of a successful career in life; so in our military schools specialisation should commence after this foundation has been laid, not before. Educationalists seem to agree that technical education should not begin too early. All the technical educator asks for is that he should receive his pupils with a sound general education. He is opposed to the sowing of tares on ground on which he proposes to plant his wheat. He prefers to sow his best seed on virgin soil. In the Army a high standard of education is not demanded in the first instance. Each rank must, however, be guarded by a test obstacle which must be surmounted by the aspirant for further promotion. Men of ambition and determination will always manage to complete the course. Our natural and national leanings towards excessive individualismlead us into the meshes of a marked particularism.

Each arm of the Service desires to enclose itself within its own shell. It was only a short time ago that the hitherto impenetrable wall between the Navy and the Army was broken through and the two Services seriously combined to practise what an Island nation must always make as its first step on a declaration of war—an embarkation followed by a disembarkation.

We must go further and remove the wall we have erected between Woolwich and Sandhurst when we made them separate schools of military instruction.

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We should commence the education of our cadets with a general curriculum made up of subjects that every soldier ought to be acquainted with. An elementary military education common to all and without any specialist subjects.

All cadets, no matter what branch of the Service they may be destined for, should have the same groundwork for the commencement of their military education. This would to some extent check the impulse to run into our own room and shut the door, which at present prevails in more than one branch of our Service. We shall then have more understanding of and more respect for one another.

The chief opponents of this proposal to reduce elementary military education to a common denomination for all military students are those who insist on the importance of a special mathematical training for certain branches of the Service. If this be so, and undoubtedly mathematics are essential in a very few of them, let this particular form of instruction be provided when the student has passed from the secondary to the technical school.

At the end of the term fixed for the secondary course an examination would be held for all, the choice of the branch of the Service for each competitor being decided by his position on the list. For instance, if there were only ten vacancies for the R.E., the first ten officers on the list who desired to be Engineers would be given the vacancies; R.A., Cavalry, Indian Army, etc., being decided in the same way on the same list.

At this examination candidates from the military

schools suggested in Chapter II. would also be allowed to compete—their curriculum being framed with a view to this trial. Cadets entering from these schools would be saved the expense of a military education at Woolwich or Sandhurst. These would, as at present, be open to all competitors. That an education at Woolwich is not absolutely essential has been proved on two occasions, in 1856 when the "Persons" were admitted, and in 1886 when the experiment was repeated with satisfactory results.

At the conclusion of his secondary military education the cadet, before receiving his final commission, would proceed to his technical school. This would be found in whatever branch of the Service he became entitled by his final examination on passing out of the secondary school. In this unit the commanding officer of the probationer would be directly responsible for the amount of instruction he received. At the same time his education would be superintended by the officers of the higher formations, generally represented by the Brigade and Divisional Staffs. Variations of the system will have to be made in such cases as the R.E. and R.G.A., when the course would probably be more prolonged and more technical. In all cases, however, the principle will be kept in view that specialist instruction is to be planned and directed by experts of the branch in question who are the only people whom practical experience of the past has taught what kind of knowledge should be supplied to a young officer at the commencement of his career in his particular branch. There has been too much theorising in the past with regard to

special training by men unacquainted with the actual needs of a particular métier.

A final examination at the end of the time of probation determines the seniority of the candidates in each branch of the Service on gaining their final commissions. This course seems necessary to insure proper interest in their work, otherwise a certain number would do little or nothing. There is a third step which should be taken to break down our love of isolation. The formation of Mixed Brigades of the following composition:—

- 4 Battalions of Infantry.
- 4 Batteries of-Artillery.
- 1 Field Company R.E.
- 1 Squadron of Cavalry and Cyclists.
- I Machine Gun Company.

As at present, three Brigades would constitute a Division, the Divisional Staff supervising the instruction and training of each Brigade. The advantages claimed for this Mixed Brigade organisation are as follows:—

- (1) It gives our younger generals experience in commanding a mixed force of all arms, making them understand in a practical manner the powers and limitations of the different arms both separately and in combination.
- (2) It insures that intimate co-operation between all arms which is so necessary if the best results are to be obtained.
- (3) It enables a Brigadier to give his officers practical instruction in the command of the different arms in combination, instead of having to apply to his

superior to detail the necessary troops, who usually give but grudging and unwilling support and are therefore asked for as seldom as possible.

This Mixed Brigade organisation would be facilitated if we were enabled to divide our Field Artillery into permanent fractions as proposed.

Before leaving the subject of education there is one more point. In the present day it has become almost a necessity for an officer who desires to qualify himself for the higher branches of his profession to obtain a Staff College certificate. As the cost connected with preparing for the examination, and of life at the College itself is considerable, it would only be fair to treat the successful competitors in the S.C. open examination as winners of Military Scholarships and award each £200. There is no doubt that the foundation of the Indian Staff College enabled many capable officers with small means to obtain certificates who would otherwise have been unable to do so. We shall have to consider the purely professional soldier much more in the future than has been the case in the past; so far he has been very much under-handicapped in / the competition for military prizes.

Stress has already been laid on the importance of holding the balance so level that favour has no opening. We have here an interesting object-lesson. The introduction of special nominations for the Staff College has proved a great success. The selections have been good, and have provided us with some of our best Staff officers. At the same time no man with a judicial mind, and who is

acquainted with the facts of the case, will deny that an officer who is well-off, well-born, well-mannered and well-known, has not a very great advantage in gaining a special nomination. Why should these advantages be all on one side? Allow the man who has suo marte by hard work and determination come through his field on his own merits, some solid and tangible reward for his labours; even with this small handicap in his favour he will find it hard to catch up his gifted rivals in the race for army prizes.

CHAPTER X

REFLECTIONS IN THE WHIRLPOOL OF WAR

We have been attempting to convince the German nation that militarism, which they have been so blindly worshipping, is a false god. Whether we have succeeded in performing the work of the iconoclast is immaterial. What really matters is whether we have been able to reduce the number of the deity's devotees and to shake the faith of those who still profess to worship this god of battle, murder and destruction. It was the vision of this forbidding fiend enthroned above and tyrannising over the German nation that served to, and perhaps still serves to, dissuade many of our own people from taking the prudent and necessary steps to defend our own homes. The strong man armed was depicted as the bloodthirsty tyrant.

The apostles of military puritanism have won a certain amount of *réclame* by their advocacy of young leaders. While admitting that any epic on this war will, in the majority of cases, rightly have for its theme the deeds of our splendid rising generation, it can hardly be denied that this apotheosis of youth has in some cases unfortunately degenerated into a thinly disguised intrigue on the part of the juniors to supplant their seniors.

For officers up to and including the rank of Brigade Commander there is practically entire agreement with the view that modern war is a young man's business. When, however, the cases of generals commanding divisions, corps and armies, and certain members of the higher and lower staffs are being considered, the necessity for young men is not clear. No war has ever been fought under conditions more favourable to generals of advanced years. The stationary nature of the campaign; the semi-peace conditions which existed for considerable periods over large portions of the Western Front; the terrific wastage which precluded any prolongation of fighting at maximum pressure; motor cars running on good roads, supplemented by a perfect system of telegraphic and telephonic communication to all parts of their line, have all conspired to enable officers who had lost some of their youthful activity to perform their work without loss of efficiency, and to keep in close and constant touch with their senior and junior commanders.

That cateris paribus a man of forty is a better man than one of sixty can hardly be denied. A young officer, however, who from a subordinate position finds himself by rapid promotion in command of 60,000, perhaps 200,000, men must be a very exceptional man if he can make the most of his position and not learn his work at the expense of his command. If those called upon to form important decisions had previously been exposed to days and nights of great physical strain, one could well understand the necessity for young, vigorous men. No

such strain has been put on our senior commanders in the later stages of this war.

When the man of sixty is provided with reasonable comforts and aided by modern fatigue-saving devices, his twenty years of extra experience ought

to stand him in good stead.

Possibly our Generals have in the past been badly selected and our army system has failed in their training. If, however, neither of these suggestions be accepted, it is difficult to understand the great advantages of so-called voung Generals for the higher commands in the British Army. More especially so when we must admit that men of our nation, as a rule, preserve their bodily activity to a later period in life than most other countries. These have not been condemned as only fit for the scrap heap, men who have passed the age of three-score. Have the younger leaders of our armies and corps, with all their advantages, shown such a very marked superiority over their seniors in years—in our own or other armies? Will those of them at present at the zenith of their manhood consider themselves worn-out old dotards at the age of sixty?

"Le bon général ordinaire," so much scorned in our Staff College days, who had steadily climbed the promotion ladder and satisfied all tests demanded of him, had many good qualities to recommend him in the type of war we have been conducting. An organiser and administrator of proved ability, accustomed to study and to deal with the larger questions associated with army life, and armed with all the experience which age brings, he should, always provided he had not lost his energy, have been quiet capable of exercising his command in an efficient manner. The older man may not possibly have proved such a docile subordinate. A comprehensive study of the war may, however, reveal too much docility on the part of subordinate commanders during certain phases of its duration. What should be emphasised is that more depends on experience and on moral and intellectual qualities for a senior general than on mere bodily activity and youthful appearance. The reliable general has played a great part in this war. Capable, hard-working and methodical, he has done all that has been expected of him. There has been little scope for Napoleonic qualities on our Western Front.

Without advocating a return to the days when octogenarians like Mélas and Radetzky were considered fit to command armies in the field, it should not be forgotten that the qualities necessary for the successful command of a large body of troops are not always the same as those which make a man a brilliant leader of a comparatively small force in the presence of the enemy. We want the best men we can get. If a man is too old for his position he should certainly be removed. In our search for perfection in efficiency we sometimes forget that best is the enemy of good, and that while spring unfolds the bright flowers autumn produces the matured fruit.

The Dardanelles report, in spite of the tragic tale it unfolded, had an almost humorous side. The conception of the campaign was correct. The

outlook offered a reasonable prospect of great and farreaching results. The method of execution of the plan can only be compared with that of a burglar who rings the bell at a house he is about to rob, and informs the inmates that he will return later on to carry out his nefarious designs, and then expresses surprise and mortification when he has been roughly handled while attempting to give effect to his burglarious intentions. We also seem for the moment to have forgotten that in making your plans for an attack it is as well to give_your opponent credit for doing something sensible. The origin of this expensive and disheartening failure may to some extent be traced to the fact that on the declaration of war all our most eminent and renowned soldiers betook themselves to France "seeking the bubble reputation," and leaving the conduct of our Imperial Strategy in the hands of an assemblage of military advisers, many of whom were new to their positions, and who, however capable they may have been, were neither known to, nor trusted by, the public. We may be here reminded that we had Lord Kitchener at the helm of the military ship. The charges levelled against him that his strong, masterful personality bore down all opposition to his will had possibly a certain amount of justification. This attitude probably resulted from his having to deal with a crew who had not won his confidence and who were new to their work and to the stations they occupied. Certain it is that from the moment ha was given a first officer in whom he had confidence. the ship settled down to a straight and consistent

course in spite of the many storms and adverse currents through which she had to be steered.

The evil resulting from this ill-timed exodus was a two-fold one. In the first place it inaugurated what may be called the "Reign of Error" during which the conduct of our Imperial Strategy was at the mercy of a number of amateur military theorists each advocating his own panacea for a successful termination of the war which many then believed could not possibly last beyond a few months. the second it has displaced the centre of gravity of our military system to such an extent that the General Commanding in France became, and remained till the end, the virtual Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. During nearly three years of the war the position of our Army in France was practically stationary. Semi-peace conditions prevailed for long periods over, large portions of our front. Had a Channel Tunnel existed the B.E.F. could quite easily have been commanded from Whitehall. Some maintain that an autocracy is the best form of government for the prosecution of a war. We have certainly had one in France, where the G.O.C. has exercised a most arbitrary sway, and from whose decisions there has been no right of appeal. Armed with almost a blank cheque, practically unhampered by returns of expenditure, and ably served by his own correspondents, who could record nothing but his victories, he has quite rightly been shielded from all public criticism, receiving the full credit for all successes without blame for failures. No general has ever wielded such extensive and such unrestricted power or been so liberally supported by the State.

Our system of Army Control which, instead of resting on sound foundations well laid in peace, was built up haphazard as we went along, calls for some examination. In charge of the military machine stood, as usual, the Secretary of State for War, a civilian selected mainly for his political prowess. The chief executive power was, however, for a considerable time vested in a triumvirate of Cavalry officers the correlation of whose powers might well form a theme worthy of a modern St. Athanasius. Our Home Army was commanded by a Field Marshal who was the senior officer in our Army on the active list. Our Army in France was also commanded by a Field Marshal who had been specially selected for the post, and who, though junior to the first-named, exercised an independent and almost autocratic command. While perhaps the key position was for some time occupied by the Chief of the Staff, a General officer who was junior in rank to both the above. One Field Marshal might pronounce an officer fit for advancement, the other might express his opinion that he was quite unfit for the command he was holding. There was no strong independent Court of Appeal to reconcile this wide divergence of opinion. The Army Council had very little direct control over the G.O.C. in France, none whatever over the Minister of Munitions, on the efficiency of whose department the success of our operations largely depended.

The ramifications of our military system was

revealed during the debate on the Cambrai "regrettable incident," when it was quite easy for those placed on their defence to mystify the inquirer as to who was actually responsible for the set back. "The Military Authorities," "We," "The Higher Command," "The War Office," "The Army Council," and, finally, that mysterious body known as G.H.O. in France, all served in turn as screens behind which to retire, leaving the questioner thoroughly baffled and mystified. While ample assurances were forthcoming that all was all right, it was painfully evident that somebody or something was all wrong. There was also the mutually destructive plea that the Army Council could not interfere with administration in the field, and that in the field officers have got more important business to attend to than holding inquiries.

Weakened by the departure of nearly all the most trusted and best known Army experts for France, our military mechanism was on the declaration of war subjected to a very severe strain.

The Army Council certainly remained doing, as it always has done, hard and useful work. Excellent as it was, it had, however, its limitations. Few of its members have had much or any experience of the actual command of troops in peace or war. Their departmental work, always heavy, precluded the necessary leisure for the study of the important and rapidly changing strategic situations of the day—perhaps even of the hour. The comparatively junior rank of most of the councillors, added to the fact that they were all men expectant of future

advancement and promotion, and had ingrained in them by a long course of discipline that attitude of mind which defers readily to the views of a senior. militated against that free volition and independence in expression of opinion so necessary for a body on whom rests the responsibility of giving the most unprejudiced advice to the Secretary of State for War. Furthermore, as a judicial body of final Court of Appeal, their rank disqualified many of them from dealing with the cases of senior officers who might be holding appointments as to which their judges of to-day could possibly become their successors on the morrow. Our War Minister is responsible to the nation for the efficiency of our Army. He is the man selected by the King for his ability as a politician, being well versed in the conduct of public affairs and parliamentary procedure, and in close and intimate touch with the leading politicians of the day. The question, therefore, is-How can he be most wisely counselled in his task of controlling and administering our National Forces?

Up till quite recently the Secretary of State for India was the only head of a State Department who has been aided by a permanent council. The India Home Council may not have been an entire success. This does not prevent us from profiting by some apparent mistakes—chiefly with regard to its rules and composition. This structure of government seems to coincide with an increasing tendency towards a form of departmental control, represented by political leadership counselled by expert advice: a committee of experts representing successful

practice serving to dilute the advice of the useful but too traditional permanent official.

The principle of the Indian Home Council to make use of the experience of its most eminent and successful Indian public servants was a sound one. A weakness in its practical working appears to have arisen from allowing its councillors, already well advanced in years, a too long tenure of their seats in the council chamber. Also it made no provision for the immediate enlistment of those who had just retired from some important position on the active list in India: men who had reached an age when every year subtracted from their mental and bodily vigour, and removed them further out of touch with the rapidly changing Indian zeitgeist.

Working on the above lines the proposal is to form a small Army Senate which will act as a purely advisory and consultative body to aid the Secretary of State for War in forming his decisions and be also an authoritative and final Court of Appeal. The object in view being not the encouragement of appeals, but that the knowledge that an appeal is possible will give pause to those in authority, some of whom in the past seem to have forgotten what justice means. Such an assemblage would in no way supplant the Army Council, each member of which has his own distinct functions and sphere of usefulness, and whose corporate duties are executive as well as consultative.

The modern Field Marshal, or full General, is normally a middle-aged man by no means enfeebled in mind by the ravages of age. Only soldiers of eminence who have held or are holding high positions are promoted to these superlative ranks. On their retirement from the active list they might be usefully employed as members of an Army Senate, where their extended experience eminent services would entitle their opinions to weight and respect, and having little further expectation of future rewards they would have less diffidence in expressing their heartfelt and sincere convictions. It seems unnecessary to add to the financial burdens of the State by providing them with special salaries. as in the case of Field Marshals, their pay is the same whether in retirement or actively employed. In the case of full Generals, service on the Senate might be considered to constitute a certain claim to eventual promotion to Field Marshal's rank as vacancies occurred.

The fact of having held certain appointments such as Chief of the General Staff and 1st Member of the A.C., C.-in-C. in India, etc., might be considered to give a claim but by no means a right to serve on the Army Senate. The period of holding the rank of Army Senator to correspond with the period of tenure of Army commands (about four years), so that as little delay as possible would elapse between the time an officer gave up his active command and became a senator on the retired list. Four would appear to be a sufficient number of senators, with one from the Indian Army. A certain number of co-opted members might be invited to attend certain special meetings.

A Senate built up upon the above outline would

possess the following advantages:-

(1) On the outbreak of a national war the Secretary of State for War would retain intact his advisory council, composed of men whose past careers justified their positions, and who being no longer on the active list would have no expectation of service in the field.

(2) The thoroughly practical past experience in army affairs possessed by senators of the proposed standing would prove a great value to the State.

(3) Such an assemblage might be expected to display more independence of view than those whose future careers depended on harmony with the Chief. As a final Court of Appeal to hold level the scales of justice they would supply what some consider a much-felt want.

(4) The much higher standard that has of late years been demanded of our senior officers seems to justify the prediction that a council so constituted would add much to the strength and wisdom of the corporate military mind whose task it will be to solve the many serious military problems connected with the rebuilding of our whole Army fabric.

(5) The conclusion of this war finds us with a large number of tried and experienced soldiers capable of filling the position of Army Senator. The proposed scheme will probably save us from holding a large number of committees of investigation by using the Army Senate as a Standing Committee on certain purely Army questions.

The Army Senate would be entirely separate

from the Imperial Army Council and would limit its horizon to the outlook of the Secretary of State for War.

The conception of such a Senate is akin to our present War Cabinet, which has the advantage of a small and select-body freed from all departmental duties such as immerse our existing Army Council, several of whose members are heads of large and important departments. A kindred body, but vested I understand with more power, exists in Japan, where a Council composed of senior Field Marshals and Admirals assembles from time to time to consider military questions of the first national importance. Had we possessed a Senate of the description indicated at the moment war was declared, we might have been saved a number of sad experiences and much loss of concentrated effort. The result of a weak federal control has culminated in our resigning the bulk of our Army patronage to the G.O.C. in France and in our unchecked expenditure of men and material in that country. should also have had the necessary restraining influence on excessive military autocracy—a Court of Appeal.

It is perhaps too early to propose, though no doubt we shall come to it in time, that it should be an elected body chosen by the Generals and Lieut.-

Generals on the active list.

The war on the Western Front has taken the form of a series of sanguinary soldiers' battles of varying magnitude, which have been decided chiefly by the methodical preparations of the different

staffs, the fine leading of our regimental officers and the courage, grit and determination of our splendid rank and file. There has been little scope for the exercise of great strategical or tactical skill. A battle once joined has taken its own course. There has been no teaching the "doubtful battle how to rage." The piling up of row upon row of artillery fed by inexhaustible supplies of ammunition has been a triumph due to national effort rather than to military prowess. Without the mass of mechanism and matter no advance would have been possible. Should the statement be doubted let a comparison be made between the guns used and the ammunition expended in the second and third battles of Ypres. Although we have made considerable progress in military organisation and administration, the actual advance on either side has been mainly due to the production of preponderating force. While giving full credit to the fine work accomplished by our artillerists, their efforts, magnificent as they have been, would have borne little fruit without the practical assistance of our Minister of Munitions and of our home factories. For too long we attempted to break through a solid wall with inadequate implements. A comparison between the amount of high explosives used in 1914 and 1918 makes us wonder how we ever progressed at all. Our efforts in the early days may be compared to those of a man with a small trowel endeavouring to dig a hole in a huge bank. Cavalry which is only capable of dealing with loose fragments was expected to perform a rôle for which it was quite unsuited. The

evolution of new methods, many of which we have learnt from our Allies and from our enemies, has been gradual, and has not demanded great origination, nor has either side been able to produce startling successes with dramatic results. There has been no Sédan, no Sadowa, no Waterloo. A beaten enemy has never been converted into a routed enemy. A reason for this is doubtless to be found in the peculiar conditions of modern war which enable a few determined men in a strong well-chosen position, armed with a machine-gun, to withstand for long the attacks of vastly superior numbers.

Our initial failures in Mesopotamia have been ascribed to many causes. From a purely military point of view two stand out conspicuously. Our want of preparation for the campaign followed up by sending a boy, and a very badly equipped boy, to do a man's job.

It has been stated that in the year 1911 the C.-in-C. in India proposed that that country should prepare an Expeditionary Force (armed and equipped to meet a European Army) in contemplation of a war with Turkey. The theatre of operations of such a force must certainly have included the country through which the last section of the Bagdad railway was planned to run, and the defence of our oilfields at the head of the Persian Gulf. What steps were taken by our General Staff in India to prepare for such an expedition?

To any one examining the proposed theatre of war it was plain that such a campaign would involve us in what are known as amphibious operations, for the successful conduct of which a close study of river and land transport is necessary. In countries with well organised and efficient military staffs any proposed enterprises are prepared for by collecting and collating all the military information about the prospective enemy and the territory which can be gained by an active intelligence department, supplemented by an efficient secret service to keep the plans formulated on such knowledge up to date. This alone is not sufficient. Staff tours meticulously worked out by the Army Headquarter Staff and by the students of Staff Colleges should both test the and elaborate the detail. Furthermore, manœuvres must be held on a "terrain" as nearly as possible representative of the actual ground in the theatre of contemplated activities, where further experience of a more practical nature is gained.

Had such foresight been exercised?

As long as our Headquarter Staff in India keeps its eyes fixed on Peshawar and Quetta to the exclusion of the rest of the Indian Army, we cannot hope to produce a force in that enormous area capable of performing the variety of tasks it may from time to time be called on to undertake. We are an Empire founded on sea power. Embarkations, disembarkations and amphibious operations must always fall to our lot, and one of our chief tasks should be to attempt to bring them to perfection. Our staff exercises and manœuvres should have been planned with a view to testing our purely paper staff projects and to gaining experience on

certain definite subjects. As far as the experience of many of us goes, so long as manœuvres and staff tours were held in India, that sufficed. The Director of Staff Duties was quite content with a cavalry concentration at A, or divisional manœuvres at B. There was little apparent co-operation between him and the Director of Operations.

A long series of more or less successful small wars conducted against an inferior enemy, the ultimate issue of which was never in doubt, had lowered the standard of our military ideals in India to such an extent that we were inclined to accept as sufficient, preparations which would prove quite inadequate when dealing with first-rate troops, armed, organised and equipped up to a modern European standard. That cursed spirit of false economy which acted as a blight on many of our pre-war efforts to obtain the most ordinary military efficiency was far too predominant in India. The Finance Department has been blamed, but after all it was only, in colloquial slang, "keeping its end up." The real responsibility for our failure to meet the Turk on equal terms on the day of battle rested on those whose duty it was to balance the claims of economy and efficiency. We appear to have classed the Turkish Army in the same category with Afridis, Afghans or Waziris, not as a European Force armed, munitioned and equipped by the most up-to-date military power in the world.

Either we had not seriously contemplated the campaign we undertook, or if it be claimed that we had fully anticipated what would happen, then it must be conceded that the preparations for the task did not redound to our military professional credit. A serious undertaking had been embarked upon without foresight or a well-considered plan. The bravery and devotion of our matchless officers and men alone illuminated one of the dark pages in the history of our prolonged and world-wide struggle. We have yet to learn at what cost this salvation was won.

In this war the machine has played a leading part. We have created enormous metal fish beside which the whale resembles a whiting, and monster mechanical birds which dwarf the Dinornis. The motor lorry has revolutionised modern war by enabling limitless hosts to be fed and munitioned on a scale never before contemplated. The tank has not only won victories, but has achieved more in the conduct of War Saving Campaigns than our most eloquent orators.

War has also become mechanical, and our Army a large machine, which since the Allied effort has been placed under a single commander has lost all independent volition, and merely travels along the groove assigned to it. Giving all credit to those who conducted and carried out our operations in Palestine, it was the tanks which enabled us to break through the Turkish defence, and our aeroplanes which converted the retirement into a rout.

No prophetic inspiration was necessary to predict that as soon as Germany became hard pressed Turkey would be the partner who would suffer soonest and most sorely. Without money or munition works, in the European sense of the term, she was bound to experience a shortage, possibly a lack, of those mechanical appliances which are the life-blood of a modern army. Her minimised machine power placed her at the mercy of an adversary who had at his command a plentiful supply of the most destructive weapons, and who also had in abundance everything necessary to sustain his troops with confidence, and to maintain them in contentment.

Turning for a moment to consider the Russian problem. Although no Bolshevist Buonaparte arose in that distressful country to enslave Europe in the grip of a frenzied proletariat, a safe insurance against such a catastrophe was always to be found in the industrial poverty of the Slav race, a condition which rendered the forces of Russia incapable of meeting on anything like equal terms the Western Armies, plentifully provided with the death-dealing machines of to-day, and possessing inexhaustible supplies of the most modern munitions of war.

The strength of the hills and the fastnesses of the forest which were the sanctuaries of the barbarous and savage tribes of the earth have been derided by the mechanically winged man, who not only sees into their recesses, but brings back with him an accurate picture of the whole panorama.

We commenced the war with two main branches of fighting effort, our Navy and our Army; we have since made two independent and important additions, our Munition Service and our Air Force, each with its own ministry; the former purely mechanical,

the latter entirely dependent on the same for its efficiency.

In former times war was conducted by a mastermind directing numbers whose actions he could closely control. To-day, although the orders may issue in one name, the impulse is the result of a number of independent efforts all working for a common purpose.

In spite of the wealth in legacies left to him by his ancestors in learning and knowledge, art and science, discovery and invention, man remains the same size in all his dimensions. He has neither greater length of life, breadth of mind, nor loftiness of soul than those who proceeded him, very often not so much.

The seven wonders of the ancient world for the most part represented the achievement of uselessly expended labour to satisfy the whim of some autocrat, or to perpetuate his memory. The seven wonders of the modern world, whatever they may be, represent achievements which bring prosperity and blessings to mankind, in which the name of the builder is lost in the utility of his edifice.

To control a stationary force of millions of soldiers requires an exceptional man; when the force becomes a dynamic one we may justly infer that in order to do full justice to our machine we must have a super-man. The public possibly takes this view, for although hero worship is not so openly supported as in the past ages, there remains a certain amount of it in the world of to-day. It takes the form of worshipping, or at least seeing more than there is

to see in, magnified men on whom has been concentrated all the rays of effort which their office nominally controls. A man commanding millions scattered over hundreds of miles of battle front is credited with a ubiquitous presence, and with the performance of personal deeds and achievements which while he is journalistically enacting, he is really employed in such commonplace actions as reading the papers, writing his home letters, or even eating his breakfast, after all he is merely a human being. As, however, it must have some one to worship, our public has personified our immense military machine, which, although running smoother in the hands of a certain driver, does not suffer derangement of its parts when it becomes advisable to change him. We do not write the name of the engine-driver on the locomotive and attribute to him all the mechanical triumphs of the machine. You may change the label on your bottle, the wine inside remains the same.

The machine does the work, the man merely guides it. It has been built up gradually from all parts, not only of Great Britain, but from our entire Empire. Amongst other things it requires spirit to give it motive power, oil to minimise the friction, and a system of constant renewals. You can hardly blame the man who assisted to build it for not recognising some of its defects, nor understanding that some of the parts require renewal, a few even scrapping. Though the man requires rest, and is subject to influences, the machine works incessantly, it is always demanding more fuel and casting forth

as ashes the residue of what it has consumed. It has periods of quiescence and periods of stress. Though the machine may be working at high pressure, the man may remain unmoved, he has directed its impulse and becomes a mere spectator of its work. The track made by the machine is marked clearly on the ground, where you can follow the indentations on the wall opposed to its advance, not, however, the injury suffered by the machine during its onward, or backward, progress. The machine creaks and groans, it is, however, incapable of articulate expression owing to the careful fitting of the "silencer."

Whatever may have happened in the past, leaders in our day certainly contribute to victories, they do not create them. Great Britain's effort is represented by the combined contribution of the citizens of our Empire, whether dressed as sailors, soldiers, airmen, munition workers, or V.A.D.'s. All have made sacrifices, comparatively few have received rewards. Let us then be content to talk of the deeds of our Armies without recourse to the old style of personification which seems to blurr the true perspective of our national achievement and too often magnifies the twinkling of a small star into the brilliance of an all-pervading sun.

We have been taken to task as a nation for our failure in what has been described as "team-work." Regarding our Army Corps as a team, we do not appear to have used it to full advantage. In an important despatch, our C.-in-C. in France laid emphasis upon the extreme importance of adequate training prior to placing troops in the line of battle.

Whatever shortcomings there may have been with regard to the training of troops dispatched from home, some think that the failure to make the best use of the Corps' organisation was to some extent responsible for any defective training there may have been in France. Assuming that there were five Armies in the B.E.F., the following table shows the normal scale of its composing units:-

An Army was composed of about—5 Army Corps. An Army-Corps contained normally—3 Divisions. A Division contained normally—3 Brigades.

A Brigade latterly contained normally-3 Battalions.

The Division was practically the fighting unit. The Army Corps, except in the case of the Anzac and Canadian Corps, which preserved the same composition at all times, like the Saxons, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, etc., in the German Army, was in many cases merely a General and his Staff to assist the Army Commander in dealing with the divisions composing his Army. The composition varied according to circumstances, thus, the rooth Corps might one month consist of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, and the next, the 19th, 21st and 24th. To such an extent did these changes take place that in 1917 it was computed that no fewer than fifty divisions had passed in turn through a single Corps since the beginning of the war, a by no means exceptional record. A Corps Commander was, in many cases, merely the controller of a huge machine which ran, as a rule, on a fixed line of rails which circumstances did not permit him to quit. He had

been advanced from among the other Divisional Commanders to a higher command on account of his previous services, but whether he was permitted to take an active part with his own Corps which he was supposed to be responsible for training, in one of the periodical attacks on a large scale, rested on the decision of G.H.Q. If not actively employed his Corps was told off to hold an extended position on the line of defence, the divisions he had more or less trained were taken from him and replaced by tired ones, whose casualties had for the moment weakened these below attacking efficiency, and which as soon as they were recuperated and reformed might be again taken from him and employed in the area of active operation. Corps Commanders who had had experience in these gigantic encounters were naturally preferred to those who had merely been holding a portion of the line and came into prominence, while the less fortunate lapsed through no fault on their part into comparative oblivion. If a roster had been maintained and Corps Commanders with their Staffs had been allowed to fight as their turn came, emulation would have been stimulated, and at least some complexion of fairness made manifest. A Commander who failed when his turn came should have been removed. Although this mixture of divisions was no doubt unavoidable in the large modern attacks, there seems no reason why these divisions could not have been returned eventually to their parent corps, as those of France and Germany do, when their training could have been much more satisfactorily dealt with. This failure to use the

Corps organisation as it was originally intended to be used, centralised too much work round G.H.O., and did not distribute the load of responsibility sufficiently among the senior Generals of the Army. The weakness of our Corps' organisation was to some extent a contributory cause to the inferior training of our troops. Had the same Divisions always remained in the same Corps their training could have been more smoothly and systematically proceeded with, and the Corps' Staff being thoroughly acquainted with the Divisional Staffs, that friction which is inevitable between two bodies of officers who are possibly strangers to one another would have been reduced to a minimum. Also the Corps Commander and his Staff would naturally have taken more trouble to train officers and men who were to fight under their orders than when there existed a strong probability that on the commencement of active operations, they would be sent to reinforce some other Corps, and sever all future connection with them. In like manner the Division and Brigade Commanders were constantly having new masters, whose perhaps divergent views with regard to training disturbed that faith in a common doctrine which is so essential for continuity and uniformity of instruction. The friction, not to describe it by a stronger term, which from time to time manifested itself between Staff and regimental affairs, was in part due to the fact that these constant changes did not permit of the intimate relations between the Brigade, Division and Corps Staff which would, under different circumstances, have existed.

Although the C.-in-C. made a great point of insisting on having the officers he desired to have. the same necessity was not recognised in the case of Army Corps or Divisional Commanders and Staff appointments. All these were made at G.H.O., who adhered jealously to their patronage in spite of the centralisation it created. It is idle to say that the C.-in-C. had time to consider all such appointments with most of the candidates for which he had no acquaintance whatever. It is true that in certain cases these appointments were made in accordance with the wishes of a subordinate Commander: this was, however, a matter of favour or friendship, not of right. There is much in favour of a single list for all Commanders and Staff officers, and those provided were beyond question good. It is the inconsistency of the principle of granting privileges to a Commander which resulted in an unnecessary and expensive system of dual control that is in view. A central office in London could have dealt with all appointments with more equity and equal efficiency. The duplication of an enormous staff was merely to retain patronage in the hands of the G.O.C. in France, and in that of his Staff.

When the history of the war comes to be chronicled the doings of the different corps (with the exception of the Dominion ones) will have no meaning in relation to any particular body or troops. Many Divisions will stand out from the rest, but Army Corps whose component Divisions were frequently changing will be represented by the General and his Staff, the numeral designating the particular

Corps, but by nothing else. None will shine out from amongst its fellows or display any marked superiority, all have been reduced to a colourless drab.

The more distant the sun the less are his rays felt. The higher the position occupied by a modern General in the field, the wider is the separation between him and his front line; and while the brain and directing force is located at the centre of the circle, the actual driving force is applied at the circumference. more influential the personage, the more dependent does he become for information as to what is actually taking place in the fighting area on the official and unofficial reports supplied to him by his subordinates. These latter instinctively endeavour to harmonise their views with the temperament of their chief, and as most men like to hear repeated what they themselves think, the result is often an exaggerated optimism ending in corresponding disappointment; failure being too often attributed to the lack of sufficient men and material, and not to miscalculation of the task. The prophet of evil is just as unpopular as he was in the days of Micaiah the son of Imlah; "I hate him for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil," is still to be heard

The power of central control has been enormously increased by two modern appliances, the telephone and the motor-car. These have magnified the power of the human tongue and ear almost beyond conception, and have provided mankind with not merely "seven-league boots," but with at least

seventy-league ones. To attempt to realise their influence we may picture the situation which would have been created if some strange atmospheric disturbance had thrown all the telephones out of action and had at the same time attacked the carburetter of every car. As at least one result, each unit, whether Army, Corps, Division, Brigade, or Battalion, would have been more or less isolated, and would have had to have acted for some time on its own responsibility as in the old days of warfare. Although we should have suffered from unity of effort, and lost many military advantages, the disaster would have had some compensations. Before science had come to our rescue and applied an antidote for the ailments of our auxiliaries, we should have perhaps discovered what a large amount of superfluous talking and travelling we had been doing, and how wonderfully well a large number of affairs progressed without our continual inspection. That liaison is a necessary portion of the machinery of military command is undisputed. That it has shown signs of overgrowth and superfluity in the past hardly admits of doubt. No one would. I think, be permitted to go on board, certainly not to go round, a battleship without the permission of her commander. On the Western Front, junior officers from G.H.O. had free access to Generals' areas of command, and had the power to furnish detrimental reports concerning which no explanation could be offered. To some of us it appeared preferable to tolerate a General who though good may not possibly have been the very best, rather than to

introduce a system which placed the selection of our senior officers to some extent at the mercy of a mysterious but influential body largely composed of their juniors. I shall always remember the words of our respected Governor at Woolwich, "Gentlemen, remember there is no espionage." He always acted up to this principle, and was admired and respected by the cadets in consequence.

Before this war we had a fixed proportion of Generals, and each arm of the Service had an allotment, the claims of officers to advancement and promotion being dealt with by a Selection Board.

The plan worked well.

The growth of a Nation in Arms soon over-shadowed our small pre-war military machine, which was unable to maintain control of it, and made futile efforts to fit it into the old framework of our Expeditionary Force. Our Dominion Armies soon asserted their independence, and claimed and obtained for their own forces those plums which rightly fell to their own share. As the rest of our Army, owing to its weak central control, had not sufficient strength to safeguard its interests it became the prey to a system of patronage that it will be hard to justify.

Our Defence problem is the exact opposite of that presented for solution to most continental nations. These latter have as a rule important and vulnerable land frontiers to protect, combined with comparatively small colonial responsibility. The apparently correct answer for them being a strong National Army for home defence supplemented by a small highly paid Colonial Army for exterior security.

Great Britain has, fortunately for us, no land frontiers to protect, although it has become plain that our securest line of defence lies beyond our shores. We have, on the other hand, vast colonial responsibility, and in consequence of this, our Colonial Army, known up till now as our Regular Army, has assumed the prior place in our Military Defence System. If we can persuade the nation to entrust the defence of its shores to a Citizen Army resembling those raised by some Continental nations with a very light compulsory backing, and can restore to our Regular Army its real rôle, viz. that of purely colonial police work, we shall be able not only to reduce our national expenditure, but also to place our system of defence on much sounder foundations. In pre-war days we were not prepared to take this bold step. Much has happened in the meanwhile to make it an easier one than it was before. Our entire manhood has been directly or indirectly connected with the Navy or the Army, and we have at our disposal, in addition to very great experience in war, vast stores of clothing, accourtements, and munitions with which to start our Citizen Army. Moreover, the nation has been educated and has had its interest awakened in military matters to an extent that makes the provision of officers and N.C.O.'s a matter of no difficulty. If we can either persuade the other nations of the world to come round to our views with regard to abolition of compulsion, or overcome our

prejudice to this unpopular word, this seems the time for us to act. We now understand that home defence implies, if need be, fighting beyond our shores, and can therefore free our professional Army for its proper rôle, viz. the maintenance of order, and the enforcement of our laws throughout our

vast Empire.

For the simplification of an examination of our military position let us assume that in pre-war days we had 100 regiments each with two battalions. one of which was to be at home and the other abroad. If in Great Britain we had 100 battalions. of these 72 were to form part of the Expeditionary Force of six divisions, leaving, say, 28 unallotted. Nearly all these 100 battalions furnished drafts to the 100 battalions abroad. Now that the principle is acknowledged that our Home Army is, if need be, to fight on the Continent, except for the reinforcement of our foreign garrisons, we have no special need for an Expeditionary Force, which can therefore well be reduced to two divisions, mostly composed of the Guards and the Marines. If we have a separate Army for India, and garrison some of our coaling stations with men in the Regular Army who have been permitted to extend their service to 21 years, and employ some native battalions in tropical stations for this purpose, we shall do away with the necessity of having to keep up battalions for the purpose of supplying foreign drafts, as these can be trained at depôts as complete battalions. Our Colonial Army would thus, with the exception of the recruits at the depôts, be almost entirely

composed of units serving permanently either in India or in one of our colonial stations. As has been explained, the Expeditionary Force could be brought up to a total of six divisions by obtaining three divisions from our Dominion Armies and a fourth from India. The money saved by the reduction of our Home Battalions, and some further considerable reductions in our Cavalry in Great Britain, could be devoted to the improvement of our National Army for Home Defence.

Recent experiences have wrought great changes in the outlook of what was our professional Army. At the commencement of our world-wide War many officers were infected by a craving for military renown created by a series of small wars, the ultimate result of which had never been in doubt. A certain number of them professed to look forward to the day when the long-threatened European conflagration would burst into flame. No serious soldier after taking part in this death struggle would to-day share such an anticipation. The greater the soul the greater it hath compassion. No amount of honours and rewards can remove from the mind of a truly noble man the feeling of his insignificance compared with those who have given their lives for their country fighting in the cause of right and justice for freedom and liberty. This sentiment has found true expression in the concluding verse of Mr. Horning's beautiful poem, "Wooden Crosses," published in the Times of July 20th, 1917.

[&]quot;The brightest gems of valour in the Army's diadem
Are the V.C. and the D.S.O., M.C., and D.C.M.;
But those who live to wear them will tell you they are dross
Beside the final honour of a Simple Wooden Cross."

CONCLUSION

In the course of the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to employ the searchlight of past experience to illuminate the darkness which conceals from the ordinary observer some of the inner recesses of our military mechanism—to röntgenise some of the ramifications of Army life. An attempt has also been made to outline some of the guiding principles to be followed in the building of our new military structure. The formation of a real National Army and its complete separation from our old Regular one, recruited by voluntary enlistment, for service beyond our shores. The harmonious union of all our Imperial Armies, and their proper co-ordination and liaison. A recognition of the fact that the principles of military economy and efficiency are not mutually exclusive. The introduction of such a transformation into our Army life as will permit officers to live on their pay and insure that intellectual capacity may not be obscured by distinctions based mainly on property. The establishment of an impartial and independent military Court of Appeal, not so much for the trial of cases as to guard against injustice. Great stress was laid on the fact that we were fighting to uphold the

rights of men belonging to small nations. We must not forget the rights which belong to those who occupy small stations. A profession in which a man can be condemned and then cast out from unheard without a chance of an appeal is both unhealthy and unsuited to our justice-loving race. A system of a higher command which will not be dislocated on the outbreak of war, nor made entirely subservient to the Secretary of State for War. A fair and equitable system of promotion for all. Selection for appointments to the higher commands vested in a carefully chosen Selection Board such as we had in pre-war days. There is plenty of work for the Minister of Reconstruction in connection with our New Army. A good Boarder Scheme for horses, an officers' branch of the Pimlico Clothing Department, the establishment of Secondary Military Schools, to enable boys without means entering the Army as officers without attending an expensive Military College or Academy. A certain number of houses for our destitute war widows with families. A registration Act for boys and girls similar to the Canadian one.

Our pre-war Imperial Army, in so far as it possessed any corporate existence, resembled a region with a water system in which a number of streams flowed separately into the sea of effect, instead of all combining into one mighty river which focused the military efforts of our entire Empire. The different Armies which should have been tributaries bringing strength and vigour to our main stream, represented by our Regular Army, expended all

their powers in their comparatively diminutive courses, and thus dissipated the strength which should have been united to form a force worthy of the fine fighting material we possessed. We must now take steps to join all these different affluents into one powerful stream. The waters of each tributary must be made to do its share in the great imperial concentration of force. A representative assemblage in which all have a voice must remove all those jealousies and particularism which has so far interfered with a real combination of effort.

The just and fair representation of our different Imperial Armies on our future "Imperial War Council" will be no easy matter. We are still waiting for a satisfactory scheme of Empire Federalism, and it is impossible to see whether it will take the form of a Federal Parliament as represented by the late German Reichstag, or of an Imperial Executive represented by a Federal Council similar to the defunct "Bundesrath." Towards the latter form of control our present Imperial War Cabinet is a decided step. The Imperial Conference and the Committee of Imperial Defence tend towards the same direction.

Our Imperial War Council must also have definite duties assigned to it, amongst others the control of our Imperial Striking Force made up of units from all parts of our Empire working in complete union with our Imperial Navy.

A project for the representation of a Federal Parliament on the basis of one member to every

MILITARY IMPERIAL FEDERATION 227

200,000 white inhabitants has been suggested. This would have given—

| United Kingdom 222 | Canada | 37 |
|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Australia 25 | S. Africa | 7 |

On the Bundesrath principle of representation each plenipotentiary would command so many votes on a fixed proportion according to the number of men his army represented. On such a Council India and our Protectorates should be allowed a voice. The exclusion of India from our Military Councils has so far led to a certain amount of jealousy and harmful show of rather petty independence. As India pays for her Army she has the right to command and administer it. These rights should not, however, prevent that fusion of interests which is so necessary to the harmonious working of a corporate Imperial undertaking.

We commenced the past war with a very small but very efficient Army, behind which stood our Territorial Force of 14 divisions, which demanded six months' training. Also our Dominion Armies, which had received little training in the European sense of the word, and our Indian Army of nine divisions. We conclude the war with the whole manhood of England, Scotland and Wales, and that of our Dominion Armies, in the ranks, trained, armed and experienced in War, with more than a million of our Indian subjects in support.

Writing of our Army on the Western Front, Mr. Fisher says: "Never in history has a war been waged by an Army so highly and so generally

educated, and yet the standard of courage and the range of moral splendour has exceeded anything imagination could conceive. The war has not shown deterioration in the primitive virtues."


Our nation has at length, we trust, witnessed the obsequies not only of military, but of every other form of obscurantism. The principle of compulsion is now acknowledged not only by ourselves, but also by some of our colonies. Shall we ever return to the voluntary principle? The terms of peace will naturally influence our decisions, but a generation which has made such sacrifices for the security of its successors will surely see to it that the burden which they have so nobly borne is not going to be lightly cast off by their progeny. Our final step should be a strong National Committee of inquiry to decide the basic principles on which our future Army is to be constructed, administered, controlled and maintained.

Always bearing in mind that it was the Consumer's Council, a body of twenty persons, the chosen mouthpieces of the greater representatives of the People, which formed such a valuable auxiliary to the Food Controller in his gigantic national undertaking, and which removed barriers which had made the work of the corresponding officials in Germany and Austria absolutely impossible.

In order to bring the Army into the closest possible touch with the nation, and particularly with Labour, which has provided the bulk of the rank and file, we shall be wise to call to our aid an Advisory Council on which what are known as the working classes will be liberally represented.

In war time the nation is the producer, the Army the consumer. Hitherto we have been content to hear only one side, the consumer's side, of the great army problem. We are now learning that there is another voice that the modern Army reformer will be wise to listen to before he formulates his schemes for the reconstruction of our military system. We must not rest content with ideals, but must be prepared to work with tenacity and self-sacrifice for their realisation.

A new Army is come to birth. Are we going to confess that there is not strength to bring forth?



APPENDIX I

Extract from the Report of a "Committee on the demobilisation of Army Horses," in 1917.

THE Boarding Scheme referred to is one which was prepared, drawn up, and carried into effect by Colonel Mulliner, the Colonel of the Warwickshire Howitzer Brigade in the South Midland Division, T.F.

(b) BOARDING OUT SCHEME.

19. In considering schemes of this nature the Committee have assumed that at least 100,000 suitable and conditioned horses will be required on mobilisation, that the annual territorial training period after the war will be increased from 14 days to a full month and that at least 50,000 horses will be required annually for that purpose. They have also borne in mind the fact that the majority of the horses required will be light draught and also that horses of this type are likely to become less and less used owing to the increase in mechanical traction with its convenience and saving of labour.

20. In the scheme recommended by the Committee, details of which will be found in Appendix A, it is suggested that the War Office should retain on demobilisation 100,000 of the best surplus horses, the majority of which should be of light draught type, and that they should be hired out on easy terms, as far as possible to commercial firms and horse users generally in towns, though the Committee think that farmers in all suitable districts should also be encouraged to take horses under

the scheme, as the numbers to be absorbed are very large, and it is doubtful if they could all be placed out if

hirers are sought only in towns.

21. The Committee consider that the scheme recommended by them in Appendix A is a practical and economical one. They are aware, however, from the evidence of representatives of cartage and contractors' associations in London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham, that the scheme is likely to meet with opposition from jobmasters with whose trade it may interfere. It was argued by witnesses that if the jobmasters' trade is killed the number of light draught horses kept will be reduced, and that the hiring out of horses by the Army on easy terms would be an interference with legitimate trade, and might enable men without capital to undercut firms of standing who had invested thousands of pounds in their business. The Committee realise the force of these objections, but in their opinion the jobmasters' trade is likely to be killed in any case by motor traction, and the only possible way of encouraging a continuance of the use of horses is for the Government to provide cheap horse power as is proposed under the scheme. The second objection would probably be met by a wise discretion in the selection of hirers and, if the necessity arose, by the insertion in the hiring agreement of a clause limiting the issue of Government horses to half the total number of a hirer's stud.

22. The consensus of evidence shows that the working life of a trade horse is limited to five years, and, therefore. in financing this scheme 20 per cent. replacements must be provided for annually. On the other hand, the Committee believe that a considerable annual hiring charge will be accepted, but in view of the importance of making the terms as easy as possible so as to attract custodians. the Committee do not feel justified in recommending a higher charge than £7 10s, yearly, to include veterinary

attendance and medicine.

23. The Committee realise that there must be considerable machinery for giving effect to this scheme. It is not feasible to buy a horse to-day and issue it to-morrow, and the Committee estimate that one-quarter of the annual replacement will be in military hands throughout the year at a cost of £40 per horse.

24. Financially the scheme works out in round

figures as follows:-

| Purchase of 20,000 horses yearly to replace casualties, at £00=1,200,000 Expenses of rail, &c., of 20,000 horses at £2= 40,000 Cost of veterinary attendant for 20,000 horses at £1 2= 240,000 Cost of keep of 5,000 horses in deports at £40 = 200,000 Interest at £90 = 200,000 Interest at \$5% per annum on £3,000,000; that is, capital value of 100,000 fr,690,000 fr,690,000 £2 £ £ Payments bycustodians of 100,000 horses at £1 100,000 horses at £7 105, per 20,000 horses at £100,000 Training grant for 50,000 horses hired for 33 days at 75. 6d. a day = 618,750 Annual pre-war expenditure on subsidies and registration fees= 47,500 £5,000 horses at £30 each= 150,000 £1,656,230 | Debit. | Credit. | |
|---|---|---|-----------|
| Interest at 5% tion fees 47,500 per annum on 53,000,000; that is, capital value of 100,000 horses at £30 each 150,000 | Purchase of 20,000 horses yearly to re- place casual- ties, at £60=1,200,000 Expenses of rail, &c., of 20,000 horses at £2= 40,000 Cost of veteri- nary attend- ance on 100,000 horses at £1 per an- num Cost of keep of 5,000 horses in | Payments bycus- todians of roo,ooohorses at £7 105. per annum | |
| £1,656,230 | Interest at 5% per annum on £3.00,000: that is, capital value of too,ooo borses | tion fees • 47,500 | |
| | £1,690,000 | | 1,656,250 |

Annual Deficit = £33,750.

25. Thus, for an extra expenditure of £33,750 the State owns and provides annually 50,000 suitable horses for the training of its Territorial Army and ensures 100,000 horses for mobilisation without any further capital cost and with a minimum of inconvenience to the public. Looking at it in another way the actual annual payments under this scheme are £1,540,000 and the actual receipts £990,000, that is an expenditure of £550,000.

26. With regard to the items on the Debit side of the above statement the Committee wish to point out that in their opinion the price of suitable horses after the war will remain high, and that £60 is a reasonable sum to pay for a horse at five years old if breeders are to be encouraged to produce the class of horse required by the Army. The annual cost of keep, which is put at £40, may seem high, but as the price of oats, etc., is likely to remain above pre-war level for some years the estimate is none too liberal.

As to the Credit side the pre-war grant for the provision of 50,000 horses for Territorial training was £250,000 for 14 days, the hire of a horse per day being reckoned at 6s. 8d. It does not appear to the Committee that it will be possible to hire after the war at a lower charge than 7s. 6d. per day and it has been assumed that, in future, training will be for a full month. It is probable that the casting value of horses will average more than £12 for those actually sold, but allowance has been made for the horses that die and for which only carcase value could be obtained.

27. If there were no Boarding Out Scheme the State would have to pay annually £618,750 in hiring probably less suitable horses to equip the Territorial Army for training, and would have in hand £150,000 for the purpose, being the interest on the price of the horses sold, but it would have to pay at least £6,000,000 for the purchase of 100,000 horses on

mobilisation.

28. The Committee considered an alternative scheme put forward by the London Cartage Contractors' Association. Briefly, the Association recommend the sale of 100,000 horses on demobilisation instead of the boarding out of them, payment to purchasers of a subsidy of £10 per annum to secure the use of one-third of them annually for a month, and a payment of 6s. 8d. a day per horse for the period during which the horses are called up. Set forth on similar

lines to the financial statement of the Boarding Out Scheme the net cost appears to be considerably larger:—

| Dobit. | Credit. |
|--|---------|
| 100,000 horses at £10 sub- sidy per annum=1,000,000 | |
| 33,334 horses for 33 days' training at 6s. 8d | |
| training at 7:. 6d. a day = 206,24: £1,572,913 | • • |

Annual Deficit = £606,665.

29. This scheme appears defective because under it only 33,334 horses would be provided annually by the purchasers of the 100,000 horses; the War Office would thus have to hire 16,666 horses annually, and further they must purchase 100,000 on mobilisation. There would probably be considerable difficulty in hiring the necessary horses, and the hiring charge would not be less than 7s. 6d. a day. It will be noted that the Association estimate that the 100,000 horses would average £60 each at sale—a price which, in the opinion of the Committee, is far too optimistic having regard to the large number of horses that would be for sale.

30. Reviewing the position there appear to be three

alternative schemes:-

1. Boarding Out Scheme.

If the Boarding Out Scheme recommended by the Committee is adopted the State will pay annually £1,540,000 and receive £990,000, an annual deficit of £550,000. For this expenditure, however, the State has in its possession 100,000 trained horses, which are suitable and immediately available for mobilisation without further capital charge on public funds, and half this number is available annually for training purposes. The greatest importance also must be attached to the

fact that the Scheme will provide a market for horses bred for Army purposes.

2. Subsidy Scheme.

If the Scheme submitted by the London Cartage Contractors' Association is adopted the State will pay annually £1,572,915 and will receive £300,000 if it is found possible to sell at the end of the War 100,000 horses at an average of £60 each. The annual deficit under this scheme is, therefore, £1,272,915, and under it the horses required for mobilisation would entail an immediate expenditure of at least £6,000,000.

3. Pre-war Scheme.

If neither the Boarding Out nor Subsidy Scheme is adopted the State would presumably follow the pre-war procedure. This would entail an annual expenditure of £618,750 for hiring horses for training and of not less than £47,500 for subsidies. Towards this expenditure there would be available the annual interest (£150,000) on the value of horses sold (estimated by the Committee at £3,000,000). In this scheme, as in the Subsidy Scheme, a very large capital expenditure would be necessary to secure horses for mobilisation.

31. Of these three alternatives the Committee have no hesitation in recommending the Boarding Out Scheme, as being the soundest proposition, the best means of providing good horses for territorial training, and the only satisfactory means the Committee can devise for keeping light draught horses on the road and for providing that market without which breeders cannot be expected to produce the class of horse required by the Army. For the attainment of the objects in view the expenditure to be incurred is comparatively small.

The actual annual expenditure under this scheme is less than that of the subsidy scheme by £722,915, and although it exceeds by £33,750 the expenditure under the pre-war scheme, it provides on mobilisation 100,000

horses without any charge on public funds, whereas the provision of such horses under the other two schemes would involve an expenditure of at least \$6,000,000.

32. In view of the novelty and extent of the proposed Boarding Out Scheme, and also of the fact that its success entirely depends on the method of its execution, the Committee recommend that before it be launched on the public, preliminary measures with regard to the formation of a working plan be undertaken; such measures to be placed in the hands of a selected Committee, the members of which shall be chosen for their special knowledge of and aptitude in dealing with those problems on the correct solution of which depends the success of the undertaking.

33. To promote the success of the Scheme the Committee wish to emphasise the desirability of enlisting the co-operation, so far as is possible, of all Government Departments and Public Bodies, who might well assist the War Office and the Board in securing the objects in view, namely, the use in civil life of the class of horse which is essential to the needs of the Army for its

artillery.

APPENDIX A

SCHEME FOR BOARDING OUT ARMY HORSES AND MULES ON DEMOBILISATION

In reference to the surplus of Army Horses and Mules which will remain on Demobilisation, it is proposed to board out a selection of these with responsible persons and firms throughout the Country. With this object in view it is necessary to arrange for homes to be in readiness to which they can be sent as soon as possible after Peace is declared.

As regards the quality of the horses or mules which will be issued, only good and sound animals would be of use for Army requirements, and previous to being dispatched the horses and mules will be examined and certified by Army Veterinary Officers as being free from disease, the Military Authorities not accepting any further responsibility under this heading.

Always provided that the horses and mules are reasonably taken care of, the terms upon which they will be loaned

out may be summarised as follows :-

 Free delivery will be made to the Railway Station specified by the Borrower, to whom not less than 14 days' notice of dispatch will be given by the Military Authorities.

(2) The Borrower will have the free use of the animals for all the usual requirements of his business, as

indicated in the "Conditions."

(3) If an animal is unsuitable for the Borrower's requirements, or becomes unfit, it will be replaced without charge if the Military Authorities agree.

(4) The animals are to be given up for military require-

ments:-

(a) Temporarily for 33 days in every alternate year—the Borrower being thus enabled to retain half the number for his requirements during the period.

(b) Permanently in the event of General Mobilisa-

tion

(5) The Borrower to pay annually a sum of £7 ros. for the use of each animal. All veterinary expenses and medicine will be provided free of charge by the Military Authorities.

CONDITIONS.

In the following, the term "Military Authorities" shall mean any Officer duly appointed for the time being.

The term "Borrower" shall mean the person or firm

to whom the horse or mule is entrusted.

The word "Mule" is to be substituted for the word "Horse" when the agreement is for the former animal.

(1) While the horse is in the possession of the Borrower

the Borrower shall:—

(a) At his own expense properly stable, care for, feed and keep it suitably shod. (b) Have the use of it for all reasonable work, but not for carting unduly heavy loads, or purposes which would interfere with its usefulness for military requirements.

(c) Not, without the consent of the Military Authorities, allow it to be hogged (unless already so) or docked, nor let it on hire, nor allow it to be "turned away"

to grass.

(2) The Borrower shall afford reasonable facilities to representatives of the Military Authorities for regular inspection of the horse and for checking mileage, hours and loads.

(3) If the horse is injured, or becomes unsound, or rendered incapable of work, or unfit for military purposes:—

(a) The Borrower shall immediately notify the Veterinary Surgeon appointed by the Military Authorities.

(b) The Borrower shall (if required) continue to keep the horse at his expense, but not for a longer period than one month, the Military Authorities providing Veterinary Attendance (including medicine) during the period.

(c) If at the end of one month, the horse is still unfit, it shall be returned to the Military Authorities, who will replace it. Otherwise the Agreement shall be considered terminated and it shall rest with the Military Authorities to determine what proportion, if any, of the annual payment shall be refunded in

respect of the unexpired period.

(4) In the event of the horse proving or becoming unsuitable for doing work for which the Borrower is entitled to use it, the Borrower shall give the Military Authorities one month's notice in writing, and if within such period the Military Authorities shall not have substituted another horse to the reasonable satisfaction of the Borrower, the Borrower shall return the horse to the Military Authorities and the Agreement shall be considered terminated, and it shall rest with the Military Authorities to determine what proportion, if any, of the annual payment shall be refunded in respect of the unexpired period.

(5) If the horse dies while in the possession of the Borrower, and should the Military Authorities not replace it with another horse within one month, the Agreement

shall be considered terminated, and it shall rest with the Military Authorities to determine what proportion, if any, of the annual payment shall be refunded in respect of the unexpired period.

(6) The Military Authorities shall, if so desired by them,

have the exclusive use of the horse :-

(a) For any 33 continuous days in every alternate year.

Any Borrower taking more than one horse shall not be required to send in more than one-half of the total number in his charge in any one year, and shall send in the remaining horses the following year. The Military Authorities shall give the Borrower not less than 14 days' notice of the date on which they will require such horses, and the Borrower shall, if so desired, deliver the horses to the Military Authorities at any place appointed by them, provided that such place is not more than ten miles from the stables of the Borrower, the Military Authorities, at the expiration of the term, returning the horses either to the stables of the Borrower or to the appointed Railway Station.

(b) Upon Mobilisation the Borrower shall deliver the horse, within 24 hours of notification by the Military Authorities, to any place named by them, provided that it is not more than ten miles distant from the stables of the Borrower, and upon receipt of the horse, the Agreement shall be considered as terminated, and no compensation or refund of any unexpired portion of the annual payment will

be made by the Military Authorities.

(7) The Borrower shall pay annually in advance to such person as the Military Authorities may appoint, a sum of £7 10s. for the use of each horse. All Veterinary expenses and medicine will be provided free of charge by the Military

Authorities.

(8) If the Borrower becomes bankrupt, or a Receiving Order be made against him, or any execution of distress be levied on his goods, or if in the opinion of the Military Authorities it is undesirable that the horse should continue to remain in his possession, the Military Authorities have the right forthwith to terminate the Agreement and resume possession of the horse without notice or payment of

compensation, or the return of any unexpired portion of the

annual payment.

(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Conditions, the Borrower shall not be relieved of responsibilities in the event of improper treatment of the horse, or culpable

negligence on his part.

(10) Subject to determination as provided in the foregoing clauses the Borrower shall keep the horse, or any horse which may be substituted therefor, for the period of one year from the date when the first horse was received by the Borrower, and at the expiration of that period shall continue to keep the horse, subject to three months' Notice in writing of his intention to terminate the Agreement.

APPENDIX II

As the reorganisation of our Artillery is in contemplation, a brief review of the existing situation as presented to one who has served for over forty years

with the "Gunners," is perhaps permissible.

In pre-war days the Royal Regiment of Artillery may be said to have been represented by a middle piece with two detached ends. The R.F.A. was the centre-piece and had one semi-detached branch represented by the R.H.A., and an entirely separate one represented by the R.G.A. The latter included the Mountain Artillery and a certain number of mobile heavy batteries. If we can cut off the extreme ends and strengthen the middle piece we shall have gone some way towards solving the problem of reconstruction.

We may commence with three postulates—

That we shall in future adopt a simple and uniform system of promotion throughout our Army, i.e. a single list with promotion up to and including, Lieut.-Colonelafter a fixed period, such as exists in the Indian Army and in the Royal Engineers.

That the immobile portion of our Artillery, i.e.
the heavy position guns in our Defence Works
connected with Coast Defence at home and
coaling stations abroad, will be handed over to

the Royal Navy.

3. That the number of R.H.A. batteries will be reduced to meet the bare requirements of the Cavalry, and that the officers of this branch will be permanently posted on joining; so

that the organisation of the larger and more important portion of our Regiment may not be deranged in order to meet the requirements of a small but influential minority.

To deal with these points in the order given :-

I. The justice of and advantages accruing from a uniform system of promotion throughout our Army have already been pointed out. Under such a system permanent grouping of our Artillery to suit our Brigade, Divisional, Corps and Army needs could be made; advancement taking place in each group. Any great anomalies arising from the system being rectified by occasional transfers to equalise matters. For instance, in the Indian Army, these groups consist of Battalions and Regiments, and although there may occasionally be an excess of Captains, Majors and Lieut.-Colonels in a particular unit, this can easily be rectified by the simple process of transfer in order to equalise numbers.

Unless the Corps formation is going to receive more support in the future than it has in the past it seems probable that it will only exist as a war creation, the Division remaining the highest fighting unit. The Mixed Brigade as a divisible portion of the Division is also worth consideration as an all-arm independent formation. Besides our Artillery allotted to Division and Corps we shall require some for Army purposes and shall have also to consider Trench Mortars. Anti-aircraft Guns, Tanks and Anti-

tank Guns.

2. We have no land fortresses in the Continental sense of the term. The defence of our important seaports is closely interwoven with Naval tactics and methods of defence. The fact that the minefields are under one branch of the Service, and the guns which defend them under another violates the principle of complete unity of command. The attack on the Dardanelles Forts proved how successfully a skilful gun defence can protect a minefield

against sweeping operations.

The heaviest nature of guns form no part of the equipment of a Field Army, and even if the Navy do not take them over this portion of the R.G.A., which must be largely local, can never be anything but the detached branch of the Artillery. It may not be generally known that the personnel of our heaviest nature of howitzer with the B.E.F. was up till the end of the War provided by the Royal Navy. It seems more logical to confine Naval effort to its proper sphere of action on land, viz. Coast Defence.

There are, however, two portions of the R.G.A which should be transferred to the R.F.A.

(a) All the Mobile Heavy Batteries, whether mechanically or horse-drawn.

(b) The Mountain Artillery.

3. The splendid traditions and esprit de corps which have always characterised the R.H.A. makes us loath to have recourse to any measures in which there may be even a suggestion of its reduction. On the other hand, the uncertain future of the Cavalry and the sacrifice of gunpower that mobility demands of a weapon to successfully serve that arm calls for a certain amount of forethought before arriving at a decision with regard to the future of the R.H.A.

As long as the Cavalry require a special gun in which gun-power is sacrificed to mobility, and which gives neither a range nor a destructive effect at the end of it equal to that of the shell of the R.F.A. field gun, the chief sphere

of usefulness of the R.H.A. will be limited to their support of that arm, and their services will not be in great demand except in emergencies. During two long campaigns we have witnessed the enforced inaction of some of our best officers due to the above causes. Also the expenses and time-robbing transfers connected with the appointment and re-appointment of officers of this popular branch. Although the R.H.A. officer has imbibed much of that fine Cavalry spirit which permeates the arm, we cannot resist the conviction that he has by the same spirit exercised an influence in the affairs of our Regiment much beyond what is warranted either by his numbers or his professional attainments.

Another suggestion has been made. It is that the Cavalry should provide their own gunsupport, which might take the form of machineguns and pom-poms, and that the R.H.A., armed with the ordinary R.F.A. gun, should become the Artillery of the Guard providing the Field Artillery for the Guards' Division on mobilisation. In this manner this fine corp d'elite would be preserved and the granting of this honour would be a well-merited reward for their past services.

The proposal therefore is to unite the R.F.A. mobile Heavy Batteries and Mountain Artillery into one Regiment with a Divisional Corp and Army organisation, leaving the details of the composition of the necessary groups for these formations a matter for those who have to undertake the construction of our New Army.

THE END



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